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ABSTRACT 
A heterogeneous research partnership (HRP) is one in which industry, 
academia and government collaborate to conduct research, typically of 
national importance.  Whilst most HRPs complete their planned duration and 
deliver their agreed tasks, it is not uncommon for participants to be left 
feeling somewhat dissatisfied, suggesting that the requirements which are 
being met are incomplete.  There is an opportunity to improve the success of 
HRPs by establishing principles and practices for the application of systems 
engineering in their development. 
The thesis reviews literature drawn from a broad body of work covering three 
main areas: the context of HRPs themselves, systems engineering and 
related disciplines, and research methodology.  The research adopts an 
interpretive approach, initially applying Soft Systems Methodology in a pilot 
case study and subsequently conducting a qualitative analysis of sixteen 
HRP case studies in order to develop and refine generic models which are 
relevant to HRPs.  Drawing from the commentary of interviewees, published 
sources and other evidence, major themes across the case studies are 
integrated in order to develop ten principles and ten practices for the 
application of systems engineering to HRPs. 
The importance of consistency between the research context, systems 
approach and research methodology is emphasised, and the thesis highlights 
a significant philosophical challenge facing system of systems research as 
the discipline seeks to use a range of hard and soft systems approaches 
which are fundamentally rooted in different paradigms. 
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GLOSSARY 
Although primarily a list of acronyms used, the glossary also contains a 
number of terms which are used within this document to have specific 
meanings.  Such terms are presented „thus‟ below. 
Acronym or Term Definition 
CATWOE Customers, Actors, Transformation, Weltanschauung, 
Owners, Environment 
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics 
CiK Contribution in Kind 
CM Conceptual Model 
CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration® 
„Context‟ HRPs are the context for this research 
CSER Conference on Systems Engineering Research 
CSP Critical Systems Practice 
„Customer‟ Within the case studies, the primary funding body 
D&D Design and Development 
DIS Defence Industrial Strategy 
„Discipline‟ Field of study such as systems engineering, physics, art 
etc. 
DoD Department of Defense 
„Domain‟ Area of application such as defence or aerospace 
Dstl Defence Science and Technology Laboratories 
DTI Department of Trade & Industry 
DTS Defence Technology Strategy 
EIA Electronic Industries Alliance 
EngD Engineering Doctorate 
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Acronym or Term Definition 
„Environment‟ The situation in industry academia and government 
within which HRPs are created 
EPSRC Engineering & Physical Sciences Research Council 
HRP Heterogeneous Research Partnership 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
IRA Irish Republican Army 
ISO International Standards Organisation 
IT Information Technology 
„Lifecycle‟ The progression of an HRP from creation to 
termination, whether natural or „engineered‟ 
KM Knowledge Management 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OR Operations Research 
„Sector‟ Industry, Academia or Government 
HRP Heterogeneous Research Partnership 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
MoD Ministry of Defence   
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
PhD Doctor of Philosophy 
QAA Quality Assurance Authority 
QFD Quality Function Deployment 
QR Quality Related 
R&D Research and Development 
RAE Research Assessment Exercise 
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Acronym or Term Definition 
RD Root Definition 
SE Systems Engineering 
SEDC Systems Engineering Doctorate Centre 
SG Steering Group 
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
SoS System of Systems 
SOSM System of Systems Methodologies 
SRL System Readiness Level 
SSE System of Systems Engineering 
SSM Soft Systems Methodology 
SyE Systems Engineering 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
TSB Technology Strategy Board 
UAS Unmanned Air System 
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1 RESEARCH NEED: POSITIONING THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
The title “Principles and Practices for the Application of Systems Engineering 
to Heterogeneous Research Partnerships” will, it is hoped, raise a number of 
questions in the reader‟s mind.  Academic researchers and students may be 
interested in the contribution to systems engineering research, whilst those 
from industry or government may wonder whether the research will add any 
value in practice.  Both are likely to ponder what „heterogeneous research 
partnerships‟ actually are.  Were the title to apply to a PhD thesis or company 
report, then to satisfy one or other interest would be adequate.  For an 
Engineering Doctorate, however, both groups of readers should be satisfied.  
By the end of Chapter Ten, it is hoped that this will be the case - and that the 
reader will have also become very familiar with the operation of 
heterogeneous research partnerships. 
This thesis represents a journey through the largely uncharted territory of 
systems engineering research.  There are no maps or well-trodden paths to 
follow and each pioneer of systems engineering research must be willing to 
explore, to take wrong turns and to find their own way. The journey starts 
here in Chapter One, where the systems challenge to be addressed is 
positioned in the context of broader systems problems: specifically, within the 
class of problems associated with the extension of systems engineering into 
the domain of Systems of Systems. 
1.2 Systems of Systems  
1.2.1 Generic Systems of Systems Challenges 
„System of Systems‟ (SoS) is a term given to large, complex systems where 
the component subsystems can operate as independent systems in their own 
right (or indeed as part of other SoS), such that the interdependence and 
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interconnectivity of component parts is not easily understood or engineered.  
Maier‟s definition notes that the component systems possess two additional 
properties which distinguish them from the components of a mere system: 
the operational and managerial independence of the components (Maier 
1998).  Four different types of SoS are identified: Virtual, Collaborative, 
Acknowledged and Directed (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Systems and Software Engineering 
2008). 
According to the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) 
(Fossnes, Forsberg et al. 2007), the development of a SoS is influenced by 
the following characteristic challenges: 
 System elements operate independently 
 System elements have different life cycles 
 The initial requirements are likely to be ambiguous 
 Complexity is a major issue 
 Management can overshadow engineering 
 Fuzzy boundaries cause confusion 
 SoS engineering is never finished. 
Some of these challenges relate to aspects of project management and the 
coordination of independent projects aimed at delivering different parts of the 
system of systems at different times.  Some relate to the sheer scale and 
duration of the undertaking and the fact that requirements may be unknown 
and/or change. Some relate to the technical difficulties associated with a very 
large scale undertaking.   
They do not, however, address a critical aspect of systems of systems, and 
that is the interaction of people.  In noting that system elements operate 
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independently, they imply some degree of free will for each element – and 
few system elements operate entirely without human intervention in some 
form.  However, they fail to recognise, at least explicitly, that this therefore 
implies some form of interoperation between humans.  A number of possible 
reasons might be cited for this.   
 INCOSE‟s focus is on systems engineering, and therefore although 
organisational structures and relationships may be engineered, it might be 
considered that engineering is an inappropriate process for human 
relationships. 
 Although systems engineering processes exist for a number of human 
factors aspects of system development, such as ergonomics and cognition, 
they focus on aspects of individual or group capability to undertake a 
particular task rather than the social aspects of interaction. 
 Although systems engineering can be considered a very broad discipline 
which stretches far beyond technical topics, the theories and techniques 
which address these social aspects sit within disciplines such as social and 
management sciences, and not in engineering. 
 Expertise in the discipline has yet to advance to the point where it can 
offer solutions to this form of complex human relationship in the context of a 
broader, technical system of systems. 
1.2.2 Current SoS Approaches: Drawbacks & Limitations 
By focusing on the technical and project management aspects of systems of 
systems, current approaches do not tackle the challenges associated with 
the social interaction between individuals from different backgrounds, often 
with conflicting aims or priorities, who are expected to cooperate in order to 
achieve the system of systems purpose.  Without this essential element, 
good management of deadlines and technical compatibility will still fail to 
deliver. 
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In practice, management methods may be used to alleviate the problem – 
perhaps by selecting operators with certain backgrounds, or providing 
additional cultural training.  Indeed, these may be essential elements of 
effective operation, but should therefore be developed as part of the system 
of systems itself, and not as operational „fixes‟.  There is a clear need for the 
enhancement of current methods for engineering systems of systems to 
ensure that their development encompasses the social factors inherent in 
their operation. 
1.3 Research Focus: Heterogeneous Research Partnerships 
In identifying a suitable area for study, the aim was to find a suitable set of 
data sources within a specific, limited context, which would be both valuable 
to the understanding of that context in its own right, but also relevant to the 
broader systems of systems challenge.  Thus the research should be able to 
offer solid principles, concepts and ideas for this limited context, but also 
potentially highlight where these may be applicable to broader SoS problems. 
In order to do this, it was first necessary to identify a relevant context in which 
greater understanding was sought.  The problem area chosen is that of 
Heterogeneous Research Partnerships (HRPs) operating within the defence 
environment.  These are arrangements by which individuals and 
organisations from industry, academia and government sectors work together 
in order to realise defence-related research.  These HRPs exhibit, to a 
greater or lesser extent, all of the characteristics of systems of systems 
identified above.   
For the purpose of this study, the HRPs are also chosen for: 
 Conducting research in systems engineering or a closely related field 
within the defence and/or aerospace domain 
 Involving, at a minimum, 2 groups from different organisations; but 
preferably multiple parties from each of the three sectors. 
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Using US Department of Defense terminology, HRPs would be considered to 
be Acknowledged Systems of Systems (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Systems and Software 
Engineering 2008).  However, unlike conventional SoS in the defence 
domain, HRPs do not tend to involve significant equipment assets.  In fact, 
their operation relies predominantly on the enterprises engaged within the 
HRP.  This emphasis facilitates a focus on the study of the social aspects of 
interaction, without becoming overwhelmed by technical complexity of 
equipment.  Although a single enterprise would not necessarily be 
considered a SoS since it would not typically meet Maier‟s criteria of 
operational and managerial independence (Martin, Davidz 2007), this 
shortfall is clearly not true for the partners within an HRP.  In effect, an HRP 
might also be called enterprise of enterprises.  The organization and 
management of such collaborative relationships, and in particular their 
organizational dynamics, are “under-researched” (Perkmann, Walsh 2007). 
1.4 The Broader Environment: Research for Defence 
1.4.1 Introduction 
The conduct of pure and applied research is critical to the sustainment of 
defence capability, not only in the creation of new technologies, but also in 
the development of processes by which those technologies can be brought 
into service.  Prior to 2001, the majority of defence research was undertaken 
within the Ministry of Defence itself, typically within the part of the 
organisation which is now split into the Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratories (Dstl) and Qinetiq.  However, following the part-privatisation of 
Qinetiq there has been an increasing trend towards placing defence research 
with other providers, and competing work in order to seek best value for the 
taxpayer. In keeping with broader government policies, the MoD does not 
fund „basic‟ research (Research and Development Handbook. 2007), but 
accesses a broad range of research capabilities in both academia and 
industry (Defence Equipment & Support 2008), and supports programmes of 
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academic research which may be pulled through into industry for use on 
defence equipment programmes.  Relationships and interfaces within the 
MoD itself and between the MoD and industry are recognised as key to long 
term partnering and to ensuring that new technologies are exploited in 
defence solutions (BLUEPRINT: The Future Operating Model. 2008). 
Through Dstl, it actively seeks scientific and technological collaboration with 
industry, academia and government bodies in the UK and overseas (Dstl: For 
when it really matters. 2006).  However, the complexity of how the MoD 
seeks to manage these relationships is illustrated by their own R&D 
Handbook which goes to enormous effort to detail roles and responsibilities 
but remains in draft form almost four years after initial publication (Research 
and Development Handbook. 2007). 
However, in this more open environment it is recognised that “although MoD 
clearly expresses intentions, requirements and objectives for research 
spending, the response of the supplier network in terms of what they bid and 
deliver is modified by MoD commercial practices (e.g. competition) and their 
own set of values and objectives, weighted by the value of the „MoD £‟ in 
combination with other research income streams.  In some cases, satisfying 
MoD‟s needs will not be the dominant driver of supplier 
behaviours”(Oxenham 2010).  
The 2003 Lambert Review of business-university collaboration “highlighted 
the importance of encouraging closer links between industry and the 
research base”(HM Treasury, DTI 2006), and this was reinforced in 2006 in 
the MoD‟s Defence Technology Strategy (Ministry of Defence 2006).  
However, in conducting collaborative research programmes industry, 
academia and government face a number of challenges (Brown 2007a): 
system of systems context and the change of pace; identification and 
communication of critical research areas; management approaches at all 
levels; funding; scarcity of qualified resources and security considerations.  
Each of these is now described in more detail in order to highlight the scope 
of the challenges faced.  
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1.4.2 SoS context and the change of pace.  
The environment in which the challenge of multi-enterprise research 
management exists is, in itself, a complex system.  From an international 
defence perspective, the relative certainties of the Cold War are little more 
than a distant memory, rekindled only when seeking to solve today‟s 
asymmetric warfare challenges with equipment designed for that bygone era.  
Although in the UK the threat of terrorism is not new, the nature of the threat 
is quite different to that of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
predominantly in the 1970s & 80s.  With notable exceptions, the IRA threat 
was an armed struggle against the police and military – a conflict seated in 
political decisions of the 16th century, but with a clear aim that could be 
addressed through modern political process.  Not so the global asymmetric 
warfare of the 21st century - apparently driven by idealism, far from 
susceptible to national or international political processes; and constantly 
evolving at a rapid pace. 
Against this international backdrop, the UK retains its ambitions as a world 
military power in a way which is increasingly in conflict with the views of both 
the Treasury and the voting public.  Investment in hospitals and schools wins 
votes.  The „War on Terror‟ and expensive new military materiel do not.  The 
MoD and its contractors are called to account on cost overruns for complex 
development programmes which span years and even decades:  the 
requirement is to do more for less, at the forefront of technology and without 
the significant technical and programmatic risks becoming reality.  Thus all 
military projects are required to be delivered „on time and to cost‟, whilst 
being able to deal with threats that were not envisaged at the time the 
programme was conceived and the contract let.  After years of squeezing 
more into less, the politically sensitive need to take very difficult decisions in 
order to create a realistic and affordable equipment programme was 
inevitable (House of Commons Defence Committee 2008). 
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In this environment, research - which by its very nature may actually „prove‟ 
that an idea doesn‟t work rather than the converse - provides an even greater 
challenge.  The added complication of doing research to meet some future 
requirement which has yet to be fully defined, and developing technologies 
for which the ultimate commercial viability is also indeterminate can place this 
research in direct conflict with the demands of its environment.  Rapid 
technology change and the world-wide-web give potential aggressors access 
to a range of new technologies at a pace not experienced before, and in stark 
contrast to traditional 10-20 year procurement cycles for major defence 
equipment.  The need for agility in defence procurement has become very 
real and new, flexible approaches to technology planning are required which 
reflect an understanding - not of what the future will be - but of what it will be 
„like‟ (Pang 2006).  
Since the end of the cold war, the western defence industry has been driven 
by “industry-led cooperation under the pressure of globalisation toward trans-
national industrial consolidation”.  At the same time, Governments on both 
sides of the Atlantic have failed to match this trend, remaining "behind the 
curve" in failing to remove bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles (Schmitt 
2002).  At the November 2002 European Security Forum in Brussels, the 
chairman Klaus Becher noted that “The overwhelming size of the US defence 
market and the fragmentation of markets in Europe add aggravating 
structural dimensions to the difficult business prospects in this sector after 
years of shrinking or stagnating defence spending in Europe that increasingly 
leaves European players without the necessary critical mass...”, and that “… 
properly coordinated and strategically targeted R & D programmes would be 
important to halt the demise of European defence industries” (Becher 2002).  
Nevertheless, almost a decade on, the challenges remain.  UK defence 
industry has become characterised by shrinking budgets for both R&D and 
equipment programmes, and by trans-European and transatlantic 
collaboration, mergers and acquisitions in an attempt to maintain a 
sustainable business, avoid the feast-and-famine associated with large 
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contracts and extended procurement cycles, and provide an acceptable 
return for the notorious short-termism of the financial markets. 
The academic environment also faces change.  The number of UK students 
studying Physics at “A” level, for example, has halved in the past 20 years 
(Science and Technology Committee 2006).  Science, technology and 
engineering are “unattractive” to the current generation of students, resulting 
in the closure of a string of UK university departments in recent years, 
notably in the physical sciences.   The teaching facilities required for these 
subjects are typically more expensive than those for the humanities and 
social sciences, although a variable course fee structure compensates 
universities for some of those costs.  With the introduction of tuition fees paid 
by the students themselves, advanced technical courses lasting 4 years or 
more are now not only „unattractive‟, but also more expensive to study, 
leading to rising levels of student debt.  The UK trend is, however, 
compensated by the large and growing body of overseas students who pay 
higher fees and act as a lucrative source of income for universities under 
financial pressure.   Collaborations between western universities, particularly 
in the US and UK, and pre-eminent institutions in India and the Far East are 
becoming more popular, further reinforcing the globalisation of the academic 
system, and often with Government support (HM Treasury, DTI 2006). 
Whilst UK government has struggled to take an integrated approach to 
science and innovation, some countries such as Finland “... are increasingly 
considering science and innovation as an „ecosystem‟, and are developing 
holistic strategies to drive forward a commercialisation agenda”(HM 
Treasury, DTI 2006). 
1.4.3 Identification and communication of critical research needs 
The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) (Secretary of State for Defence 2005) 
and Defence Technology Strategy (DTS) (Ministry of Defence 2006), 
published by the UK Government, go some way to identify the technology 
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areas of national importance but, unsurprisingly for unclassified documents, 
suggest the technology areas rather than the critical technologies per se.  
The generic question is “How to identify which research is critical to the 
delivery of a particular capability in perhaps 20 years time?” given only a 
vague concept of that capability today and many different ways in which it 
might be achieved.  The identification of exploitable research paths relies on 
the successful integration of scientific expertise – whether in industry, 
academia or government – with industrial expertise to identify both those 
technologies which are, in themselves, exploitable and secondary 
technologies which may be necessary for exploitation.  For companies who 
integrate large, complex systems, the balance between developing 
technology internally, buying it in and partnering with others is paramount 
when developing technical capability and requires “a bird‟s eye view of what‟s 
on offer from supplier companies and institutions around the world”(Jenkins 
2007). 
Government control of some of the critical technology areas has changed 
significantly in the past 20 years, with the value of commercial research, 
particularly in the IT sector, far outstripping government-funded work.  The 
smaller scale and lower profitability of government & military markets is such 
that technology advances in this area will inevitably be made in the civil 
sector, removing Governmental influence on both the identification and 
exploitation of such critical technologies.  The challenge then becomes one 
of adopting or adapting such technologies for government and defence use, 
and dealing with the significant security issues which commercial IT products 
bring. 
Communication of identified research needs provides another challenge.  
Research areas will typically have their own “language” with which to express 
technical concepts.  However, these do not always readily translate between 
technical domains, or between the government customer and industrial & 
academic research providers.  At the System of Systems level, the range of 
research required to develop a future capability is likely to cross a number of 
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technical domains.  Achieving complementary research results will provide 
both a temporal and physical integration challenge, and the lack of common 
concepts and terminology can make a difficult task virtually impossible. This 
is further complicated by the fact that the UK funding system has “traditionally 
channelled research along specific disciplinary „silos‟” in a way which “may 
unintentionally give preference to work in established fields” without 
reference back to industry or government needs (HM Treasury, DTI 2006).  
In the light of this, technology roadmapping is seen as an important tool 
which should “improve the common understanding of all MoD and industry 
stakeholders”, by providing the “ability to share an overarching view of the 
project or problem, quickly & accurately”(Ministry of Defence 2006), although 
this does not address the further step of translating that view into academic 
terms. 
1.4.4 Management approaches at all levels 
Research – as with any innovative endeavour – is not an activity which lends 
itself particularly well to the rigours of management.  That is not to say that 
work cannot be planned and objectives set, but that the outcomes cannot be 
predicted.  To a product developer, a negative outcome to critical research 
can spell the end of a programme, and yet it is a risk that cannot readily be 
managed. 
Increasingly, defence-related research of national importance is undertaken 
by a consortium of industry and academia. Such consortia may either be ad 
hoc – formed to address a particular technology need and funding 
opportunity – or enduring, such as relationships between major companies 
and selected academic institutions.  Often these programmes can have 
multiple funding sources, involving “Contribution in Kind (CiK) ” (e.g. 
manpower, research facilities, modelling capabilities) from the companies 
involved.  Even the smallest of these companies may well be involved in 
several different consortia, conducting related research and providing CiK for 
a number of different contracts and “collaborative R&D partnerships among 
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asymmetric partners are becoming increasingly common”(Carney, Strong et 
al. 2007).  The effective management of intellectual property rights and 
contractual obligations across this complex web is a challenge for all involved 
and formal partnership agreements are sometimes needed. “These 
partnerships must be meaningful, tough and contractually binding”(Lord 
Drayson 2006).  
The drivers for partnership are mixed.  “Some of the most interesting 
scientific advances occur ... on the boundaries between publicly and privately 
funded R&D”(HM Treasury, DTI 2006), and certainly attempting to develop all 
the technologies needed by a company or even country “in-house” can be 
very inefficient (Stevens, Brook et al. 1998).  However, 40% of respondents 
in one survey felt that collaboration “made product development more costly, 
more complicated, less efficient, more time consuming and more difficult to 
control and manage”(Carney, Strong et al. 2007).  Another survey noted that 
over a quarter of companies reported their “least successful innovation 
activities” as being with universities, with three quarters feeling that 
academics did not understand business needs.  Nevertheless, collaboration 
“has a lot to offer, but a different approach is probably required to ensure that 
companies maximise their returns”(Confederation of British Industry 2005).  
This clearly reflects a conflict between the need for “invention, product 
innovation and technology” to be as close to production as possible, whilst 
gaining effective access to the “brilliant ideas” of university-based research 
scientists (Stevens, Brook et al. 1998). 
In this context, the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) by an 
organisation or individual appears to make sound business sense.  However, 
such protection can be in direct conflict with maximising exploitation – 
graphically illustrated by the success of open standards in computing and the 
entertainment industry.  In general however, the ownership and use of IPR is 
seen as a particular barrier to business-university collaboration (Santoro, 
Greenish 2006).  Universities wish to publish the results of their research as 
a measure of status and the means by which staff further their careers, but 
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industry would rather keep potentially profit-making results private.  
“Negotiating a position between these two objectives is extremely time 
consuming” (Santoro, Greenish 2006) and trust remains a key issue, without 
which “collaborations will not bring value and the painstaking work on 
clarifying agreements will be wasted”(Carney, Strong et al. 2007).    
The importance of exploitation is still a subject for debate.  Research for its 
own sake, simply adding to the knowledge base, may be acceptable from an 
academic perspective, but the same cannot be said of industry or 
government.  Yet both industry and government continue to suffer from the 
problem of taking research from their own research establishments and 
exploiting it on equipment programmes.  The inefficiency of this process is a 
key driver for change in management approaches.  The challenges are even 
greater where research is conducted in academia, further extending both the 
physical and intellectual distances that must be covered for exploitation to 
succeed.  A lengthy PhD thesis is not the most valuable tool to aid 
exploitation: computer-based modelling & simulation, graphical 
representations, presentations etc are all more likely to assist in a wider take-
up of the work.  However, a Powerpoint presentation is not a replacement for 
rigorous analysis and these exploitation aids will generally be in addition to, 
rather than to replace, the thesis.  This needs to be accounted for in both the 
planning and funding of the work. 
The ongoing assessment of the quality of an individual piece of research, and 
the way in which it is developing to aid subsequent exploitation, provides 
another management challenge.  Some academic researchers in particular 
resist “interference” and will expect to be left undisturbed for the duration of 
the research contract (perhaps up to 3 years), typically providing an annual 
report.  From an industrial perspective, finding out that research hit a problem 
and was redirected 12 months ago is not acceptable. Approaches which 
demand a monthly report, whilst partially successful, can sometimes be met 
with a rather superficial overview which still does not highlight technical 
difficulties.  Obtaining better information generally requires a significant 
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investment in time to develop a close working relationship between research 
manager and research provider, and the establishment of equality of power 
and influence in both interpersonal and group relationships.  Simply adopting 
good processes for dealing with stakeholders is no guarantee of the 
effectiveness of the relationship (Elias, Cavana et al. 2002).   
1.4.5 Funding  
Inevitably, in conducting research of national importance there will be the 
question of “who is going to pay?”  The fact that it is nationally-important 
research might suggest the taxpayer, but even this is not straightforward.  
Government research, funded by the taxpayer, comes in a number of 
different forms, and is handled through different departments or ministries 
and the UK Research Councils such as the Engineering & Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC).  European Union-funded programmes are 
funded by European taxpayers – some of them, of course, in the UK.  Each 
body is faced with funding requests which far outweigh the funds they have 
available and prioritisation is necessary.  Such prioritisation tends to follow 
topics which are felt to be important in each area, and these can shift 
between the different funding bodies.  Thus funding requests also travel 
between the funding bodies until funding is obtained, and long-term research 
may be funded by the taxpayer through a number of different bodies over 
time.  Each funding body has its own rules regarding which costs can 
legitimately be claimed, and so knowing how and where to obtain funds can 
be the factor which makes or breaks critical research.  Nevertheless, the 
scarcity of Research Council spending on industry-led research stands as 
another barrier to industry-university collaboration (Santoro, Greenish 2006), 
in spite of their stated aim to work closely with all these parties in order to 
“play a strategic role in fostering effective knowledge transfer” and drive 
innovation (Esler 2007). 
Non-project-specific research funding of UK universities is largely driven by 
the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) through “quality-related”(QR) 
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block grants.  Whilst research quality has risen significantly since the RAE 
was introduced (HM Treasury, DTI 2006), it has tended to drive behavioural 
patterns on publishing and staff recruitment, and involves a silo-driven peer 
review process which fails to appreciate interdisciplinary research.  Further, 
although it is supposed to encourage industrial relevance by rewarding 
“excellent user-focused research in the same way it rewards excellent 
curiosity-driven research ... it is not at all clear that this has occurred in 
practice”(HM Treasury, DTI 2006).  This is reflected in the fact that among 
the eighteen categories of „indicators of peer esteem and national and 
international recognition‟ taken into consideration in the 2008 RAE, only four 
relate to industry, the first of which appears twelfth on the list (Hughes, 
Madden et al. 2006).  Metrics used to assess the value of university 
knowledge transfer activities also “place insufficient emphasis on the value of 
these activities to business”(Confederation of British Industry 2005). Once 
again this is at odds with the Research Councils‟ intent to “engender a culture 
in the research base in which collaborations and exploitation are encouraged, 
valued and rewarded”(Esler 2007).  The fact that working with industry is 
potentially „less beneficial‟ to peer review and therefore academic funding 
makes universities reluctant to engage in industrial projects (Santoro, 
Greenish 2006) and inevitably offers a further challenge for collaboration. 
The Government might argue that industry, as the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the research, should bear at least part of the research costs (Anderson 
2006).  In a highly competitive environment, however, industry would argue 
that the risk associated with such investment is too great.  Not only is there 
risk associated with the research itself, but even successful research does 
not guarantee product sales and profitability.  At a time when friendly nations 
are seeking greater interoperability between their armed forces, a failure to 
obtain sales in the home market can completely destroy the potential market 
elsewhere in the world. Increased industry funding is therefore reliant on 
better government – industry cooperation and trust in this area, providing 
greater certainty of a return on the research investment.  This approach, 
together with the important support role of public expenditure and 
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procurement policy (Hughes 2006), is self-reinforcing: “ironically, guaranteed 
long-term funding by MoD is more likely to attract industry investment (and 
academia‟s commitment) for this very reason”(Carney, Strong et al. 2007).  
There is evidence that universities are better suited to long-term 
investigations of a more fundamental character than short-term 
developments (O'Reilly, Broers 2005), and that “the best industry-university 
collaborations tend to be based around long-term relationships rather than 
individual research contracts”(Santoro, Greenish 2006).  The role of 
government as an early adopter and procurer of new ideas and technologies 
is seen as critical to support such innovative partnerships: whilst no 
department fares particularly well in this, MoD is amongst those judged 
„better than average‟(Confederation of British Industry 2005). 
1.4.6 Scarcity of qualified resources 
By its very nature, research of national importance draws upon relatively 
scarce skills, at both scientific and engineering levels.  The scientific 
expertise at the forefront of such technologies is far from being a commodity 
and may only exist within a small handful of universities, and/or government 
and corporate research establishments – typically within a small team 
comprising a highly knowledgeable and experienced (and therefore “mature”) 
researcher, leading a group of more junior staff.  However, “university 
expertise is embodied in individuals and therefore is not stationary”(Santoro, 
Greenish 2006).  In spite of attempts to develop the junior staff, the 
retirement or departure for other reasons of the group leader can have 
disastrous results for the overall capability of the team, often leading to 
disbandment and the redistribution of the other staff.  Even in cases where 
this does not happen, the external perception that the loss of the leader has 
eliminated key skills can be enough to prevent future work from being placed 
with the team and thus guarantee the team‟s demise.  The most positive 
outcome might be the transfer of the remaining group of skilled individuals to 
another similarly skilled team, but this is not straightforward. Barriers to 
mobility vary between industry, academia and government, and also with the 
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age of those affected.  The geographical scatter of the teams and ultimately 
details such as pension arrangements can be deciding factors which prevent 
skilled individuals from moving. 
Whilst the scientific knowledge of critical technologies may well be led within 
academia or government laboratories, skills for their exploitation and 
engineering sit almost invariably in industry.  In addition to many problems 
similar to those in the scientific base, industry teams face an additional threat 
in the form of a lack of engineering contracts.  Whilst the scientific base can 
be sustained by the injection of sufficient funds to support scientific research, 
the industrial base cannot.  So, for example, improved aircraft sensor 
technologies might be developed in the laboratory but the expertise in sensor 
engineering comes only with their application on a new or modified aircraft – 
with many-fold increases in costs associated with development, 
manufacturing, test, training, maintenance and so on.  Thus the industrial 
capability cannot sensibly be sustained simply by funding – retaining 
engineering expertise also requires „something to engineer‟. 
MoD procurement staff are also under pressure: not from a lack of 
programmes to engineer, but from cost-cutting measures designed to redirect 
funding to front-line forces.  Such moves are in conflict with the need to 
maintain a highly-skilled workforce and can mean that even when staff are so 
busy they have insufficient time to attend training courses, their numbers are 
subject to further substantial reductions (House of Commons Defence 
Committee 2008). 
In identifying appropriate resources to conduct a piece of research, judging 
the qualification of the resources provides another challenge.  In industry, 
obtaining government contracts generally requires external certification of the 
quality management system to standards such as ISO 9001:2000.  
Academia, on the other hand, applies no such formal standards. Instead, 
government research funding levels are determined based on the outcome of 
the formal Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) which is held periodically to 
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establish the relative research quality of different universities conducting 
research in similar areas.  The assessment is based on a number of criteria 
including the numbers of doctoral students supervised and of papers 
published in peer-reviewed journals, per head of academic staff.  Whilst this 
provides an indication of technical quality it does not adequately address the 
issue of key interest to industry and government: effective exploitation.  From 
their viewpoint the ability, willingness and indeed success of academic staff 
in ensuring that their work is usefully applied is a key criterion.   Not all 
academic staff share this view, however – which may explain why it is largely 
missing from the current assessment approach.  There remains a question of 
“how the different incentive structures for academic researchers and industry 
staff can be aligned to produce mutually beneficial results” (Perkmann, Walsh 
2007). 
“On an individual level, scientists need to choose who to collaborate with and 
in what form, not have it imposed.  The diversity of participants is also 
important and arenas and systems for social interaction and networking are 
required”(Carney, Strong et al. 2007). 
1.4.7 Security considerations 
Fundamental to the national importance of the defence-related research are 
the interrelated issues of sovereignty and security, and this is “an occasional 
barrier to communication” within research partnerships (Carney, Strong et al. 
2007).  The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) and Defence Technology 
Strategy (DTS) effectively identify the technology areas where the UK 
wishes, for reasons of national security, to retain a national capability.  
Fundamentally, this means not being reliant on another nation for the supply 
and maintenance of key defence equipment at a time of conflict, independent 
of whether that nation is a coalition partner.  It also means that the UK can 
retain control of the supply of that technology through export regulation, 
preventing it from being sold to potential aggressors.  The export regulation 
of other nations, especially with regard to US export of technology to the UK, 
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remains an issue (Adams 2002) for which satisfactory resolution has yet to 
be demonstrated.   
Globalisation of both industry and academia further complicate the security 
picture.  None of the major defence industrial players have a footprint in only 
one country, and technology leakage within companies but across national 
boundaries remains a risk.  In academia, a large and growing proportion of 
doctoral students are not UK nationals, and this trend is reflected among 
many western nations including the USA.  Most students return home on 
completion of their studies, and the internet provides global access to the 
science and technology base.  Thus academic research in UK universities 
cannot, in most cases, be considered to be national resource, but rather a 
contribution to the international knowledge base. 
1.5 Generic HRP description 
1.5.1 Aims 
HRPs aim to draw upon the research management and delivery capabilities 
of industry, academia and government, coupled with funding sources in 
industry and government to deliver nationally-important research with the 
potential to be exploited commercially and for national benefit.  
HRPs are established to address the need for research outputs in complex 
disciplines and domains where no one organisation or sector has the need, 
the knowledge and the funding to deliver the solution.  Typically, knowledge 
of both the need and potential solutions is spread between many individuals 
and organisations; meanwhile funding may only be available to certain types 
of organisation.  Such pressures within the industry, academic and 
government sectors were reviewed in detail in Chapter 1.  Cooperation within 
and between the sectors is the only way to deliver the requirements within 
the constraints faced. 
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1.5.2 Characteristics 
Perceptions of HRPs at this stage are based on the author‟s own 
experiences of working in and with such partnerships over more than ten 
years.  It is this experience, coupled with that of systems engineering, which 
motivated the research. 
For the purpose of this research, HRPs involve: 
 At least two organisations from two different sectors, but typically many 
more 
o Government organisations may be within the MoD, industry-
related departments, research-funding bodies such as the 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB) or Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), or regional such as the 
Regional Development Agencies. 
o Industry typically involves large companies, their partners and 
competitors, as well as Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs). 
o Academia involves UK universities, typically with a strong 
research reputation and with good ratings in recent government 
assessments 
 A scale of research which requires the involvement of perhaps 10 to 100 
or more people on at least a part time basis, providing not only research 
outputs but also technical leadership, project management, commercial and 
administrative support. 
 A multi-year duration, typically 5 to 10 years with a minimum commitment 
of 2 years. 
These characteristics imply that those involved cannot operate as one small 
team of known composition, nor can the research requirements and the 
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relationship between them be explicitly detailed within a straightforward 
contract.  Complexity and uncertainty are implicit. 
1.5.3 Measures of Success 
Measures of success vary to some extent between HRPs.  Some measures 
will be public and explicit, typically declared on websites or in publications.  
Others will be internal to the HRP, or perhaps even just to one partner.  It is 
the author‟s view that, in general, HRPs may be judged to be „successful‟ by 
industry and government funding agencies when: 
 The research which is undertaken is judged by peer review or other 
comparison to be of national standard. 
 Research is delivered largely in line with the original expectation. 
 Viable routes to exploitation are identified. 
 The research community is stable and relationships are good. 
For HRPs to be judged „highly successful‟ by these bodies: 
 The research which is undertaken is judged by peer review to be of 
international standard. 
 Research is delivered in line with the original expectation, or evolves as 
needs evolve, so that the benefit is at least as great as was envisaged at the 
outset. 
 Exploitation of the research can be demonstrated. 
 The community engaged within the research cooperates to become self-
sustaining, identifying ongoing research directions and securing funding to 
pursue them. 
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1.5.4 Familiar Challenges 
In the author‟s experience, typical problems faced by HRPs include: 
 A sense of „acceptable‟ rather than exemplary outcomes 
 Research outputs which are not in a form which can be used by industry 
and government 
 Tension between the desire to protect intellectual property and the desire 
for academic publication 
 „Good‟ outcomes which are still not exploited 
 A sense that the same work could have been performed „in-house‟ by 
industry or government, more effectively and at lower cost.  
1.6 Conclusion  
HRPs are an attempt to deliver cost-effective, leading-edge research in a 
complex and changing environment.  They face a range of challenges and in 
order to be successful there is a need to work towards an agreed vision 
based on trust and confidentiality. “Partnership cannot be based on words.  It 
must be based on actions and a commitment to shared values”(Lord Drayson 
2006). 
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2 RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
Having identified the generic issues associated with SoS in Chapter 1, and 
outlined the characteristics of HRPs as one instantiation of SoS, Chapter 2 
now identifies the aim of this research and the requirements it seeks to 
satisfy, which come from several sources: 
 The research aim is driven by an immediate technical problem which the 
industrial sponsor seeks to solve. 
 The research itself must conform to the requirements for doctoral research 
established by the UK Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
(QAA). 
 The research must also conform to the framework of complex challenges 
established by the Systems Engineering Doctorate Centre (SEDC). 
Taking these as the fundamental research requirements, further 
requirements can also be derived which help to define what the research 
itself needs to do: in systems terms, its required functionality. 
2.2 Research Aim 
During the initial stages of the research it was agreed with the sponsor that 
the specific aim of this research was  
“to develop and validate guidance for those involved in establishing and 
operating HRPs to enhance their effectiveness by choosing and using the 
systems techniques which reflect the needs of their partnership, underpin the 
establishment and maintenance of shared understanding, and support the 
delivery of envisaged benefits through life.” 
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2.2.1 Implied Research Questions  
This research aim implies a number of questions which the research will 
need to address: 
 What are the needs of these partnerships? Can generic needs be 
identified? 
 What is the nature of HRPs such that appropriate systems techniques can 
be selected? 
 What systems techniques are available to enhance the effectiveness of 
HRPs? 
 What is the lifecycle of an HRP? Are different systems techniques more 
appropriate at different times? 
 Although primarily taking the UK as the sampling base, are there any 
indications that this learning might also be applicable in other countries? 
2.3 Generic Doctoral Requirements 
According to the QAA descriptor for a higher education qualification at level 8 
(Doctoral degree) (The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
2008) 
“Doctoral degrees are awarded to students who have demonstrated:  
 the creation and interpretation of new knowledge, through original 
research or other advanced scholarship, of a quality to satisfy peer review, 
extend the forefront of the discipline, and merit publication  
 a systematic acquisition and understanding of a substantial body of 
knowledge which is at the forefront of an academic discipline or area of 
professional practice  
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 the general ability to conceptualise, design and implement a project for the 
generation of new knowledge, applications or understanding at the forefront 
of the discipline, and to adjust the project design in the light of unforeseen 
problems  
 a detailed understanding of applicable techniques for research and 
advanced academic enquiry.” 
2.4 SEDC Requirements 
According to the SEDC website (Systems Engineering Doctorate Centre ), its  
“Research projects, developed with industry partners, will address current 
and future challenges in Systems Engineering associated with: 
1.    Exploiting Systems of Systems  
2.    Managing Systems complexity  
3.  Maximising system performance, capacity and capability of affordable 
systems  
4.    Understanding humans in the system.” 
The implication here is that research projects will address one or more of 
these challenges but not that they are expected to address all four. 
Whilst research project outlines are agreed by the SEDC, the detail is largely 
driven by the industrial sponsor, ensuring applicability of the research to the 
company.  This can, in some cases, create tension between industrial needs 
and the accepted bounds of research.  It is the research engineer‟s 
responsibility to manage that tension and ensure that both industrial and 
academic needs are met.  In so doing the research engineer is able to 
practice the skills of a systems engineer in managing the trade-off between 
conflicting requirements. 
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2.5 Derived Requirements 
Further requirements have been derived based on these explicit 
requirements and the author‟s knowledge and experience: from the taught 
elements of the EngD programme and wider reading, from more than 20 
years industrial experience and from observation of the international systems 
engineering research community. 
2.5.1 Business Usability 
In order to meet the needs of industry, the output has to not only be in 
academic form, but also in a form which is useful to the business. Whilst an 
“executive summary” or abridged report may go some way to meet that need, 
they are still unlikely to be read by the majority of the target audience.  In 
order to be genuinely valuable to the business, the research output must 
include material in a form which is familiar to the business and usable in a 
way which is consistent with its normal operations.   
2.5.2 Challenges in Systems Engineering  
According to the SEDC requirements, the research should address current 
and future challenges in systems engineering.  The research must therefore 
encompass aspects of systems engineering, either through the research 
focus on systems engineering itself, the novel application of systems 
engineering to a new area, or its use as an overarching model for research 
which addresses novelty in another technical area. 
Systems engineering is both systemic (considering not only the parts but also 
the whole and their relation to it) and systematic (following a structured 
approach), and these aspects should therefore be evident whatever the focus 
of the research. 
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2.5.3 Challenging the Boundaries of the Discipline 
In order to extend the boundaries of the discipline, it is necessary to identify 
where these are.  However, systems engineering means different things to 
different people and therefore the boundaries are not easily defined.   
For the purpose of this research it is necessary to identify assumed 
boundaries (at least for the context in question) and areas where these might 
overlap adjacent disciplines.  This is addressed in Chapter Four. 
2.5.4 Research Techniques 
In order to meet the requirement for a detailed understanding of applicable 
research techniques, the research must include an exploration of this topic 
area.  However, it is known that systems engineering is a relatively new and 
therefore immature discipline, particularly in terms of its research.  It is 
therefore likely to be necessary to undertake research beyond the immediate 
subject matter to satisfy the research aim, into research techniques 
themselves.  This is expected to go beyond literature review to contribute to 
the development of the body of knowledge on systems engineering research, 
and therefore provide both methodological and substantive contributions to 
knowledge.  
2.5.5 Meriting Publication 
Even when the intent is to submit by thesis rather than by publication, it is 
important to demonstrate that the research is of a quality and substance 
worthy of publication. 
2.6 Functional Identification 
These requirements imply certain functionality in the research: that is, what 
the research needs to do.  Taking the fundamental and derived requirements, 
the following functions can be identified as shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1   Research Functions 
No. Research Requirement Research Function 
1 
What are the needs of these 
partnerships? Can generic needs be 
identified? 
Understand HRP context 
and operation 
2 What is the nature of HRPs such that 
appropriate systems techniques can be 
selected? 
Link HRP context and 
operation to systems 
techniques 
3 What systems techniques are available 
to enhance the effectiveness of HRPs? 
Understand potential 
systems techniques 
4 What is the lifecycle of an HRP? Are 
different systems techniques more 
appropriate at different times? 
Understand HRP lifecycle 
and link to systems 
techniques 
5 Are there any indications that this 
learning might also be applicable beyond 
the UK? 
Design research to give 
initial  insight beyond UK 
6 Creation and interpretation of new 
knowledge 
Create / interpret new 
knowledge 
7 Extend the forefront of the discipline,  Extend the SE discipline 
8 A systematic acquisition and 
understanding of a substantial body of 
knowledge  
Systematically acquire / 
understand knowledge 
9 Conceptualise, design and implement a 
project  
Design research  
10 A detailed understanding of applicable 
techniques for research 
Understand research 
techniques 
11 Exploiting systems of systems  Propose SE techniques for 
SoS 
12 Understanding humans in the system Propose SE techniques for 
humans in the system 
13 Business usability Match research output to 
business need  
14 Challenges in systems engineering  Apply SE to research 
design and content 
15 Challenging the boundaries of the 
discipline 
Understand boundaries of 
SE discipline 
16 Research techniques Understand research 
techniques 
17 Merit publication Publish research 
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In order to satisfy all the major stakeholders, it is necessary to take a holistic 
approach which goes beyond the research aim to address these broader, 
largely implicit, research „functions‟.  These functions – and the architecture 
of the research necessary to deliver them - will be considered further in 
Chapter Three. 
2.7 Preliminary Literature Review 
2.7.1 HRPs: what do we already know about them? 
HRPs (specifically) are not an area that has been well covered in the 
academic literature, either in the UK or elsewhere.   
Exceptions to this include two papers addressing extant HRPs based in the 
UK which have also been used as case studies here.  The first describes the 
complex systems engineering exercise involved in developing the HRP, 
noting that the different objectives and constraints of a wide range of 
stakeholders had to be reconciled into legal, technical and organizational 
frameworks to provide identity and coherence “without compromising the 
potential contribution of the parent organizations”.  However, other than 
noting the role of organizational structures and the formation of working 
groups, the approach taken to achieve this reconciliation is not described 
(Jackson, Siemieniuch et al. 2003). 
The other takes an interpretive case study approach to explore the role of 
intellectual capital in what is described as a “virtual centre of excellence”.  
Drawing upon resource-based theory, they examine the interplay between 
social and structural capital and the role of each in developing enterprise 
intelligence.  They emphasise the importance of “broad based relationship 
building” using activities which “cut across, bridge or blur boundaries” to 
create social coherence‟ around which the organization can adapt through 
time, whilst recognising the coordination burden and impact on short-term 
efficiency that this creates.(Dixon, Brown et al. 2007) 
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Looking further afield, Berumen et al proposed a systems approach to 
enhance the effectiveness of a Research and Development (R&D) Centre in 
Mexico (Berumen, Toledo et al. 2009). Although recognising that the 
competitiveness of R&D activities was dependent on a “joint and sustained 
effort” between government, R&D centres, universities and industry, the 
paper did not address differences in need or perspective between these 
stakeholders, but focused on the application of systems theory to initiate and 
manage innovation.  It assumed that systems engineering would enable the 
elimination of communication barriers and enable cooperation and 
collaboration towards a common objective and strategic vision.  In going on 
to consider the role of systems engineering in design and development, they 
suggested that although in general “the more detailed the requirements the 
better”, this is not necessarily true for innovation activities.  They note that in 
this case “systems analysis is an attempt to apply the scientific method to 
important strategic issues, even when those problems are not particularly 
suited to scientific method and would never have been selected for the 
application of scientific method by a truly academic researcher”. 
In a fourth study, Elias et al suggest that applying the concept of participatory 
design to the entire innovation system, potential customers and partners can 
be integrated into R&D activities in order to build overlapping communities of 
practice (Elias, Cavana et al. 2002), although they do not address differences 
in stakeholder needs and objectives and how these might be addressed.   
Although not in openly-published literature, the author identified another 
study based on stakeholder interviews, in which practice in HRPs was 
reviewed from the Government perspective (Carney, Strong et al. 2007).  
This identified that: 
 there was reasonable consistency in the generic factors contributing to 
effective collaborative research, such as the influence of personality.  
The behaviours of individual actors were “repeatedly cited” as being 
highly influential.  
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 management and organisation was another significant factor: complex 
management structures were not favoured, but those which were 
strong and tightly run were seen as most beneficial. 
 there were marked differences between stakeholder perspectives (e.g. 
customer/supplier and academia/industry) over perceptions of issues 
such as risk. 
 in spite of “close relations” between them, individuals had not lost their 
core identity, nor had the liaisons become “full-blown partnerships”.  
Individuals needed to be appropriately expert to be taken seriously, 
and too many participants diluted the benefits. 
 there was a concern that some work lacked relevance to the 
government customer, or duplicated work already done internally.  In 
part, this was attributed to commercial or defence security concerns 
which prevented the sharing of relevant information. 
 complexities in contracting resulted in staffing problems which delayed 
the start of the research. 
 most stakeholders felt that they provided good “value for money” 
compared to conducting such research in-house, but recognised that 
such additional value was largely intangible. 
The study‟s recommendations included: 
 selecting majority partners with existing networks and a good 
reputation  
 establishing HRPs with a minimum of 3 years funding to aid 
recruitment and investment  
 exercising care in developing IPR agreements, using existing models 
to minimise the cost and effort of negotiations whilst ensuring that the 
government‟s needs were met.  
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2.8 Initial Research Approach 
Drawing from the 1973 work of Rittel and Webber, John describes „Wicked 
Problems‟ in which requirements are volatile, constraints keep changing, 
stakeholders can‟t agree and the target is constantly moving.  Such problems 
run counter to the systems engineer‟s traditional desire to understand the 
problem, gather and synthesize data, and develop a solution.  He notes that 
in these situations “one cannot understand the problem without knowing 
about its context... one cannot meaningfully search for information without 
the orientation of a solution concept... one cannot first understand, then 
solve” (John 2006). 
Such is the challenge of this research area.  There is insufficient information 
in published literature to characterise the problem and design an appropriate 
research solution and thus an evolutionary approach has been adopted.  This 
employs one possible methodology by means of a pilot study in order to 
further explore the problem context and application of systems engineering, 
and to test the appropriateness of the methodology itself. 
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3 INITIAL FIELD DATA COLLECTION AND PILOT STUDY 
3.1 Introduction 
Having explored the context of HRPs in Chapter One and taken an initial 
review of the literature in Chapter Two, it was apparent that some initial field 
work was required.  This comprised two major elements: field data collection 
on several HRPs to which the author had direct access in order to both better 
understand the problem space, and to identify where literature from other 
domains or disciplines might be relevant; and the conduct of a more in-depth 
study on one of them in order to start to develop relevant models and explore 
a potential research methodology. 
3.2 Initial Study Methodology 
3.2.1 Field data collection 
During the early stages of this research, the author had direct access to four 
of the HRP case studies subsequently selected for the main research.  Such 
access ranged from attendance at strategic and operational meetings, 
workshops and conferences, to access to the working documentation of the 
HRP covering areas such as strategy, management planning and review, 
technical direction and working with external customers and contacts.  The 
author‟s position at the time meant that the access in several cases was as a 
participant-observer, involved to a greater or lesser extent in each of the 
HRPs, but without specific management responsibilities.   
Detailed field notes were taken and copies of documentation collected, 
although no analysis was done at this stage.  Nevertheless, the observation 
inevitably influenced the author‟s perception of themes and issues for the 
HRPs in question, as well as establishing a network of contacts for the main 
study.   
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3.2.2 Philosophical position 
A primary challenge within this research design was in establishing the 
philosophical position from which the research would be conducted.  Those 
funding the research (the industrial sponsor and EPSRC) both typically fund 
research undertaken from a positivist or realist, natural science perspective.  
Both the industrial supervisor and researcher are qualified as engineers, and 
therefore also come from a realist background.  And yet, fundamentally, the 
real need underlying this research did not lend itself to such an approach. 
From the outset, it was clear that the different sectors (industry, academia 
and government), and indeed individuals within those sectors, had different 
views on HRPs.  This is true both in terms of what the objectives should be 
and how they should be achieved, and in terms of the perceptions of actual 
operation.  Carney had made it clear that in his study, interactions between 
individuals were key (Carney, Strong et al. 2007).  HRPs do not operate in a 
machine-like manner following prescribed processes, but rather rely on those 
interactions in order to deliver outcomes through a complex social system. 
It was therefore clear that a realist stance would be unlikely to adequately 
reveal the richness of data relevant to the research questions and that some 
form of interpretive approach was appropriate, but also that such an 
approach must be tuned to the needs of the customer.  This meant that the 
analysis and presentation of results would need to go beyond comparative 
observations of different HRPs, their participants and their use of systems 
engineering, to produce some form of characterisation and actionable 
recommendations. 
It became apparent that a pilot study was appropriate which: 
 Examined one HRP (which would become known as Case Study A)  
 Utilised a systems engineering approach 
 Employed a recognisable research methodology. 
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The aim of the pilot would be to test the approach (both in terms of the 
systems engineering and the research approach) and to act as a start point 
for either more in depth research in the same HRP, or similar research 
across a number of HRPs. 
3.3 Pilot Study 
3.3.1 Pilot Study Methodology: influential literature 
Nothing in the rather sparse existing literature on HRPs provided a basis on 
which to select an appropriate research methodology for this pilot study.  Nor 
did the traditional processes of systems engineering itself: the HRP studied 
had no obvious single customer, no clear user need or complete set of 
requirements against which its implementation could be verified and 
validated.   
In this situation, it was noted that an interpretive systems methodology 
“should always be chosen initially as the dominant methodology”(p374) since 
such interventions tend to proceed more smoothly than those governed by 
functionalist or emancipatory rationales (Jackson 1997).  One authoritative 
source provided a way forward: Peter Checkland‟s “Systems Thinking, 
Systems Practice”. The battered copy of the original 1981 publication, 
obtained originally from the university library, was a revelation.  Reprinted 
almost annually since that original edition, and known around the world, the 
authority of the work speaks for itself: it should be a compulsory text for all 
students of systems engineering.  Not only did it explain the soft systems 
methodology which would be perfect for the pilot study, but it opened up a 
deeper understanding and a deeper questioning of systems, both hard and 
soft: of science and of practice, of thinking and of reality.  It was a revelation 
that would underpin the research going forward.   
Post-1999 reprints of Checkland‟s book include a new retrospective chapter 
which, rather than changing the original text, adds reflections of soft systems 
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research and practice over 30 years.  It allows the reader an insight into not 
only the evolution of his Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), but also how it 
has been used and misused, represented and misrepresented (Checkland 
1981).  What emerges is a clear impression that SSM is not a collection of 
tools, nor a prescriptive method which when „applied correctly‟ will give the 
„right answer‟.  SSM demands rigour and self-discipline in its use, through an 
approach such as action research. 
3.3.2 Action Research 
With its foundations generally attributed to Kurt Lewin and others working in 
the 1940s (Cooke, Wolfram Cox 2005), action research involves: 
 Systematically collecting research data about an ongoing system 
relative to some objective, need, or goal of the system 
 Feeding these data back to the system and conducting a collaborative 
diagnosis of the data 
 Taking action based on the diagnosis, and  
 Evaluating the results of the action (Ramirez, Bartunek 2005) 
“Instead of beginning in the conventional fashion with a review of literature, 
the specification of hypotheses, and the finding of a target organization to 
test out our design, we start by discovering the problems existing in the 
organization”(Foote Whyte, Greenwood et al. 1991).  The goals of Action 
Research are practice-focused: understanding, improving, contributing to 
knowledge and critically improving the practitioners‟ ability to understand and 
improve their own practice (Robinson 2005).  The value of action research is 
determined by “the extent to which the methods and findings make possible 
improvements in practice”, and not by its contribution to generalisable 
knowledge (Corey 2005). 
Although it may be any of them, it is not necessarily a technical, critical, 
liberal or emancipatory endeavour (Robinson 2005).  Argyris and Schon 
argue that in many cases “particular problems cannot be resolved unless one 
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also addresses the question of why the relevant practitioners have so far 
been unable to resolve the problem” (Argyris, Schon 1991).  In settings 
containing „multiple realities‟ (i.e. where different constituencies have 
divergent perceptions of apparently „shared‟ events), action research 
interventions are likely to surface differences in the values held by 
stakeholders (Ramirez, Bartunek 2005). 
It is suggested that for applied social research in industry or agriculture, 
“participatory action research offers a more effective strategy for the 
interdisciplinary applied research projects”, than using technical specialists 
as passive informants (Foote Whyte 1991). In addition, “...participatory action 
research can have a far greater role than the conventional professional 
expert role of the consultant in stimulating and guiding major organizational 
change” and can not only “achieve results of current benefit to the 
organizations but can lead to a rethinking and restructuring of relations so 
that the impact of the process can carry far into the future” (Foote Whyte, 
Greenwood et al. 1991). 
Action research interventions are likely to lead to the use of political 
behaviours and turnover of participants (Ramirez, Bartunek 2005).  This may 
be in direct conflict with the need, “particularly at crucial points in their 
initiation and development” for the “development of effective, indeed, 
intimate, relationships with harassed and troubled individuals, usually men or 
women in key positions”.  Under these conditions, whilst the anxiety and 
uncertainty aroused by the need to seek external help must be recognised, 
the participatory role of the researcher makes self-discipline essential: in 
order to be effective they must be seen to be neutral by both sides and 
ensure that their motivations in terms of interests, needs and attitudes do not 
interfere with the success of the research. Above all, however tempting it 
may be, the engagement should not lead to the researcher taking over the 
problem (Wilson 2005).  
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3.3.3 Study description 
The Pilot Study was conducted over a four-month period between September 
– December 2007.  The aim was to gather and analyse data relating to the 
case study, in order to identify areas where a systems approach might 
resolve difficulties and further enhance areas of strength. 
An Action Research approach was used to explore the different perspectives 
of the HRP stakeholders.  Critically, this was not an independent 
investigation into the operation of the HRP, but rather an integrated approach 
aimed at engaging key stakeholders in enhancing their shared understanding 
of the partnership, and supporting joint action planning to further develop the 
HRP. 
3.3.4 Research methodology 
SSM was taken as the basis of the research methodology.  The four activities 
of his “second decade” SSM deployment were used as a framework 
(Checkland, Scholes 1990): 
 finding out about the situation,  
 formulating relevant models,  
 debating the situation using the models,  
 taking action 
Figure 3.1 details the process followed for the first three of these activities, as 
described below.    
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Figure 3.1   Pilot Study Process 
3.3.4.1 Finding Out 
The stakeholder group was both hierarchically & culturally diverse, and 
geographically dispersed.  A questionnaire was therefore used to capture 
initial views in an asynchronous way, to ensure that the full breadth of 
perspectives would be represented in the data set.  The raw data was then 
used to inform the development of potentially useful models for subsequent 
stakeholder review and action planning. 
The study involved more than 60 of the HRP‟s stakeholders. These 
stakeholders were drawn from both academia and industry, and included 
members of the Steering and Management Groups, participants, key 
customers and industrial technology champions.  60% were from the 
industrial partner, 30% from the academic partner and 10% from elsewhere 
including government bodies.   
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The questionnaire was used to gather one or more structured definitions from 
the stakeholders, each describing their view of a purpose of the HRP, using 
the form “WHAT – HOW – WHY”.  Beyond the provision of an unrelated 
example, no guidance was given as to the scope or level of required 
responses, in order to avoid artificially constraining the different ways in 
which the stakeholders viewed the HRP. Respondents were encouraged to 
provide as many separate definitions as they felt necessary to fully describe 
their perspective, rather than creating one bland and all-encompassing 
statement.  This resulted in an average of 3-4 responses per respondent.  
Each stakeholder was also asked to complete two supporting information 
forms, giving details of the nature and duration of their relationship with the 
HRP.  This information was not used in any explicit way (for example in a 
quantitative analysis), but enabled the context of their responses to be 
understood to assist interpretation of the data as part of the qualitative 
analysis. 
Throughout the data collection exercise, the emphasis was on the quality of 
interaction with the stakeholders.  Nearly 90% received at least an outline 
face-to-face explanation of the aims of the research and the methodology 
being used, taking opportunities as these arose through team briefings, 
management meetings and so on.  Detailed explanations were given on 
request to around 10% of stakeholders.  Due dates for responses were 
negotiated on an individual basis to take account of work pressures and other 
priorities, and this resulted in just under 23% of stakeholders providing their 
response by the agreed date; a further 25% needing one reminder and 
additional time, and the remaining respondents requiring a further reminder.  
Response rates for the questionnaire were very high, averaging 56% overall 
as illustrated in Figure 3.2.  Although the responses were clearly dominated 
by the higher number of industrial stakeholders and their higher response 
rate, no weighting was given to „repeated‟ responses.  Thus whilst a better 
balance of inputs would have been desirable, the inclusive rather than 
reductionist approach to analysis meant that the larger number of responses 
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gave the industrial partner‟s needs no greater weight than that of the 
academic partner, and in fact served to include the views of the diverse 
range of industrial stakeholders (from different businesses, sectors and job 
roles) which was not such a characteristic of the academic population.   
 
Figure 3.2   Questionnaire Responses 
Questionnaires were made available in both hard and soft copy to suit the 
different needs of those who preferred to complete them by hand, and those 
who preferred electronic submission.  In general, although not exclusively, 
remote respondents tended to favour electronic submission whilst those 
based locally favoured hard copy.  A total of 132 structured definitions of the 
HRP‟s purpose were provided.   
3.3.4.2 Formulating Relevant Models 
Modelling was focused in two areas:  the creation of an integrated set of 
conceptual models to reflect all the perceived aims of the HRP, and 
development of a “Rich Picture” to reflect the organisation and context based 
on the nature of stakeholders‟ relationships with the HRP. 
Figure 3.3 shows the first step in the development of the conceptual model.  
Verbs used by stakeholders to describe the purpose of the HRP were 
grouped to show related themes.  As groupings were established, it became 
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clear that these could be loosely related to a two-dimensional matrix, 
reflecting whether the aim was internally or externally facing (i.e. the focus 
was the HRP itself, or its relationship with others), and whether it was input-
related (such as winning a contract) or output-related (delivering the results).   
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Figure 3.3   HRP Purpose: Verbs Used 
 
Next, the objects associated with each verb were identified, as per the 
example in Figure 3.4.  This helped to clarify the extent to which the use of 
the same or similar verbs actually reflected similar objectives, and was 
necessarily a manual process which required an understanding of context to 
correctly interpret the respondent‟s intent.   
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Figure 3.4   HRP Purpose: Example 
Several common themes arose across a range of verbs: training & education, 
innovation, outreach, partnership, products and world leadership.  Each of 
these were identified and mapped separately, see Figures 3.5 – 3.10. 
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Figure 3.5   HRP Purpose: Training & Education 
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Figure 3.6   HRP Purpose: Innovation 
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Figure 3.7   HRP Purpose: Outreach 
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Figure 3.8   HRP Purpose: Partnership 
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Figure 3.9   HRP Purpose: Products 
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Figure 3.10   HRP Purpose: World Leadership 
 
This process of exploring the verbs used, whilst not producing a definitive 
model in itself, enabled the author to become sufficiently familiar with the 
data to derive a set of nineteen structured definitions which fully 
encompassed the scope of the original 132.   Fig. 3.11 and Table 3.1 provide 
an illustrative example of the simple top level model and supporting 
description based on Checkland‟s CATWOE mnemonic (Customers, Actors, 
the Transformation, Weltanschauung, Owners and Environment) which were 
developed to support communication and shared understanding of meaning.  
The complete set is included at Appendix One.  
 
Chapter Three  Initial Field Data Collection and Pilot Study 
[60] 
 
Assess
success
Identify
need
Output trained
engineers
Attract
trainees
Deliver
course
Develop 
course
Identify
staff
 
Figure 3.11   Conceptual Model: Educate and train systems engineers 
 
Table 3.1   Root Definition: Educate and train systems engineers 
Owned by 
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To ... 
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in the UK 
In order to 
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systems 
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The 19 definitions differed broadly in both scope and the level at which they 
applied, reflecting different stakeholder perspectives and priorities.  In order 
to make them more easily understood as a complete set, a hierarchy was 
introduced.  Fig. 3.12 shows the hierarchy and indicates how the 
underpinning objectives relating to, for example, resource provision and basic 
operations can be seen to contribute to the strategic objectives and 
underlying values of the HRP.   
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Figure 3.12   Hierarchical Conceptual Model 
The second key model developed to support the HRP management in 
understanding the „situation of interest‟ was a „Rich Picture‟.  The first step in 
this was to collate stakeholder responses to Checkland‟s „CATWOE” 
mnemonic: Customers, Actors, the Transformation, Weltanschauung, 
Owners and Environment.  This immediately demonstrated that there was 
enormous breadth in perception, in particular regarding the HRP‟s 
Customer(s) and Owner(s). The HRP was seen to have many purposes 
(illustrated by the nineteen conceptual models), often with different 
stakeholders for each.  Based on this and the author‟s own background 
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knowledge, a first draft „rich picture‟ was constructed, and over a period of 
some six weeks this was reviewed and evolved in conjunction with eight key 
stakeholders: three from industry, three from academia and two from the 
HRP leadership. The final version of the model is shown in Figure 3.13.  It 
illustrates the resources, activities and outputs of the HRP, and how these 
interact with, and are influenced by, the partners.  Whilst the „clip-art‟-based 
model does not fully meet Checkland‟s preference for hand-drawn models to 
reflect uncertainty and transience, it responds to the cultural expectations of 
the target audience:  in the 21st century, neither engineers, researchers nor 
senior managers in academia and industry relate readily to hand-drawn 
graphics.   
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Figure 3.13   HRP “Rich Picture” 
For the purpose of the analysis, it is important to note that the HRP was 
established as a partnership, rather than a separate legal entity such as a 
Joint Venture.  Control of both strategy and operation was therefore 
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exercised through joint steering and management groups as illustrated in 
Figure 3.14, resulting in the part-time engagement of a broad body of 
stakeholders from both partners.   
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Independent
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Industrial            Academic
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Senior
Management
Academic
Senior
Management
Government
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Industrial
Managers
Academic
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Figure 3.14   HRP Management Structure 
It is notable that the formation of the HRP in this way enabled the boundary 
between each partner and the HRP to remain fuzzy, whilst the central 
division between the organisations was not.  In effect, each half of the HRP 
acted as an open system with its parent organisation, with the attendant 
benefits of facilitating the resource flow into the HRP and broader access to 
resources, and drawbacks associated with lack of control (Dixon, Brown et al. 
2007).  In contrast, all the flows between the academic and industrial partner 
inevitably crossed a contractual boundary.  This demanded that the partner 
interfaces were adequately defined, drawing on both hard systems concepts 
such as timing, format and technology standards as well as reflecting cultural 
norms.  The impact on the HRP boundaries, interfaces and ways of working 
were identified as worthy of further study. 
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3.3.4.3 Debating the Situation 
Throughout the model development process, opportunities were sought for 
review with key stakeholders, both academic and industrial. This was a 
critical part of the methodology, both ensuring that the validity of the models 
was explored and tested, and sustaining the stakeholder engagement as an 
essential element of the Action Research process.  Recognising the risk that 
the lower number of responses might result in critical omissions from an 
academic perspective, this review and debate included a number of one-to-
one interviews with the „missing‟ key academic stakeholders in which draft 
models were reviewed and updated.  This provided slightly more balance in 
the representation of responses between academia and industry, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.15 
 
Figure 3.15   Questionnaire Responses 
The original intent was for the author to lead further debate and analysis of 
the models within the strategic and operational management groups of the 
HRP.  This would have enabled the different parties involved to develop a 
shared understanding of the key issues, reduce misunderstandings and 
differences in perception, and identify areas where there was opportunity for 
significant benefits.  However, for a number of reasons, the opportunities for 
this did not materialise.  In effect, this brought the Action Research activities 
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to an end before any actions which were traceable to the SSM process could 
be initiated. 
3.3.5 Pilot Outcomes 
In spite of the high level of support for developing the models and debating 
the situation on a one-to-one basis, the HRP participants were reluctant to 
engage en mass in a discussion of the models and what insights into the 
HRP they might provide.  Various reasons were given or became apparent, 
including „other priorities‟, the maturity and sensitivity of the relationship 
between the HRP partners, and contractual angst.  Twelve months later, an 
independent review of the HRP‟s objectives unsurprisingly indicated that a 
number of issues were unresolved. At this point HRP leaders “backed away 
from” using SSM (Darbyshire 2008) and material from this study was not 
used. 
This outcome is consistent with the view that SSM has “a limited domain of 
applicability.  In particular, the kind of open, participative debate that is 
essential for the success of the soft systems approach, and can be the only 
justification for the recommendations that emerge, is impossible to obtain in 
problem situations where there is fundamental conflict between interest 
groups that have access to unequal power resources”(Jackson 1997, p358).  
In such situations, it is suggested that the SSM researcher either has to walk 
away or abandon their philosophical principles and accept that the proposed 
changes will emerge from limited debate and distorted communications.  In 
this case the decision was made to step back, regroup, and seek an 
alternative approach better suited to the problem domain. 
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3.4 Evolution of Methodology 
3.4.1 Learning from pilot and early field data collection  
Evidence from the pilot study indicated that the action research approach 
was ineffective with this HRP, and was likely to face similar problems if used 
for other HRPs.  The application of SSM in this context 
 was time consuming and complex, because the problem was also 
complex  
 highlighted a set of issues such as the concept of a lifecycle, which may 
be common to other similar partnerships 
 exposed issues which were considered sensitive within the partnership 
and therefore which could not easily be openly discussed.   
Participation in the meetings of the other HRPs illustrated that political 
issues were common and even objectives which were ostensibly „shared‟ 
could be an uneasy compromise.  Individuals and their relationships were 
highly influential in the direction and dynamics of the partnerships.  Although 
some systems approaches were used, neither the pilot study nor the field 
data from the other three HRPs showed any significant evidence of the 
consistent and rigorous application of a systems engineering approach 
through the life of the HRP. 
3.4.2 Three areas of study 
In undertaking and subsequently reflecting upon the pilot study, it became 
clear that three key areas of study had emerged, as illustrated in Figure 3.16.   
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Figure 3.16   Three Key Areas of Study 
These were the systems engineering approach that was adopted, the 
research methodology that was used, and the problem domain itself.  It was 
apparent that each had its own body of knowledge and characteristics which 
was largely independent, but that any effective research „solution‟ needed to 
integrate the three.  Thus the systems theory and approach adopted should 
be consistent with the problem domain and context; the research 
methodology should be philosophically and practically consistent with the 
systems theory and the research output should be relevant and useful in the 
problem domain.  Checkland‟s use of action research to apply his SSM to 
deliver practical benefits to organisations is an example of this internal 
consistency which clearly produces results: however, it is conjectured that 
this principle applies much more broadly and indeed may benefit all systems 
engineering research (Valerdi, Brown et al. 2010). 
3.4.3 Research Architecture 
Three core „sub-systems‟ of this research have now been identified: research 
context, systems approach and research methodology.  Each of these is a 
distinct area where both background research and foreground data collection 
and analysis is required to ensure that the research addresses all the 
requirements. The functions identified in Chapter Two above, can then be 
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allocated to the three primary architectural areas for the research as shown 
in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2   Allocation of Research Functions 
 Allocation 
Research Function Context Systems 
Approach 
Research 
Methodology 
Understand HRP context and 
operation 
   
Link HRP context and operation to 
systems techniques 
   
Understand HRP lifecycle and link 
to systems techniques 
   
Create / interpret new knowledge    
Systematically acquire / understand 
knowledge 
   
Understand boundaries of SE 
discipline 
   
Extend the SE discipline    
Identify potential systems 
techniques 
   
Develop SE techniques for SoS    
Develop SE techniques for humans 
in the system 
   
Apply SE to research design and 
content 
   
Design research     
Design research to give initial 
insight beyond UK 
   
Understand research techniques    
Match research output to business 
need  
   
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3.4.4 Way forward 
If continued, action research would have enabled actionable 
recommendations to be developed on the HRP in Case Study A, and would 
have supported the immediate implementation of actions, and their ongoing 
review and refinement.  Although these actions would not be applicable to 
other HRPs, localised benefit within this case study could be expected.  
However, since the openness of the approach was in conflict with the HRP‟s 
norms and the ways of working within and between the partner 
organisations, it became clear that the significant political influences made it 
difficult for SSM to be carried through to „action‟.  As a result, it was 
determined that an action research approach was unlikely to be effective in 
this context: not only within this HRP, but also in others like it. 
The way forward was therefore determined to: 
 Extend the literature review into the two functional areas (systems 
approach and research methodology) not yet addressed. 
 Maximise the value of the pilot study by using it to identify concepts and 
subsequently develop models which may then be used to inform further 
research.  
 Collect data from other case studies based on these ideas. 
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4 LITERATURE REVIEW  
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Aims of this Chapter 
The problem domain, systems engineering approach and research 
methodology have been identified as the three key themes or subsystems of 
this research.  The literature review in Chapter One explored the problem 
domain by examining the context of HRPs in some detail: Chapter Three 
then looked at the limited amount of literature on HRPs themselves and 
touched on literature relating to Action Research in order to undertake the 
pilot study, which itself provided a better understanding of the application of 
systems engineering research to HRPs.  In particular, it identified a number 
of issues associated with both applying systems engineering and conducting 
research in this environment.  Chapter Four concludes the journey through 
the relevant extant literature by examining these two elements in greater 
breadth and depth in order to “develop sharper and more insightful 
questions” (Yin 2003) and support the development of both substantive 
models and a methodology for the main study.  Based on the pilot study, 
some initial conclusions on the relevance and applicability of the literature are 
drawn. 
4.2 Systems Engineering and adjacent theories 
Many definitions of systems engineering exist, and these range from a 
narrow process description to the „exceedingly broad‟, encompassing 
everything where it is possible to take a systems perspective in order to 
improve understanding.  For the purpose of this literature review, the usual 
bounds of systems engineering have been „stretched‟ in two ways: first, by 
extending backwards through the early „pre-engineering‟ phases of the 
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system lifecycle, and second, by extending downwards from practice-based 
systems engineering into its science-based underpinnings. 
No single view exists of „relevant adjacent theories within the system 
lifecycle‟, but the representation developed by Arnold in his consideration of 
systems competencies is useful in this respect, using overlapping normal 
distribution curves to indicate in a stylised way the overlapping roles of 
business management, project management, systems engineering and 
specialist engineering disciplines (Arnold 2000).  Specialist engineering is 
considered to be less relevant in the context of HRP development and has 
not been addressed within this literature review.  For business management 
and project management, no attempt has been made to conduct an 
exhaustive review of these  disciplines, but rather to focus on the 
identification of work in these areas which is relevant to systems engineering 
and in particular its application to HRPs.  Perspectives which are addressed 
include technology management, project management, knowledge 
management and management science.   
4.2.1 Process-based approaches from traditional SE 
4.2.1.1 Introduction 
Traditional systems engineering in aerospace and defence is predominantly 
process-based, aiming to provide assurance through consistency of 
approach.  In most implementations, such as standards and corporate 
processes, the focus is on the systematic nature of the approach. 
No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review of traditional 
systems engineering literature: there is a wealth of sources ranging from 
journal papers, conference proceedings, textbooks, standards, teaching 
material and so on.  Cataloguing this body of knowledge is a major 
undertaking, and the subject of an international project due to deliver version 
1.0 in 2012 (Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge 2011).  A detailed 
examination of the material is not relevant to this research:  across this body 
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of knowledge, principles remain largely the same, even where nomenclature 
may vary and nuances are introduced.  The traditional systems engineering 
approach starts with the assumption that requirements can be elicited and 
used as the basis for system design.  Whilst this approach is sound and 
proven for physical, electromechanical engineered systems, difficulties arise 
with complex systems where humans play a significant role. 
Authoritative texts, which are representative of the substantial body of 
knowledge addressing the traditional systems engineering approach, include 
an international standard, two handbooks and a maturity model.   
4.2.1.2 ISO/IEC 15288:2008  
Widely adopted as the international standard for systems engineering 
processes, ISO/IEC 15288: 2008 is a generic process description for 
systems engineering.  It identifies four process groups to support systems 
engineering: technical processes, project processes, agreement processes 
and organizational project-enabling processes (formerly known as enterprise 
processes in ISO/IEC 15288:2002 (ISO/IEC 15288: 2002(E), Systems 
Engineering – System life cycle processes. 2002)).  The definitions and 
processes are intended to be applicable to the development of products and 
services across a wide range of application domains (ISO/IEC 15288: 2008, 
Systems and software engineering – System life cycle processes. 2008). 
4.2.1.3 INCOSE Handbook 
Currently issued as version 3.2, the INCOSE Systems Engineering 
Handbook provides “a description of key process activities performed by 
systems engineers”.  Originally based on US-based standards, the material 
was fundamentally revised and reorganised in 2006 to align with 
ISO/IEC15288:2002, and again updated in January 2010 to bring it in line 
with the 2008 revision of that standard.  Recognised globally as a guide to 
the implementation of ISO/IEC 15288, it is also the stand-alone reference 
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text for the INCOSE Certified Systems Engineering Professional examination 
(Krueger, Walden et al. 2010). 
4.2.1.4 NASA Systems Engineering Handbook 
First published in 1995 and significantly updated in 2007, the NASA 
Handbook became an early reference text for systems engineers worldwide.  
It describes systems engineering as a “methodical, disciplined approach for 
design, realisation, technical management, operations and retirement of a 
system” (NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. 2007).  Within that system 
it includes elements such as people, facilities, policies and documents within 
the definition of all the things that are required to produce “system level 
results”. Moving away from the overly-simplistic „V‟ model, it revolves around 
the concept, which is attributed to Jerry Lake, of an SE „engine‟ which drives 
the process of successful systems engineering on a project (Forkosh 2010). 
4.2.1.5 Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI®) 
CMMI® is a process improvement approach which both acts as a point of 
reference for appraising current processes and helps to integrate traditionally 
separate organizational functions (Software Engineering Institute 2011b).  Of 
the three model variants, the Development model is used most frequently in 
organizations applying systems engineering to product development.  The 
model provides a collection of development best practices covering the 
lifecycle of products and services from conception through to delivery and 
maintenance (Software Engineering Institute 2011a) in a highly structured 
format.  Each of the 22 process areas represents a cluster of related 
practices which collectively satisfy a set of goals to enable improvement in 
that area (Software Engineering Institute 2010). 
CMMI® certification is frequently required of industry by government 
acquisition organisations.  In effect, it demonstrates that the organisation not 
only has appropriate processes in place, but operates them with a high level 
of understanding and control.  Whilst it is not suggested that HRPs should 
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seek such certification, these broad concepts may help to ensure that the 
HRP has all necessary processes in place, and has ways to understand and 
control critical functions. 
4.2.1.6 The role of Systems Thinking 
Whilst much of the emphasis of traditional systems engineering is on the 
systematic approach to product development, the second key element – 
systems thinking – should not be overlooked.  It is this merger of systemic 
and systematic practices that lies at the heart of exemplary systems 
engineering. 
Although evident among the early systems thought leaders, the balance of 
the approach moved in favour of process through the adoption of process-
based standards such as IEEE1220 and EIA632, particularly in the USA.  In 
the past 20 years however, there has been a gradual resurgence in the role 
of systems thinking in systems engineering, driven by a number of factors: 
 Growth in international systems engineering participation from countries 
where the systemic aspects are culturally more important 
 The recognition of problem classes which defy simple process application 
and demand that a more holistic approach is taken.  This is true in a number 
of domains including military planning and defence system acquisition (Tibbitt 
2008). 
 Increasing activity in the advancement of systems engineering in areas 
other than „process improvement‟. 
 The publication of seminal works on systems engineering application in 
management domains, such as Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, 
referred to earlier, (Checkland 1981) and The Fifth Discipline (Senge 1990). 
Some of Senge‟s „laws of systems engineering‟ are more focused on 
management problem solving than organisational design and operation.  
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However, key systemic issues from the perspective of HRP design are the 
need for the organisation to be self-sufficient and not rely on outside 
agencies for support, and the need to recognise the system boundary (which 
is unlikely to coincide with existing organisational boundaries)(Senge 1990). 
Other authors have developed techniques such as Systemigrams 
(Boardman, Sherman et al. 1996) and the Rigorous Soft Method (Hitchins 
undated) to depict complex situations in a structured way to assist with 
understanding and analysis.  More recently, the creation of the Conceptagon 
offers a way to balance our thinking about systems around seven triples: 
 Boundary (Interior/Exterior) 
 Harmony (Variety/Parsimony) 
 Relationships (Wholes/Parts) 
 Emergence (Hierarchy/Openness) 
 Transformations (Inputs/Outputs) 
 Function (Structure/Process) 
 Communication (Command/Control) (Boardman 2010) 
This return to an emphasis on the systemic is starting to be seen in other 
„main stream‟ systems engineering publications.  Originally released in 2005 
in the UK and published internationally in 2010, the INCOSE UK Systems 
Engineering Competency Framework explicitly recognises the role of 
systems thinking in systems engineering, and whilst still heavily focused on 
the process aspects, also notes the need for an understanding of three 
overarching areas: 
 Systems concepts – the application of the fundamental concepts of 
systems thinking, including understanding the system context, 
boundaries, interfaces and lifecycle. 
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 Super-system capability issues – an appreciation of the role the 
system plays in the “super-system” of which it is part. 
 Enterprise and technology environment – understanding the definition, 
development and production of systems within an enterprise and 
technological environment. (INCOSE UK Systems Engineering 
Competencies Working Group 2010). 
4.2.2 Theories and Approaches from Systems Science 
Although systemic approaches are becoming re-established in systems 
engineering, it is nevertheless a pragmatic, practitioner-based discipline.  
From a research perspective, and in the growing number of areas of 
application which resist the successful implementation of simple process, 
there is much that can be learned from the domain of systems science which 
has evolved independently of systems engineering, and remains focused on 
the scientific integrity of the system concepts under investigation.  This is not 
to suggest that systems science and systems engineering are independent: 
on the contrary systems engineering is founded on the principles of systems 
science.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of this literature review the two 
bodies of knowledge are largely independent and have therefore been 
treated separately.  
The „System of Systems Methodologies‟ (SOSM) (a system of methodologies 
which are systems-based, and not to be confused with methodologies for 
SoS) is a valuable framework for understanding the applicability of systems 
approaches, developed by Jackson and Keys in 1984 (Jackson, Keys 1984) 
and subsequently extended by Jackson in later work (Jackson 2003).  It 
considers systems as either simple or complex, and the participants with 
interest in the problem as unitary, pluralist or coercive, reflecting the degree 
of difference in their values, beliefs and interests and their subsequent ability 
to agree objectives.  Using this framework, Jackson classified the suitability 
of systems approaches as follows: 
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 Simple/Unitary: Hard systems thinking, such as systems engineering, 
systems analysis and operations research. 
 Complex/Unitary: System Dynamics (Forrester, Senge), 
Organizational Cybernetics (Beer), Complexity Theory (Stacey) 
 Simple & Complex/Pluralist: Strategic Assumption Surfacing and 
Testing (Churchman, Mason, Mitroff), Interactive Planning (Ackoff), 
Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland) 
 Simple/Coercive: Critical Systems Heuristics (Ulrich), Team Syntegrity 
(Beer) 
 Complex/Coercive: Postmodern Systems Thinking (Taket & White)  
Jackson reviews each approach in detail, addressing its history and 
theoretical underpinnings as well as its field of applicability before drawing 
together the key principles into the creative holistic framework of Critical 
Systems Practice (Jackson 2003).  This framework presents generic 
functionalist, interpretive, emancipatory and postmodern methodologies 
which enable the user to draw upon the broad body of systems work in a way 
which is appropriately tailored to the systems problem at hand. 
4.2.3 Technology Management 
HRPs exist to conduct research within an environment intended to facilitate 
exploitation.  As such, they can be an integral part of the technology 
management strategy of the organisations involved.  Although it is unlikely 
that an HRP will have a technology management strategy independent of the 
partners, and equally unlikely that the partners will share the same 
technology management strategy (since they typically occupy different 
positions in the supply chain), the HRP can contribute to the technology 
management strategy of multiple partners simultaneously.   
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Roadmapping is recognised by Government and Industry as an important 
methodology and tool to promote technology development to meet future 
capability needs (Future Business Group 2006).  The approach is very 
flexible and has a wide range of uses including product planning, 
service/capability planning, strategic planning, long-range planning, 
knowledge asset planning, programme planning, process planning and 
integration planning (Phaal, Farrukh et al. 2001).  By enabling better 
communication, visibility and alignment of programmes it enables better 
decision making and helps deliver effective technology exploitation, 
acquisition and insertion.  Enhanced communications are particularly 
noticeable across disparate teams and organisational boundaries (Future 
Business Group 2006), and across functional boundaries within an 
organisation (Phaal, Farrukh et al. 2001). 
4.2.4 Project Management 
HRPs are in effect projects.  They have a (funding) start point, a (funded) 
duration and expected deliverables.  However, whilst projects are typically 
centred around the core concepts of timescale, cost and quality, these 
concepts are less apparent in the fundamental characteristics of HRPs.   
As with systems engineering, a large authoritative body of knowledge exists 
for project management, the essential core of which is captured within the 
Project Management Institute‟s Body of Knowledge (Project Management 
Institute (PMI) 2000).  A review of this literature is similarly outside the scope 
of this research.  In drawing upon this wider body of both academic and 
practitioner texts, Maylor notes that the main task of project management is 
to resolve conflict, working with fuzzy lines of authority, in order to achieve 
the project goals (Maylor 2005).  However, although he presents processes 
and case studies for the four stages of project definition, project process 
design, project delivery and subsequent process development, the specific 
approaches to conflict resolution are unclear.  The 7-S framework, originally 
promoted by McKinsey and Co., is offered as a way to identify and classify 
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the issues that need to be considered: strategy, structure, systems, staff, 
skills, style/culture and stakeholders. 
Project management and systems engineering are essential and 
complementary methodologies for a successful project.  Although the focus is 
different (cost/schedule and technical respectively), they share similar 
processes, tools, techniques and competencies (Brown 2007c).  However, a 
fundamental tenet of project management is the assumption that the goals 
can be defined and agreed: the process is then one of overseeing change 
and managing individual stakeholders in order to achieve those goals.  In 
contrast, evidence from the pilot study suggests that HRPs cannot be 
effectively managed unless the stakeholder needs are integrated. Whilst 
some project processes (such as human resource management and cost 
management) will be effective in supporting HRP establishment and 
operation, this effectiveness is likely to be limited in areas of uncertainty and 
conflict. 
4.2.5 Management Science 
A broad review of management science literature has not been conducted.  
However, management science themes which are applicable to HRPs 
include strategic management, leadership and motivation, change 
management and organisational design.  These bodies of knowledge offer 
theoretical principles which may inform the design, implementation and 
operation of HRPs and enable a systems approach to be derived which 
benefits from earlier work in these disciplines. 
4.2.5.1 Strategic Management 
Maitlis and Lawrence conducted an intensive, inductive, real-time, 
longitudinal field study of decision making in an orchestra, involving the 
qualitative analysis of a range of data.  Their work considers the roles of 
individuals and groups and how they affect the ability of the organisation to 
determine direction and pursue it.  Although the language used is that of the 
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management discipline, the principles can be readily translated to the 
concept of HRPs and their stakeholders. 
By analysing “the micro-level processes and practices involved as 
organisational members work to construct and enact organisational 
strategies, through both formal and informal means” (Maitlis, Lawrence 2003, 
p111), they propose that episodes of strategising are likely to fail when: 
 key actors do not interpret issue as relevant to their situation and as 
having the potential to further their own interests 
 the issue is not interpreted and labelled in a way that is legitimate 
within the existing organisational discourse 
 organisational politics preclude agreement on the definition of the 
concept, and there exists no actor powerful enough to impose a 
definition 
 the pre-existing discursive resources of key actors are highly 
incompatible (i.e. they don‟t speak the same „language‟) 
 organisational politics do not allow for the assignment of responsibility 
and accountability in a way that benefits key actors 
 the concept definition is highly complex and internally inconsistent 
 key actors lack political skill or domain-specific expertise 
 the strategic concepts are defined in terms of the organisation‟s 
weaknesses rather than its strengths (which parallels Senge‟s 
concerns regarding the effect of negative visions (Senge 1990)). 
4.2.5.2 Leadership and Motivation 
In his research on leadership, Adair noted that there were three interrelated 
but distinctive sets of needs which must be met: those of the task, the team 
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and the individual (Adair 1983).  Looking beyond leadership itself, it is clear 
that all three aspects are relevant in any project and must be addressed in 
order for the project to succeed, and that an excessive focus on any one or 
two aspects will affect performance.  Likewise, in establishing an HRP it is 
important that these are considered in a balanced way and provision made 
for all three sets of needs to be met.  This must go beyond the „project 
management‟ approach which typically focuses on the task, with the team 
and individuals treated largely as resources.  Within the HRP, individual 
motivation is likely to be a significant factor and it is appropriate to reflect 
upon the implications for the diverse participant groups of motivation theories 
such as: 
 Maslow‟s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1943), 
 Alderfer‟s hierarchy of needs (Alderfer 1969),  
 Hertzberg‟s satisfaction/dissatisfaction theory (Herzberg 1968) 
 theories based on expectancy, instrumentality and valence (Vroom 
1964),(Lawler, Porter 1968). 
Job characteristics such as variety, autonomy, responsibility, challenge, 
interaction, task significance, goals and feedback all have motivational 
properties (Torrington, Hall 1991).  Whilst the creation of an HRP may 
provide opportunities here, the potential for the absence of these 
characteristics to cause dissatisfaction (Herzberg 1968) when compared to 
existing norms in the partner organisations is also a significant risk. 
4.2.5.3 Change Management 
The creation of an HRP is, in itself, a change process.  It requires that 
individuals do different work, or work with different people, or conduct that 
work in a different location or a different way in order to get the benefits 
associated with the partnership.  As a result, change theory applies – in 
terms of the both perceptions of the impact on each participant as an 
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individual, and in terms of their perceptions of the effects of possible 
responses.  In addition to the details of the change itself, personal, group and 
organisational factors will influence behaviour (Bowman, Asch 1987), and 
these will vary across the range of participants depending on their own 
experiences and the norms within the different partner organisations.  
Strategies of participation, education and communication, negotiation and 
power may be used to drive the implementation, and these will need to be 
tailored for the different groups. 
4.2.5.4 Organisational design 
In his work on organisation design, Child explores the challenge of defining 
„good performance‟ and notes that issues include: 
 how to weight different success criteria 
 the quality of goal setting, both in terms of content and the target level 
of performance 
 the organizational constituencies or stakeholder groups, including 
managers, employees and the community. 
 the timespan over which performance is sought: balancing short- and 
long-term objectives (Child 1984). 
Whilst these are issues in any organization, it is clear that within an HRP they 
are particularly important, since the challenge is likely to be exacerbated by 
the diversity of the partners.  He further notes that managerial preference and 
market conditions will affect the organizational design (Child 1984).  In the 
HRP context, managerial preference is likely to differ significantly between 
the partners and may be a source of tension and conflict; whilst the market 
conditions will depend upon the reputation of the partners and the resultant 
pressure upon the partnership for early successes to gain acceptance. 
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4.2.6 Knowledge Management 
Since “research is about generating knowledge” (Lee, Lings 2008, p6), 
organisations and partnerships established to conduct research are, by 
definition, undertaking a form of knowledge management (KM).  There are 
seven distinct KM processes (Brown, Ragsdell 2009):   
1. Knowledge Identification: identifying both knowledge needs and sources;  
2. Knowledge Generation: gathering together documents, people, resources 
and previous knowledge to generate required knowledge. 
3. Knowledge Elaboration: ordering and refining new knowledge by testing, 
analysis and indexing to “assess knowledge relevance, value and 
accuracy” (Liebowitz 1999, p37). 
4. Knowledge Preservation: storing explicit knowledge in both electronic and 
paper form; and preserving tacit knowledge through mentoring, 
apprenticeships and socialisation. 
5. Knowledge Mobilization/Sharing: making knowledge available in various 
forms and across the organisation, including socialisation through 
communities of practice and professional training. 
6. Knowledge Presentation: presenting the knowledge in a suitable form for 
it be understood and utilized, perhaps in training or to support. 
7. Knowledge Evaluation: assessing the use, organizational value and 
personal value of the knowledge in order to inform Knowledge 
Identification (Brown, Ragsdell 2009). 
In the context of an HRP, all seven processes are relevant although they may 
be undertaken by different parts of the partnership and in different parts of 
the research lifecycle as indicated in Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1  Knowledge Management Processes 
Planning processes Research processes Exploitation 
processes 
Evaluation 
Identification 
Generation 
Elaboration 
Preservation 
Mobilisation / Sharing 
Presentation 
 
Those involved in HRPs are responsible for the implementation and 
operation of a knowledge management system: a complex socio-technical 
construct which integrates elements of people, process, technology, 
information and infrastructure within the multi-organisational environment.  
This has implications for the technology needs of HRPs: “optimal 
communication and knowledge flow between intra and inter-organizational 
partners can be supported by information technologies, but it is not assured 
by them” (Balthazard, Cooke 2004, p.1, emphasis in original text).  It is clear 
that whilst technology may have an enormous role to play in the movement of 
knowledge, the ease or difficulty with which this is achieved is largely a factor 
of social context (Brown, Duguid 1998). The performance of the HRP as a 
knowledge management system cannot be reduced to the „sum of individual 
component performances‟, but is an emergent property of the HRP as a 
whole.   
The issue of culture, and indeed different cultures, within the HRP is 
important to its effectiveness as a knowledge management system.  “In many 
organizations, especially bureaucratic ones, employees and managers are 
discouraged from sharing knowledge and expertise” (Liebowitz 1999, p40).  
In such organisational cultures, knowledge is seen as power, and 
protectionist practices may be expected.  Where there is a culture of 
competitiveness between employees, strict hierarchies and adherence to 
rules and formal procedures, knowledge sharing may be difficult to initiate 
and support.  The „knowledge transfer distance‟ (which may, for example, be 
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physical, temporal or intellectual) between individuals and groups within the 
HRP will further impact the ease of knowledge sharing (Brown, Ragsdell 
2009).  As Swan et al stress, “people-management issues do indeed pose 
critical constraints on knowledge-sharing” (Swan, Robertson et al. 2002, 
p185). Such constraints may have a significant impact on overall HRP 
performance, unless structures and reward systems are carefully designed 
and take into account the different cultures of the partners. 
According to Oliver and Kandadi, there are ten important factors in the 
creation of an effective „knowledge culture‟ in organisations: leadership, 
organisational structure, evangelization, communities of practice, reward 
systems, time allocation, business processes, recruitment, infrastructure and 
physical attributes (Oliver, Kandadi 2006).   These are a mixture of people 
and technology issues, but all have implications for the way in which HRPs 
are established and operated.  Dixon et al note that different approaches to 
developing the enterprise impact the social and structural capital which is 
developed, in both the short and longer term (Dixon, Brown et al. 2007).  By 
responding to the social as well as individual context, and using technology 
to support informal interaction, facilitate global reach and reciprocity, it is 
possible to enhance organisational performance and engender interactivity, 
participation and learning.  However, approaches to access and reciprocity 
remain complex socio-technical issues (Brown, Duguid 1998). 
4.3 Research Methodology 
If systems engineering aspires to the status of a serious scholarly discipline 
“it will have to show that within the subject there is a cycle of interaction 
between the formulation of theory relevant to serious problems or concerns, 
and the testing of that theory by the application of methodology appropriate 
to the subject matter…[I]t will lead to ideas from which we can formulate two 
kinds of theory, substantive theories about the subject matter … and 
methodological theories concerning how to go about investigating the subject 
matter.” (Checkland 1981, p7).   
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Choice of methodology affects not only the way in which the research is 
conducted, but also: 
• the way in which the data are analysed 
• the way in which validity is demonstrated 
• the type of knowledge contribution that can legitimately be claimed 
• the applicability of that knowledge to other contexts 
4.3.1 Principles 
No attempt is made here to conduct a comprehensive review of literature 
pertaining to research philosophy and methodology: such a study is well 
beyond the scope of this research.  Nevertheless, it is appropriate to 
establish a basic framework of principles underpinning the selection of 
research methodology in order to identify relevant literature and thence 
choose, with the necessary justification, an appropriate methodology for the 
main study.  This section draws primarily from Lee and Lings to identify the 
main concepts and issues to be considered (Lee, Lings 2008). 
4.3.1.1 Scientific Theory and Methodology 
Most engineers and scientists are raised on the principles of scientific theory: 
theories which are based on natural laws and empirically testable, but which 
remain tentative: for however much supporting evidence is collected, a single 
piece of contrary evidence disproves the theory.  Although this is often 
loosely referred to as positivism, realism is a more accurate descriptor in 
most cases since it extends beyond strict positivist beliefs to accept things 
which are not directly measurable: something which is necessary even for 
theories of particle physics (Lee, Lings 2008).   
Realist research will typically follow the Hypothetico-deductive method 
illustrated in Figure 4.1.   
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Data Collection
Determine 
Measurement
Interpretation
Philosophy
Deduction
Induction
 
Figure 4.1   Hypothetico-deductive Method 
The research hypothesis is founded on theory, and data is sought to support 
or disprove it.  In effect, it is a search for „the truth‟, based on the assumption 
that the truth is „out there‟ simply waiting to be discovered.  The hypothesis is 
either true, or it is not.  The supporting scientific methodology focuses on the 
repeatable: the same chemicals, under the same conditions, will react the 
same way, no matter where or when the experiment is conducted.  Any 
differences are explained by errors: unplanned changes to the input 
parameters, or inaccuracies introduced by the researcher or the equipment. 
A potential concern, identified in a paper on Work and Organizational 
Psychology, but equally applicable to systems engineering, is that 
researchers with a scientific or engineering background do not make a 
conscious choice to adopt realism as the basis of their research, but that it is 
simply the default option: the approach is seen to be simply „research‟ rather 
than one of many possible approaches to research, and accordingly 
researchers do not feel the need to spell out their assumptions because it is 
accepted practice (Symon, Cassell 2006).   
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The issue is not simply procedural, since “to work within the positivist 
systems paradigm is not simply to hold a belief in objectivity, a 
correspondence theory of truth and an ontology of precise facts; it is also a 
disposition to seek quantifiable variables in a practical situation, to reach for 
modelling tools, to seek work where such traits find a congenial home, and to 
communicate with others who do the same”(Spaul 1997, p327).  It is, for 
many, an unconsciously adopted way of life rather than a deliberate choice in 
research design. 
4.3.1.2 Interpretivism 
In dealing with social sciences, including the science of socio-technical 
systems in which humans play and equal or greater role than engineered 
artefacts, the assumptions underpinning realist research may be challenged.  
Although the early work on socio-technical systems still took a realist 
approach, pioneered by the Tavistock Institute in the 1950s, this appears to 
reflect the heritage of work design (Eason 2006) and a domain of relatively 
simple, stable organisational systems.  As systems become more complex 
and interconnected, „right‟ and „wrong‟ solutions can no longer be defined in 
terms of natural laws.  Different people will make different interpretations and 
take different decisions at different times: they are not repeatable like a 
chemistry experiment.  Making sense of these systems requires a different 
approach. 
Interpretivism is taken to denote an alternative to positivism or realism which 
is predicated on the view that the subjective meaning of social interactions is 
an important differentiator between studying people and the objects which 
are studied in the natural sciences.  Interpretivist research is essentially an 
inductive process in which theory is generated from data.  It seeks not to 
explain, but merely to understand.  Furthermore, understanding itself is 
transitory and linked to context: knowledge is primarily descriptive and 
immersion in the context itself is necessary to understanding. (Lee, Lings 
2008).  
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4.3.2 Implications of Philosophy on Methodology Selection 
It is common to relate realist and interpretivist research to quantitative and 
qualitative methods respectively.  Whilst this may be broadly correct, it is by 
no means true in all cases. In general, interpretive approaches avoid 
quantitative techniques for a number of philosophically-driven reasons: 
 When quantifying data, it is mapped to the researcher‟s perspective rather 
than preserving the perspective of the individual participants. 
 Quantification loses the nuances of language and meaning which are 
present in interviews and observation 
 In order to do quantitative research, the theory must precede the data 
such that key aspects can be quantified (Lee, Lings 2008). 
In contrast, the main preoccupations of qualitative research are: 
 Seeing through the eyes of the people being studied, and attributing 
meaning to events 
 Description, and the emphasis on contextual meaning 
 Emphasis on process 
 Flexibility and limited structure 
 Concepts and theory grounded in data 
However, interpretive research is not synonymous with qualitative data 
collection.  Statistical data, for example, is often used; and in interpreting the 
transcripts of interviews the frequency of occurrence may also be analysed.  
However, the main preoccupations of quantitative research – Measurement, 
Causality, Generalisation and Replication – remain fundamentally at odds 
with the interpretivist paradigm. 
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Equally, positivist or realist research is not completely dependent on 
quantitative data, and the researcher‟s natural bias and perspective may 
drive realist research where quantitative data is inappropriate or 
unobtainable.  This approach, known as Imperialism, “represents a 
fundamental commitment to one epistemological position but a willingness to 
incorporate other strands of management science if they seem to be 
useful”(Jackson 1997, p351).   In the area of organizational research, it is 
suggested that „qualitative positivism‟ is more common than qualitative 
research informed by other epistemological perspectives (Prasad, Prasad 
2002).  The real challenge here is to avoid slipping into atheoretical 
pragmatism by combining opposing theories, although pragmatists would 
argue that any theoretical distinction is artificial (Jackson 1997). 
4.3.3 Validity Principles 
In research where the methodology is not explicit and „what counts as 
knowledge‟ is not declared, it is difficult to either challenge or defend the 
validity of the approach other than through the „reasonableness‟ of the 
results.  However, validity is a major – but as yet largely unrecognised – 
issue for systems engineering research.   
In quantitative research, key issues are: 
 Reliability: the consistency of a measure of a concept, in terms of its 
variation over time (stability), relationship to other measures (internal 
reliability) and reliance on a particular observer (inter-observer consistency). 
 Measurement validity: whether the measure of a concept really measures 
that concept, not only intuitively (face validity) but also based on known data 
(concurrent validity), future expectations (predictive validity), a theoretical 
relationship (construct validity) and comparison with other sources 
(convergent validity). 
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 Internal validity: the validity of the apparent causal relationship between 
dependent and independent variables, i.e. that the independent variable is at 
least in part responsible for the variation in the dependent variable. 
 External validity: whether the results can be generalised beyond the 
specific research context 
 Ecological validity: whether the findings obtained under study conditions 
have relevance in a natural setting (Bryman, Bell 2003). 
In qualitative research, alternative measures are used to avoid the 
presupposition that a single absolute account of social reality is feasible.  
Lincoln and Guba propose two primary concepts: 
 Trustworthiness, which is made up of four criteria which paralleling the 
equivalent criteria (in parentheses) in quantitative research: 
o Credibility (internal validity) 
o Transferability (external validity) 
o Dependability (reliability) 
o Confirmability (objectivity) 
 Authenticity, which addresses the wider political impact through five 
criteria: 
o Fairness: whether the research represents different viewpoints 
o Ontological authenticity: whether the research helps members 
arrive at a better understanding of their situation 
o Educative authenticity: whether the research helps members 
arrive at a better appreciation of the perspectives of other 
members 
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o Catalytic authenticity: whether the research has acted as a 
catalyst for engagement in change 
o Tactical authenticity: whether the research has empowered 
members to take action (Lincoln, Guba 2002, p588). 
4.3.4 Systems Engineering Research Methodologies 
Having highlighted the basic principles of research methodology to be 
considered, consideration now moves to extant approaches, starting with 
those in systems engineering itself.  Although methodology should be a 
primary consideration in the early stages of any research program, evidence 
suggests that this is often not the case.  For systems engineering research in 
particular, it is quite common for it to be treated as an afterthought or – worse 
– ignored completely.  Expected publication venues for systems engineering 
research have been reviewed and found to be lacking in methodological 
rigour.   
4.3.4.1 Systems Engineering, the Journal of the International Council 
on Systems Engineering 
Papers published in Systems Engineering generally address the application 
of systems engineering and describe the processes or methods used in its 
application, rather than the overarching methodology which underpins the 
work.  This appears to reflect the background and interests of the readership, 
leading to substantive advances in the discipline. 
According to the Editor-in Chief (Sage 19 January 2010) 
“Systems Engineering research is an extraordinarily broad subject, in that 
one can do research into any of the many systems engineering subject areas 
and professional practice areas. Certainly we are interested in systems 
engineering research and SSE research methodologies for the journal. As a 
society with a majority of members who are industrial or government 
practitioners and not academics, it is not unreasonable that the majority of 
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papers published in the journal of the society would not be research papers 
per se. But certainly we are interested in and do publish papers that make a 
valuable contribution to Systems Engineering Research.” 
Nevertheless, this practical approach does not demand that those papers 
demonstrate methodological rigour. 
4.3.4.2 Conference on Systems Engineering Research  
The Conference on Systems Engineering Research (CSER) is an 
international annual conference organised and hosted by leading universities 
in the field of systems engineering research and attracting largely academic 
participation.  A detailed review of the papers presented to CSER in 2008 
and 2009 revealed that only a small percentage of papers explicitly 
addressed issues of research methodology, as follows: 
 In their paper exploring systems thinking as an emergent property of 
teams, Lamb et al. follow the practices outlined by (Valerdi, Davidz 2007) for 
empirical research in systems engineering.  In establishing an exploratory 
research framework based on grounded theory techniques they are guided 
by literature on team cognition, team-based design thinking, team theory, and 
organizational culture (Lamb, Nightingale et al. 2008). 
 In developing a framework to boost the systems capability of small and 
medium-sized defence contractors in Australia, Tran and Huynh also 
selected a grounded theory approach to provide a methodology for 
generating theory directly from the analysis of their unstructured data 
sources, such as case study reports and interview transcripts (Tran, Huynh 
2008). 
 In contrast, Berglund and Malmgren‟s retrospective analysis of the 
requirements management in the design of a medium sized tanker adopts a 
qualitative, “value-laden systems approach”, again drawing data from 
multiple information sources. However, they recognise that this approach 
causes difficulties in the generalisation of the findings and emphasise their 
intention to present experiences instead (Berglund, Malmgren 2008). 
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 Taking a different approach altogether, Ferris proposes that engineering 
design can be considered to be systems engineering research when it is 
performed in a situation of considerable complexity and lack of clarity of 
objectives (Ferris, Cook et al. 2008). 
 Rowell et al use a case study approach, analysing historical data in order 
to look for trends in the nature of engineering change within a complex 
product development cycle (Rowell, Duffy et al. 2009).  They explicitly adopt 
a positivist philosophical stance, analysing data without the knowledge of 
those creating it in order to remain “unbiased”. 
 Soares and Vrancken adopt a methodology which is “inspired by Action 
Research”, working with practitioners “in order to apply the developed 
theories and test them in practice”, leading to successful pilot application and 
changes to working practices.(Soares, Vrancken 2009) 
 Broniatowski et al draw strongly on theories and approaches from 
mathematics, psychology, medicine and behavioural science to derive their 
methodology to study decision making in committees of technical experts.  
They use a quantitative approach to analyse the strength of social networks 
through the analysis of meeting transcripts, with the intention of producing 
generalizable findings and developing theory.(Broniatowski, Magee et al. 
2009)  
 Gill‟s analysis of “systems people” in a research organisation formally 
adopts an interpretative (ethnomethodological) approach based on Grounded 
Theory (Gill 2009). 
 
Lack of discipline in terminology is a common problem, with many 
researchers failing to underpin their substantive content with methodological 
clarity, explicit description and rigour, and others using the terms „method‟ 
and „methodology‟ interchangeably to refer to the procedure followed (Brown 
2009).  This makes it difficult to (1) compare research results across studies, 
(2) communicate results to sponsors, and (3) share results with other 
disciplines. However, if advances are to be made in SE research 
methodology, it is necessary to clearly define the two and to respect those 
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definitions. Over the past 5 years a small minority of authors have started to 
recognise the importance of explicitly identifying methodological options for 
systems engineering research.  In some cases this has resulted in an 
overview of research methods (Cropley, Harris 2007), or the classification of 
research approaches based on a formal taxonomy (Ferris 2009); a smaller 
subset has addressed the more challenging issue faced here: that of 
selecting and implementing a research strategy appropriate to the systems 
engineering research study being undertaken. 
4.3.4.3 Contemporary Systems Engineering Research Approaches 
It has been proposed that in systems engineering research, where the 
researcher is typically interested in contemporary events over which he has 
no control and where research questions might be of the form “How?” and 
“Why?”, then a case study approach is advised (Sage, Friedman 2004), 
(Martin, Davidz 2007).  These papers give thorough consideration to issues 
of validity, drawing heavily from Yin in this area.  Yin himself notes that case 
studies are preferred when examining contemporary events, when relevant 
behaviours cannot be manipulated. Case studies rely on primary documents, 
secondary documents, cultural and physical artefacts as well as direct 
observation of events and interviews of the persons involved (Yin 2003).  Yin 
notes that case studies were traditionally viewed as a „less desirable‟ 
strategy, often because of the lack of rigour by investigators.  He stresses 
that every investigator should endeavour to report all evidence fairly and 
emphasises that “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes”.  Thus a case 
study does not represent a sample: rather, the goal is to expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalization) (Yin 2003). 
One problem that remains is that many systems engineering researchers do 
not have the necessary methodological knowledge to tackle social research 
and most systems engineering research programmes do not provide this 
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training (Valerdi, Davidz 2007; Valerdi, Davidz 2009; Brown 2009).  As a 
consequence, those researchers who tackle the issue are often self-taught 
and this can lead to misinterpretations which may not be spotted by peer 
reviewers who themselves lack the same training.  A common flaw is the 
confusion between the functionalist or positivist and interpretive paradigms, 
and the use of quantitative and qualitative methods, with a number of authors 
(for example (Valerdi, Davidz 2007; Cropley, Harris 2007)), wrongly 
suggesting that non-positivist research is synonymous with qualitative 
research (Symon, Cassell 2006).  Nevertheless, for the blind to lead the blind 
and open the debate on this issue is better than for the discipline to stand still 
(Brown 2009).  In essence, the plea is for systems engineering researchers 
to take not only their systems engineering but also their research 
methodology seriously, to seek real data even when this is difficult to obtain, 
and to address issues of validity in their work (Valerdi, Davidz 2009). 
4.3.4.4 Research Methodologies in the broader Systems discipline 
The broader discipline of general systems research provides a much more 
extensive body of knowledge and notably extends into the same 
management domains now being explored from a systems engineering 
viewpoint.  In stark contrast to systems engineering research, the 
philosophical and theoretical foundations of systems research are both clear 
and precise.  Much of the groundwork was laid between the 1970s and early 
1990s with seminal contributions from leading contributors (such as Ackoff, 
Beer, Checkland, Churchman, Flood, Habermas, Jackson, Keys, Mingers 
and Mitroff) extending across the spectrum from functionalist „hard systems‟ 
thinking to emancipatory and postmodern approaches.  An excellent 
overview of this is provided by Jackson which addresses not only the 
systems aspects but also the philosophical constructs upon which the 
methodologies are based (Jackson 2003).  Later works have attempted to 
address questions of pluralism at various levels from methods to paradigms, 
in effect drawing together the philosophical and theoretical bases to 
challenge the need for the atheoretical pragmatic approach which 
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characterises the majority of systems engineering studies (see Jackson 
2003; Mingers, Gill 1997; Flood, Jackson 1991). Multi-methodological 
approaches are supported by Jackson‟s concept of generic methodologies 
reflecting the four major ontological stances (functionalist, interpretive, 
emancipatory and postmodern) (Jackson 2003).   
Thus the „critical systems thinkers‟, rather than guiding the researcher 
towards a particular preferred research design, opens up a world of 
possibilities with remarkably little constraint as long as there is clarity in the 
ontological stance that is taken.  Their emphasis is to “develop 
methodological pluralism in a theoretically informed manner” (Midgley 1997, 
p250), and as a result they are “in advance of organisation theory in working 
out the implications of pluralism for those who wish to actually intervene in 
problem situations”(Jackson 1997, p366).  Furthermore, this approach offers 
the theoretical basis lacked by the applied disciplines such as information 
systems, operations research, evaluation research, management 
consultancy (Jackson 1997) and, it is suggested, systems engineering. 
4.3.4.5 From method to methodology  
 “The distinction between methodology and methods is crucial here.  
Methodology is a higher order term that refers to the logical principles that 
must govern the use of methods in order that the philosophy/theory 
embraced by the approach is properly respected and appropriately put into 
practice.  Methodology is not detachable from the philosophy/theory of the 
particular systems approach, or, therefore, from the approach itself.  
Methods, however, concerned as they are with achieving more specific 
procedural outcomes, are detachable and can be used in the service of other 
systems approaches with varying degrees of success and failure”(Jackson 
2003, p43). 
For example, methodology can be the holistic systems thinking approach that 
many systems engineering researchers employ. On the other hand, method 
refers to the specific approach taken by the researcher such as the 
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measurement instruments, the (statistical) analysis techniques or the 
modelling techniques that the researcher may choose to apply. Both 
methodology and method are important but it is often the case that method is 
the primary consideration in systems engineering researcher.  This may 
derive from an early age, when as students of science they learned to 
describe the method used when undertaking an experiment in the laboratory.  
As they progressed, they would refer to the physical law or chemical process 
under observation as the „theory‟, applying different „laws‟ or equations to 
different parts of the experiment.  Although too seldom discussed in its own 
right, the overarching scientific methodology guides the collection of empirical 
data under appropriately controlled conditions and the use of those 
observations to reinforce or falsify the theory.  For many scientists, and those 
who subsequently become engineers, the assumptions of the scientific 
methodology are so embedded in practice that they have become virtually 
invisible. 
This distinction is considered critical within the systems science community.  
From Flood‟s perspective, method and methodology are separable, but the 
principles of the methodology remain key.  As long as the researcher 
complies with those principles then any method or combination of methods 
may be used (Flood 1995).  As a result, it is argued that the link between 
methodology and the methods, tools and techniques normally associated 
with it can be relaxed, but clarity regarding the paradigm which is being 
served must be retained (Jackson 1997).  Ultimately, “what is done will be 
both user-dependent and situation-dependent but should embody the 
principles of the methodology”(Checkland 2008).  For systems problems, 
quantitative modelling methods may provide useful answers “when there is 
genuine agreement on the nature of the problem”(Midgley 1997, p253).  In 
contrast, debating methods can be useful for qualitative research, supporting 
the development of mutual understanding and enabling decision making in 
situations where there is open disagreement, but that does not imply that 
they are universally applicable.  In coercive contexts, where an uneven 
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balance of power exists, they are likely to be ineffective as disagreements 
are difficult to bring out into the open (Midgley 1997).   
4.3.4.6 From methodology to multimethodology 
“Systems practitioners must be allowed the greatest freedom possible, within 
pluralism, to tailor their use of methods, tools and techniques (just as with 
methodologies) to the complexities of the problem situation they are seeking 
to intervene in and the exigencies of that situation as it changes during the 
intervention”(Jackson 1997, p369).   
However, properly-founded multi-methodological approaches are likely to be 
particularly demanding for those involved.  As a result of their organization-
based Action Research, Carrizosa and Ortegón noted that the use of 
methodologies rooted in different paradigms in the same intervention relied 
upon the methodological competence of those involved, and that in order to 
manage the incompatibility between paradigms, they needed many forms of 
representation including symbols, analogies, images, „espoused‟ and „in use‟ 
theories, models and metaphors (Carrizosa, Ortegon 2007).  This is a 
significant potential constraint on the research methodology and is consistent 
with the experience of the pilot study, where unfamiliar methods were 
branded „too complex‟ by stakeholders, and limited their willingness to 
actively participate in the action research approach. 
Mingers suggests that since all problem situations are complex and multi-
dimensional, analysing a problem situation from a single perspective or 
paradigm will always ignore important aspects from other paradigms, and so 
a range of methodologies should always be used.  However, for researchers, 
the cultural and cognitive feasibility of working with several paradigms and 
switching between them must be considered.  This applies both at an 
individual level, and in the context of organisational culture and norms 
(Mingers 1997).  For the researcher to be able to tolerate different methods 
and appreciate the resulting divergent conclusions requires the adaptability of 
Chapter Four  Literature Review 
[100] 
 
a methodological chameleon, with a daunting array of skills and attitudes 
(Jackson 1997).   
4.3.4.7 Multimethodology vs Atheoretical Pragmatism 
Systems engineering research lacks both fundamental systems engineering 
theories and an overarching methodology for the discipline. As a result, much 
existing systems engineering research has followed an approach best 
described as „atheoretical pragmatism‟, combining techniques from different 
strands of management science and systems practice to build up a tool kit 
through a process of trial and error, but drawing superficially (if at all) from 
any recognisable theoretical position (Midgley 1997). The methods used for 
data collection and analysis, whilst potentially valid in their own right, lack any 
formal connection to the knowledge which the researcher believes may be 
derived from the work, but are justified purely on the basis of results achieved 
(Midgley 1997). 
Although methodological pluralism and atheoretical pragmatism are 
superficially similar in that both aim to develop a “flexible and responsive 
practice of intervention”(p251), critical systems thinkers criticise this 
approach on a number of grounds: 
 This „trial and error‟ approach requires costly and extensive social 
experimentation: without theory there is no mechanism to understand 
why methods sometimes work, and sometimes do not. 
 Pragmatists lack a “common theoretical language” through which to 
communicate and share learning (Midgley 1997, p251).  The lack of 
an explicit theoretical underpinning to pluralistic practice results in 
strong experiences but weak publications, and provides no basis upon 
which consultants, academics and students can learn (Jackson 1997).  
 Solutions which appear to be effective in the short term may in fact 
have negative longer term consequences, but there is no common 
way to express „success‟. 
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 Methods often work because they reinforce the position of those in 
power and are therefore supported, which may lead the researcher to 
become an unwitting accomplice to maintaining the status quo. 
(Midgley 1997) 
4.3.4.8 Incommensurability 
All systems methodologies – and all research methodologies - make different 
philosophical and theoretical assumptions.  In order to mix them or combine 
them in a framework, this has to be justified at a philosophical level.  Some 
authors claim that this cannot be done (Lee, Lings 2008): that the paradigms 
themselves are “irrevocably incommensurable”(Midgley 1997, p256).  Others 
suggest that the paradigm gap can be bridged by rational analysis, or at least 
that communication between paradigms is possible even if unification is 
infeasible and undesirable.  
However, any attempt to connect methodologies across paradigms inevitably 
requires that assumptions are made which other methodologists may 
disagree with.  There is no position which is outside of the paradigm debate 
from which to argue this point (Midgley 1997), and it is somewhat 
contradictory to suggest a high level position with no ontological or 
epistemological claims of its own, which can somehow tolerate competing 
assumptions in lower-level paradigms (Mingers 1997). 
4.4 Summary 
The literature review has identified a paucity of published research literature 
specifically on heterogeneous research partnerships, none which seeks to 
identify and understand the way in which systems engineering has been 
used in their creation and operation.  Concepts from systems engineering 
and related fields which may be relevant to HRPs have been identified for 
use in the case study design. 
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Similarly, the body of systems engineering research literature from which 
methodological guidance can be obtained is equally limited.  A significant 
factor is the widespread lack of attention to methodology within the discipline 
as a whole.  It is necessary to draw upon the related body of methodological 
work from systems science to provide the philosophical framework for this 
research. 
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5 CASE STUDY DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the past four chapters, relevant literature has been identified and 
reviewed and a pilot study has been conducted to explore issues further.  
Chapter Five now draws from this in order to establish a philosophical 
framework, identify concepts and models to support further research, and to 
develop the research design for that work.  
5.2 Philosophical Framework 
Based on the foregoing literature review and analysis, the following 
philosophically-consistent research framework has been established: 
5.2.1 Ontology  
Within this research, reality is considered to be subjective, and is 
collaboratively constructed between the participants in HRPs as they interact 
with each other.  Individual experiences cannot be separated from the holistic 
socio-historical context. 
5.2.2 Epistemology 
It is not possible to discover the “rules” of applying systems engineering to 
HRPs which explain behaviour in all instances, or to provide statistical 
generalisations and thus predict performance.  Rather, the research seeks to 
enable understanding of how systems engineering is, or may be, used to 
good effect.   
5.2.3 Axiology  
The aims of the research are: 
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 To understand the nature of HRPs, including their context and the issues 
they face 
 To understand how systems engineering is used by those establishing and 
operating HRPs 
 To understand how systems engineering, taken in a broader sense and 
unconstrained by the traditional „hard systems‟ process-centric approach, 
might be applicable to this class of problem. 
5.2.4 Methodology 
The research methodology is based on Jackson‟s Generic Interpretive 
Systems Methodology developed as part of his Critical Systems Practice 
(CSP) metamethodology (Jackson 2003).  Whilst different philosophical 
positions can be adopted within CSP, all apply a structured way of thinking 
focused on improving real-world problem situations by using systems ideas 
and appropriate methods, models, tools and techniques, which should be 
consciously adapted to the particular circumstances. 
Claiming to use the interpretive systems methodology must be justified 
according to the following guidelines (Jackson 2003, p309): 
a. there is no assumption that the real world is systemic; 
b. analysis of the problem situation is designed to be creative and may 
not be conducted in systems terms; 
c. models are constructed that represent possible „ideal-type‟ human 
activity systems; 
d. models are used to structure debate about changes that are feasible 
and desirable; 
e. quantitative analysis is unlikely to be useful except in a subordinate 
role; 
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f. the process of intervention is systemic and aimed at exploring 
purposes, alleviating unease and generating learning; 
g. the intervention is best conducted on the basis of stakeholder 
participation; 
h. changes are evaluated primarily in terms of their effectiveness and 
elegance. 
Furthermore, use of the methodology should yield research findings relating 
to one or more of: 
 the theoretical rationale underlying the methodology; 
 the methodology itself and how to use it; 
 the methods, models, tools and techniques employed; 
 the real-world problem situation investigated. 
Experience from the pilot study indicates that items d. and g. above (debating 
change and stakeholder participation) are likely to be highly problematic, and 
that the stakeholders involved in the operating, managing or working within 
HRPs are unlikely to be willing or able to engage in open debate with other 
participants.  There appears to be a fundamental conflict between the need 
for an interpretive approach in order to uncover the richness and complexity 
of HRPs, and the discomfort of participants with adopting such an open 
approach which may be interpreted as critical of their customers and peers, 
or which may interfere with established contractual positions.  
In order to address this issue, respecting what Checkland calls the „cultural 
feasibility‟ of interventions (Checkland 1981), two key steps are to be taken: 
1. Intervention in the problem situation is addressed at the „HRP 
community‟ level, rather than for specific case studies.  Thus the intent 
is not to directly influence the way in which any individual HRP 
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operates, but rather to intervene at a more generic level where 
principles can be debated and potentially adopted without the 
awkwardness and potential contractual conflict associated with a 
particular HRP. 
2. The intervention itself, rather than attempting to induce change in 
existing HRPs (which would cause stress and would be expected to 
be resisted), will be through the development of guidelines for those 
involved in planning and operating future HRPs.  This will enable 
change to be implemented within the HRP community at times when it 
is desirable and appropriate to do so.  This means, however, that 
introducing change and reviewing the impact of that change is outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
These two points imply that the research outcomes will need to have some 
degree of theoretical generalisability: that is, that the guidelines will be 
constructed in such a way as to be broadly applicable to other HRPs without 
attempting to achieve the statistical generalisability of a realist methodology. 
5.2.5 Methods 
The research will draw upon field data from a number of case studies, 
focussing predominantly on interviews but also including primary documents 
and meeting observations.  The models, concepts and principles developed 
from the pilot case study and literature review will be used to frame the 
interview questions and inform subsequent data analysis. 
5.3 HRP Concepts 
5.3.1 Concepts and principles 
The following concepts and principles form the basis of this research: 
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 Complexity: HRPs are complex entities which cannot be reduced to simple 
representations and cannot readily be fully understood 
 Lifecycle:  HRPs may have a lifecycle, either natural or imposed or a 
combination of both, which may be helpful in understanding how to create 
and manage the partnership  
 Systems Engineering:  Systems engineering is a means to understand 
and engineer complex systems, but different systems approaches will be 
applicable in different situations. 
 Heterogeneity: Participants in HRPs have different drivers by virtue of their 
different backgrounds and personal or professional circumstances.  HRPs 
will be judged as successful by those involved if they meet their own 
individual or organisational objectives.  This may include hard measures such 
as financial outcomes, and softer measures such as prestige and reputation.  
5.3.2 HRP Models 
As a result of the literature review and pilot study, a number of models were 
developed or identified in order to establish a shareable frame of reference 
between case studies.  Each model was established independently in its own 
right and provided a different perspective which might help in the elicitation 
and analysis of data from the case studies.  Some models were taken directly 
from the reference literature and applied to HRPs, whilst others were 
developed from scratch to suit the HRP context. 
5.3.2.1 HRP Lifecycle Model 
The HRP Lifecycle Model was developed based on the pilot study.  Figure 
5.1 illustrates a generic HRP lifecycle with five phases: Creation, 
Implementation, Sustainment, Transition, and Termination. 
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Transition
Implementation
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Sustainment
Creation
Industry
Academia
Government
Industry
AcademiaGovernment
Figure 5.1   HRP Lifecycle 
Creation is a politically-driven process, in which the idealism of key 
influencers is turned into agreement, and the necessary support is obtained.  
It involves the initial inspiration, detailed planning, negotiated agreement 
between the partners and independent approval by each partner. 
Implementation is the establishment of the HRP which uses people, money 
and other resources to create desired research outputs which meet the 
requirements and satisfy senior stakeholders.  It is the process by which the 
initial inspiration becomes reality. 
Sustainment is the operation and maintenance of the HRP: maintaining 
access to required resources, delivering desired outcomes and ensuring 
ongoing support through stakeholder review. 
Transition is the conversion of the HRP to operate under new rules and/or 
with new resources; including establishing mechanisms to satisfy new 
requirements and new stakeholders. 
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Termination is the final phase in which the partnership is dismantled and 
independence reasserted. 
5.3.2.2 Generic Conceptual Model 
The Generic Conceptual Model illustrated in Figure 5.2 draws from the 
conceptual model used within the pilot study, but also considers the 
relevance of the different levels in the hierarchy to different stakeholder 
groups.   
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Develop the SyE
capability of a 
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company
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international 
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Figure 5.2   Generic Conceptual Model 
 
The model reflects the fact that whilst national priorities will influence the 
involvement of government agencies in HRPs, industry relies on more 
tangible results and this emphasis becomes more marked for smaller 
organisations. 
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5.3.2.3 Academic Motivation Model 
Figure 5.3 draws on the concepts of motivation theory and recognises that 
within the academic environment there are cycles which may be thought of 
as „survival‟ and „reward‟ which are impacted by industrial collaboration.   
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Figure 5.3   Academic Motivation Model 
 
Whilst the dynamic links between the survival and reward cycles, and those 
between the reward cycle and industrial collaboration are positive, those 
between the survival cycle and industrial collaboration are only negative.  
This suggests that industrial collaboration will only be successful if the 
survival needs are satisfied first, and not threatened.  Furthermore, it 
suggests that the collaboration requires the engagement of industry subject 
matter experts, not just project managers, in order to be rewarding. 
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5.3.2.4 Systems engineering approaches in defence  
Figure 5.4 illustrates the role of different types of systems engineering in a 
defence context.  It suggests that softer systems techniques may be more 
applicable than traditional systems engineering for HRPs (Valerdi, Brown et 
al. 2010).  
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Figure 5.4   Systems Engineering Approaches in Defence 
 
5.3.2.5 System of Systems Methodologies (SOSM) 
The SOSM (Jackson 2003) shown in Figure 5.5 provides a framework to 
consider how systems approaches are used in HRPs.  
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Figure 5.5   System of Systems Methodologies 
 
The model suggests that the role of hard systems thinking (including 
traditional systems engineering) is limited to the simple-unitary context where 
participants have similar values, beliefs and interests, and share common 
purposes and agreed objectives in relation to simple systems. Other 
approaches such as system dynamics are considered better suited to the 
complex-unitary context where systems are more complex and outcomes 
less determinate.  In pluralist contexts, where although the basic interests of 
participants are compatible their values and beliefs differ, approaches such 
as SSM are considered more appropriate. Although part of Jackson‟s model, 
coercive contexts are not considered relevant to HRPs. 
5.3.2.6 Conceptagon 
The Conceptagon in Figure 5.6 represents a canon of twenty one systems 
concepts intended to support the achievement of both completeness and 
balance in systems thinking (Boardman 2010). 
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Figure 5.6   Conceptagon  
Each of the seven „triples‟ encourages consideration of balance around a 
particular fulcrum such as „Boundary‟, with the balance between (in this case) 
„Interior‟ and „Exterior‟ considerations maintained in dynamic equilibrium. 
5.3.2.7 Action Centred Leadership 
The Action Centred Leadership model in Figure 5.7 is taken from the work of 
John Adair.  Adair expresses the team development process as a coherent 
whole encompassing task, team and each individual (Adair 1983). 
TASK
INDIVIDUAL TEAM
 
Figure 5.7   Action Centred Leadership  
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Task recognises that the group‟s function (in this case the HRP‟s function) is 
to accomplish defined results, making actions and interaction task-centred. 
Team recognises the need for working relationships to be developed and 
maintained within the HRP in order to accomplish the task, and demands that 
interpersonal relations are, to some extent, people-centred. 
Individual recognises that beyond satisfying basic survival needs, people 
within the HRP are motivated by needs for security, self-esteem, self-
fulfilment and the respect of others. 
5.4 Case Study Selection 
5.4.1 Selection Criteria 
All primary case studies were selected on the basis of the following criteria:  
 They were „Partnerships‟ which involved the sponsoring company and at 
least 1 other participant organisation, but did not involve the establishment of 
a separate legal entity. 
 They were „Heterogeneous‟ and involved at least two sectors (government 
/ academia / industry). 
 They were „Research Partnerships‟, primarily focused on research and 
technology development in an aerospace & defence domain. 
In addition, all primary case studies were either ongoing or had completed 
within the past 18 months in order to ensure that data was current and that 
the accuracy of recollections had not been eroded by time. 
The requirement to involve the sponsoring company benefitted the research 
(by facilitating access to people and information) and ensured the 
applicability of the results to the company.  This requirement was not applied 
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to the non-UK case study as no such case study could be identified.  The 
case study selected met all the other criteria. 
The timing criterion was not applied for secondary case studies.  Since 
secondary case studies were introduced by interviewees in the form of a 
contrast or comparison to a primary case study, this would have been 
unnecessarily restrictive. 
5.4.2 Validity of selection 
Snowball sampling (where the initial group of contacts are used to establish 
contacts with others) (Bryman, Bell 2003) was used, both for the case studies 
and interviewees.  This makes no attempt to be representative of the 
„population‟ of possible case studies and interviewees: in fact, in the very 
concept of a „population‟ of HRPs is problematic, given that new research 
partnerships are being established all the time, and those involved in them 
are changing regularly. 
As a result, the sample of case studies is biased but selected to provide 
learning from HRPs in which the sponsoring company is involved and from 
which they can derive valuable lessons.  Personal judgement, based on 
involvement in different HRPs over a period of more than ten years, drove 
the criteria for inclusion. 
Within both industry and academia, it was common for the same people to be 
involved in multiple HRPs at the same time, and many of the potential 
respondents had had varied careers with experience across all three sectors.  
A number of interviewees provided data for more than one case study and 
drew from broader experience than could be reported through this research 
approach.  Primary case studies had multiple interviewees and therefore 
much richer data was available.  Secondary cases had, in most cases, data 
from only one interviewee but were used by the interviewee as a comparator, 
typically highlighting particular strengths or weaknesses compared to the 
primary case studies.  
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5.4.3 Constraints 
Although the area of study involves HRPs in the defence domain, other than 
conforming to this generic type of complex defence-related research, the 
research programme content itself is unimportant for the purpose of this 
study.  Thus types or levels of definition of information which are 
commercially or nationally sensitive are not necessary for the purpose of the 
study and would only serve to restrict accessibility to the data unnecessarily.  
This type of data was not collected. 
In order to maximise access to information on a range of HRPs, including 
those which were felt to be less successful and from which valuable lessons 
might potentially be learned, the decision was made for case studies to be 
reported anonymously.  This anonymity was applied both to the HRP and to 
the individuals who agreed to be interviewed.   
5.4.4 Primary Case Studies 
5.4.4.1 Case Study A 
Case Study A was established in 2003 as a £60M, 10 year initial partnership 
between a Company, a University and local government, with plans to 
embrace other industry sectors & academia.  The collaboration established a 
physical centre for systems engineering research and training where 
academic staff and industrial employees are co-located, overseen by a joint 
management structure, in order to help companies focus on the challenges 
inherent in the design and development of complex systems.  There were six 
interviewees for Case Study A.  
5.4.4.2 Case Study B 
Case Study B was a £32 million aerospace programme addressing key 
issues relating to unmanned autonomous aircraft.  It involved a consortium of 
major aerospace companies, working with a number of small companies and 
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academic staff.  Case Study B was supported by national and regional 
Government investment to ensure that the aerospace industry maintained its 
global strength and developed world class technologies in line with the 
National Aerospace Technology Strategy.  There were four interviewees for 
Case Study B. 
5.4.4.3 Case Study C 
Case Study C was set up in 2007 between a Company and a government 
customer to develop a shared understanding of capability drivers, alternative 
solutions and potential exploitation routes for technology, and to reconcile 
these with available research budgets, resources and timescales in order to 
remove duplication and to understand the impact of decisions on programme 
risk and on the sustainment of relevant industrial capability.  There were 
three interviewees for Case Study C.     
5.4.4.4 Case Study D 
Case study D was an £8.4M research programme established in 2006, jointly 
sponsored by a government funding agency and a Company, and delivered 
by a consortium of ten UK universities.  The programme aimed to define, 
develop and demonstrate approaches to system of systems engineering 
needed to support network enabled capability.  There were nine interviewees 
for Case Study D. 
5.4.4.5 Case Study E 
Case Study E was set up in 2005.  It was a „virtual centre of excellence‟, 
managed by an industrial consortium and funded jointly by government and 
industry participants, providing an overall budget of £60M. Its core goals 
were to research innovative technologies relevant to autonomous systems 
and, through the adoption of systems engineering approaches, to facilitate 
pull-through of the technology into military capabilities.  There were five 
interviewees for Case Study E. 
Chapter Five  Case Study Design 
[118] 
 
5.4.4.6 Case Study F 
Case Study F was a government-funded strategic initiative established in 
2008 to enhance the management of software intensive defence systems, 
and thus to reduce risks, delays and cost overruns. Case Study F was an 
open consortium of industrial and academic organisations, intended to 
support the UK software systems engineering community. It comprised core 
members who managed the programme, and associates who participated in 
delivering the broader objectives.  There were five interviewees for Case 
Study F. 
5.4.5 Secondary Case Studies 
Secondary case studies were highlighted by interviewees and presented as a 
comparison to the primary case studies.  Although, where possible, some 
background research has been done on the secondary case studies, largely 
from internet sources, the information relies largely on the commentary of a 
single interviewee and as such is likely to be both limited in scope and biased 
in nature.  The purpose of including the material is to add richness to the 
discussion of certain issues, rather than to imply generalisability. 
5.4.5.1 Case Study G 
Case Study G was a £6M five-year research programme established in 2005, 
jointly sponsored by a government funding agency and a Company and 
delivered by a consortium of four UK universities.  It aimed to develop 
techniques, methods and architectures for modelling, designing and building 
decentralised systems that could bring together information from a variety of 
heterogeneous sources in order to take informed actions. Case Study G had 
only one interviewee. 
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5.4.5.2 Case Study H 
Case Study H was a research programme funded by a European agency.  
Only a limited amount is known about this HRP.  Case Study H had only one 
interviewee. 
5.4.5.3 Case Study I 
Case Study I was a five-year, £6.5M research programme undertaken at 10 
UK Universities sponsored by a Company and government funding agency. It 
undertook research into novel technologies for the next generation of 
unmanned air platforms. By designing and building a representative air 
vehicle and conducting a real flight campaign demonstrating the new 
technology, it took the technology to a higher level of maturity than is usual in 
academia.  There were two interviewees for Case Study I. 
5.4.5.4 Case Study J 
Case Study J was established in 1979 by UK aerospace companies to 
demonstrate the credibility of UK industry to deliver a future fast jet.  The five 
member industrial consortium was self-funded and managed, and continued 
to work together on the development of technologies and strategies of mutual 
interest more than thirty years later.  Case Study J had only one interviewee. 
5.4.5.5 Case Study K 
Case Study K was established in 2007 as a Centre of Excellence on a 
University site. Four industrial core partners each committed £1 million over 
five years to support research into a particular area of technology for high-
tech, high-value vehicles such as aircraft, ships, high-speed trains and high-
performance cars. There were two interviewees for Case Study K. 
5.4.5.6 Case Study L 
Case Study L is a government-funded programme at a university which 
builds on an existing partnership between the university and a Company.  
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Only a limited amount is known about this HRP.  Case Study L had only one 
interviewee. 
5.4.5.7 Case Study M 
Case Study M was established in 2003 as a customer-industry partnership to 
analyse problems, examine options and de-risk requirements.  The HRP was 
governed and funded by the customer and involved a broad community of 
partner and competitor companies.  Case Study M had only one interviewee. 
5.4.5.8 Case Study N 
Case Study N was a 3 year £600k government-funded programme which ran 
between 2003 and 2006. This project aim was to extend CFD-based 
aeroelastic prediction tools to realistic aircraft geometries. Case Study N had 
only one interviewee. 
5.4.5.9 Case Study O 
Case Study O was a bilateral agreement between a company and a 
university.  Only a limited amount is known about this HRP.  Case Study O 
had only one interviewee. 
5.4.6 Non-UK Case Study 
The final case study is unique within this research as it is drawn from outside 
the UK, but is in many other ways similar to the UK case studies.  It is 
included to enable consideration to be given to whether obvious national 
differences exist, and whether there are differences in practice which might 
make the formation and operation of HRPs more or less effective. 
5.4.6.1 Case Study P 
Case Study P is a five-year contract to establish a research centre focused 
on systems engineering research, supported by researchers from more than 
a dozen universities and research centres.  It aims to enhance the definition, 
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synthesis, integration and test, deployment, and support of complex systems 
and enterprises.  There were four interviewees for Case Study P. 
5.5 Data Sources 
For each Case Study, data was obtained from a number of sources. 
5.5.1 Published sources 
Basic data describing each case study was collected from published sources 
including conference and journal papers written around the case study, the 
case study‟s own website and other websites such as those of funding 
bodies.  Other publications from the case study such as material advertising 
the launch and other events, annual reports etc were also accessed. 
Published sources were used as the primary data source for such „factual‟ 
information to enable contact time (in meetings and interviews) to be focused 
on perceptions and issues rather than the collection of basic data. 
5.5.2 Meeting observations 
Four of the case studies provided an opportunity for the author to attend 
management meetings as follows 
Case Studies A and E:  The author had been a participant at a managerial 
level in both these HRPs prior to the commencement of the research, and 
thus had access to participants, both on an individual basis and collectively in 
meetings. 
Case Studies C and F:  The author was invited to attend the management 
meetings of these two HRPs during the course of the research. 
The decision was made not to directly record the meetings, for several 
reasons: 
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 The research content discussed in such meetings might occasionally be of 
a classified nature, potentially rendering the recording classified too. 
 The location of most meetings was such that recording equipment was not 
normally allowed in the building. 
 The meetings took place between individuals in relatively senior positions 
in their respective organisations.  The information and opinions that were 
shared were not always the formal positions of their respective organisations 
and were often shared in confidence.  Although it might have been possible 
to stop recording at certain times or to delete sections of the recording, there 
was a significant risk that recording such conversations might compromise 
the natural flow.  
In all the meetings, the author was welcomed to the meeting as “one of us”. 
The fact that detailed meeting notes were being taken did not appear to 
disrupt the flow at all, and in fact on several occasions the author‟s meeting 
notes were used to supplement the formal meeting minutes.   
5.5.3 Interviews 
5.5.3.1 Interviewee Selection 
Interviewees were selected on the basis of 
 Current or previous personal involvement in the Case Study, so that their 
perspective was that of a participant rather than an outside observer. 
 Some involvement in or familiarity with systems engineering, which should 
enable them to recognise where systems engineering was used or could 
have been used. 
 A leadership role which would give them visibility of, and potentially 
influence over, the way in which the HRP was run.  This was to focus the 
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data collection on the management intent behind the case studies, rather 
than add the complexity of views from across the workforce.   
Recognising that there may be a reluctance on the part of some individuals to 
share their views openly in front of other stakeholders (Midgley 1997), 
interviews were held on an individual basis.  As with the meeting 
observations, the decision was made not to record the interviews.  It was felt 
that the interviewees would be much less likely to share their views openly if 
they were being recorded. 
All proposed interviewees agreed to be interviewed.  In one case this was not 
possible due to travel plan conflicts.  In two other cases, it appeared 
impossible to arrange availability in spite of numerous opportunities.  It may 
be postulated that these individuals felt that they had peer pressure to agree 
to be interviewed, but in fact did not want to participate, or did not feel that 
the commitment of their time would be adequately compensated by the 
benefit likely to ensue.  
All the primary cases had 3 or more interviews, up to a maximum of 9 for 
Case Study D.  Typical interviewees gave their views on one or two HRPs, 
up to a maximum of five.  
For Case Study E, the author had also conducted a small number of senior 
stakeholder interviews on behalf of the HRP in 2006, prior to the 
commencement of this research.  Notes from those interviews form an 
additional data source. 
5.5.4 Internal documents 
In a number of cases the author was given access to or copies of documents 
internal to the case study such as letters, reports, contractual documentation 
etc.  This applied in addition to those case studies where there was direct 
access to participants. 
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5.6 Interview Overview 
5.6.1 Interview themes 
After being given an overview of the research aims, each interviewee was 
asked: 
 To focus on their opinions rather than facts about the HRP, which could be 
gathered elsewhere (in order to maximise the value of face-to-face time) 
 To characterise the HRP based on the themes derived from the pilot 
o Complexity 
o Objectives 
o Lifecycle 
o SE techniques 
o Perceptions of Success 
All interviewees contributed to at least one theme but not all themes were 
drawn from each interviewee or each case study. 
5.6.2 Interview recording and analysis 
During the interviews the notes were categorised according to the five 
themes drawn from the pilot study.  Although sheets had been prepared to 
assist in note-taking during the interviews, it quickly became apparent that 
whilst this was an effective prompt to ensure the themes were discussed, the 
interviewees were all very willing to talk about the HRP and expressed their 
thoughts at length.  In some cases, detailed background on the history or 
their role was given, resulting in notes which filled many additional pages.  
Apart from thematic prompts the interviews were largely unstructured, and 
interviewees typically moved between or returned to themes as the 
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conversation progressed, resulting in notes which did not neatly follow the 
pre-prepared sheets. 
As data was collected and analysed it became clear that several other 
themes were emerging, including the nature of relationships within the HRP; 
the contracts, management controls and IPR agreements that were in force; 
cultural issues between participants and available resources, primarily in 
terms of people and money.  This resulted in a final structure for the case 
studies based on ten commonly-referenced themes. 
5.6.3 Interview order 
The scheduling of interviews was determined primarily by convenience, 
according to the travel plans and availability of the interviewees or 
interviewer.  No attempt was made to complete all interviews on one case 
study before embarking upon the next, and indeed a number if interviewees 
provided data on several case studies during the same interview.  As a 
result, the exploration of themes developed iteratively as learning from 
different case studies matured over a period of approximately 9 months 
between first and last interviews. 
5.7 Research Validity 
5.7.1.1 Credibility 
In order to avoid anecdotalism, the narrative was constructed from all the 
quotes captured in each case study, weaving together complementary and 
conflicting views within the pre-determined structure, rather than basing the 
analysis and conclusions on a small number of quotes or examples to 
epitomise key points.   
Respondent validation was used to confirm the transcription of the interviews 
into the case studies.  After each draft case study was prepared from the 
interview notes it was sent to the relevant interviewees for review.  Each 
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interviewee was given the unique reference number for their own quotes and 
asked: 
 To confirm that the text correctly captured their meaning. 
 To identify any content which was too sensitive or in other ways 
inappropriate to be included in the final thesis. 
The interviewees were asked to supply replacement text in either of these 
cases and this was incorporated into the case study.   
The purpose of this was three-fold.  Firstly, it enabled confirmation that the 
author had correctly heard and understood the interviewee‟s comments.  
Secondly, it enabled confirmation that when the comments were combined 
with others within the overall structure of the case study, that the meaning 
was not distorted.  Interviewees were invited to correct any inaccuracies in 
their own comments at this stage but had no influence over the inclusion of 
conflicting comments from others.  Finally, it enabled interviewees to re-
phrase their comments where they felt that their original words had been too 
colloquial or may be misinterpreted by others. 
It is notable that no interviewee tried to influence the way in which the quotes 
of other interviewees were recorded, although several observed that the 
comments of others regarding the challenges faced left several of the case 
studies with an „overly negative tone‟.   
Since the aim was to validate the interview data rather than find the „truth‟ 
about each HRP, additional data from other sources was not included in the 
case studies until after respondent validation.  However, once all the 
interview data had been included and checked, additional data from other 
sources including websites, meeting minutes, reports etc was incorporated 
into the case studies, providing either reinforcing, contradictory or simply 
additional perspectives integrated within the established framework. 
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Data from the author‟s participation in Case Studies A, C, E and F was not 
explicitly referenced except where documentary evidence existed.  However, 
it influenced the construction of the case studies in two ways: 
 By providing access to documentation which was not publicly available 
and which could be incorporated as evidence within the case study. 
 By enabling a richer understanding of the context in which the 
interviewees operated, and thus supporting the interpretation of 
interviewee comments. 
5.7.1.2 Transferability 
Triangulation across a total of sixteen case studies was used to draw out 
similarities and differences.  Although all case studies met the HRP criteria, 
they ranged from those in the early stages to some which were complete, 
and from those perceived as very successful to others which were less so.  
All had different leaders, used largely different approaches at the detailed 
level, and had different partners. 
5.7.1.3 Dependability 
5.7.1.3.1 Transcription of data 
Interview notes were captured by hand.  In order to create each case study, 
the text from each interview was transferred into a table with rows 
representing the section headings and columns for each interviewee.  A 
sample row for the „Role of Systems Engineering‟ from Case Study F is 
shown at Table 5.1.   
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Table 5.1 Sample Collated Interview Data  
Interviewee Fi Fii Fiii Fiv Fv 
R
o
le
 o
f 
S
y
s
te
m
s
 E
n
g
in
e
e
ri
n
g
: 
 
 Did 
architectural 
design of 
processes for 
resource 
management. 
 Not to my 
knowledge in 
any formal way 
 Company 
viewpoint – 
followed the 
usual process 
 Customer  – 
no evidence of 
SE approach 
 Ignored 
overhead of doing 
internal review 
process. 
Intolerable even 
on £5M 
programme. 
Embarrassingly 
large: level of 
effort too great. 
 Traceability from 
vision to what we‟re 
doing „ought to be 
agreed‟. 
 The 
organisational 
outline was specified 
in the ITT and bid 
documents i.e. Joint 
Boards, 
Management Group: 
not a lot of room for 
manoeuvre. 
 We had no input 
to architecture: 
customer had 
decided what it was 
going to do, what 
the architecture was. 
Have subsequently 
done things like 
„combining‟ 
(dropping) themes. 
 Customer now 
talking about 
rationalising 
meetings – tinkering 
around the edges. 
 26 tasks, 
22 active: 
building a 
coherent 
whole out of 
bits is tricky 
 Don‟t use 
formal 
technique: look 
for solution 
holistically. 
 Look for 
things that are 
important, not 
obvious. 
 Like a chef: 
some things in 
presentation, 
adds to taste, 
brings out 
flavours: 
ambience, 
music, crowd, 
noise. 
 Start with a 
bundle of 
constraints. 
What are all 
the bits? 
Prioritise. 
 Mistake to 
write them in a 
list 
 
The case study was then written taking data from each row across all 
interviewees.  Occasionally some data fell more naturally into a different 
section as the narrative evolved.  All data was used by the time each case 
study had been completed. 
5.7.1.3.2 Categorisation 
Categorisation of the data was originally based on the interview data.  
Interviewees were asked questions based on the five themes which emerged 
from the pilot study and these were initially used to structure the case study 
narrative.  As more data was collected, five more themes emerged as a 
result of repeated references by a number of different interviewees.  It was 
felt that the ten themes provided adequate but not excessive definition for the 
data in developing the case study narratives. 
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5.7.1.4 Confirmability 
In order to understand the way in which the author‟s biases might affect the 
research, it was first necessary to identify what those might be.  The following 
quote is taken from the author‟s research report at the end of the first year of 
research, which described in some detail the author‟s background and 
experience: 
“Taken together, these elements are the foundation upon which this research 
is built – an enthusiasm to challenge accepted practices and for holistic 
thinking, coupled with an acute awareness of environmental influences; a 
recognition of the diversity of stakeholder perspectives and a fundamental 
belief that openness, cooperation, shared understanding and trust are critical 
to the effective operation of any organisation in a dynamic and challenging 
environment; and a conviction that systems engineering, taken in the 
broadest sense, holds the key to unlock many of the world‟s big problems, 
and many more of the small ones.” (Brown 2007b) 
The data collection and analysis looked for evidence to support or refute the 
assumptions implicit in this „foundation‟: whether or not the objectives of the 
HRPs were understood and shared and the nature of the relationships 
between participants; the environment of resources and control systems that 
operated, and whether indeed the HRPs were created in a way which 
enabled them to meet their objectives.  Holistic themes considered the 
concept of a lifecycle and the complexity of the HRP.  The use, or not, of 
systems engineering was explored; and finally perceptions of success were 
sought in order to understand the causality: had the mix of characteristics 
enabled the HRP to succeed, or not. 
The motivation for the research was on the basis of personal experience and 
significant anecdotal evidence over a number of years that few, if any, HRPs 
would be universally described as „outstandingly successful‟, and that there 
is, in most cases, scope for improvement. 
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6 CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
Within Chapter Six, data from different interviewees and other data sources 
has been integrated in order to construct sixteen separate case studies 
based on the framework of ten themes, as follows:  
 Objectives 
 Nature of Relationship 
 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
 Culture 
 Resources: People 
 Resources: Funding 
 Lifecycle 
 Complexity 
 Role of Systems Engineering 
 Perceptions of Success 
In Chapter Seven these characteristics will be compared across the case 
studies in order to draw out common and contrasting messages.   
6.1.1 Terminology and referencing 
In order to preserve the anonymity of the case studies, generic terms have 
been used for the participants as follows: 
 The “customer” is the primary source of the research requirement and/or 
funding 
 The “company” is the principal or sole industrial partner 
 The “partners” are other industrial participants 
 “Academia” and “universities” are both used for academic participants. 
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Throughout the case studies, quotes from specific interviews are referenced 
in the form „(Xn)‟ where „X‟ is the case study (letters A to P) and „n‟ is a 
Roman numeral representing a particular interview within that case study. 
Anonymity of documentary references within the case studies was preserved 
by using only the first two letters of the author‟s surname and creating a 
sanitised reference list at the end of this chapter to cover all documentary 
references from the case studies.  Any mention of individual HRPs within 
document titles and website addresses, and any other data such as location 
which might directly identify the HRP have been removed from these 
references.  Where appropriate, case study references have been used to 
replace the HRP name. 
6.2 Case Study A 
The HRP in Case Study A was established in 2003 as a £60M, 10 year initial 
partnership between the company, lead university and Government funding 
agency.  The collaboration established a physical centre for systems 
engineering research and training where academic staff and industrial 
employees were co-located, overseen by a joint management structure, in 
order to help companies focus on the challenges inherent in the design and 
development of complex systems. 
6.2.1 Objectives 
The objectives of the HRP in Case Study A were to provide “cheaper, faster 
research”(Ai) for industry by enabling “industry and academia to work side by 
side”(Av) and to “collaborate on research and allow cross-fertilisation of 
industrial / academic approaches”(Av).  The intent was for “multiple cross-
sectoral stakeholders”(Aiv) to see it “as a key component for systems 
engineering competence”(Aiv) although there was “a question of how the 
objective of getting third parties on board was valued”(Ai), particularly during 
the first five years. 
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There was general consensus that the objectives were “very 
aspirational”(Aiii) and “idealistic”(Av).  It was noted that it was “an 
experiment”(Aii), that the “feasibility of the requirements was untested”(Ai) 
and that there was no certainty “if it could be achieved”(Aiv). It was seen as 
necessary to “make a leap of faith to innovate”(Av) although this may have 
been unrealistic. “Naively so”(Aiii).  For the academics, one of the problems 
was simply to understand the nature of systems engineering research and 
how it might apply to them (Br___ 2008). 
Fundamentally, it was noted that the specific written objectives were different 
for the different parties involved (Do___ 2002a) and that these could be 
considered “adequately conflicting”(Ai) or “all different, but all capable of 
being satisfied at the same time”(Aii). In either case it was considered clear 
that the parties “did not have common objectives”(Avi).  It was felt that the 
objective of “academic excellence was fairly orthogonal to the company‟s 
value & relevance; and equally orthogonal to SME‟s value & relevance”(Ai) 
but that in order for it to succeed “objectives couldn‟t be mutually exclusive: 
even if not completely aligned there had to be a win-win”(Avi). It was felt that 
“what each enterprise wanted to get out of it”(Ai) was known: that the 
company understood the university‟s “primary driver was papers”(Avi) and 
that the university understood that the company “needed tangible 
outputs”(Avi). 
At a technical level, it was felt that the aim was to “find the novel systems 
practices to solve novel systems problems”(Ai).  Although formal 
“requirements addressed research outputs, themes and topics”(Ai), there 
was “not a consolidated programme”(Avi) and work done within the HRP had 
to be on a “real needs basis”(Aiv).   
6.2.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP was based on a long-standing relationship between the university 
and the company (Do___ 2002a).  However, although projected as “an 
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academic / industrial partnership to conduct research”(Av), “partnership was 
one thing it wasn‟t.  It never was.  It was never set up as one”(Aii).  
Describing a partnership as “both trying to achieve something by working 
together that couldn‟t be achieved or would take longer without”(Aii), the 
interviewee noted that it was hard to imagine that “anyone thought it was a 
partnership”(Aii).  The challenge of establishing a true partnership rather than 
the usual customer/supplier relationship had been identified early on (Ja___, 
Si___ et al. 2003).  In its current state, the HRP was described as “a 
research arm of the company”(Av), a view which excluded university staff. It 
was noted that there was “lots of collaboration at a strategic level and at a 
personal level, but not at an operational level across various people”(Av) and 
that the objective of having “co-located teams”(Aii) of “industry and academia 
sitting and working together hasn‟t happened”(Av). 
There was an expectation that the HRP would “grow through multi-
partnering” to become a UK centre of excellence which would “become the 
first port of call for systems engineering capability brokerage” (Ph___ 
[undated]).  This would “require different academic partners”(Ai) and for the 
HRP to expand to encompass these partnerships with the lead university 
acting as the hub (Ja___, Si___ et al. 2003).  This expectation was, however, 
quickly reduced to a „network of universities‟ (Do___ 2003) rather than a 
partnership, and there was no evidence of any more formal arrangements 
(such as subcontracting of work or secondment of researchers to other 
universities) being achieved.   
Similar expectations existed regarding the inclusion of additional industrial 
partners (Do___ 2003), (Ph___ [undated]), (Ph___ 2005), but in spite of the 
general intent to evolve and add new partners to the HRP, it was unclear 
“what sort of agreement was desirable if a new partner arrived and wanted to 
join”(Aii).  Different options for levels of partnership were considered in 
conceptual terms (SEIC Partnership (framework). undated) but not defined in 
detail. There was a concern that “common ground shrinks as the number of 
partners increases”(Aii) and “the obvious way to get value was to abstract 
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away the detail and jointly fund „vanilla flavour‟ work”(Aii), but that this would 
result in “taking our eye off the ball”(Aii) for existing research.  In spite of the 
“enthusiasm for widening the partnership”, the development of good 
relationships and discussions with a number of companies, the target of 
achieving an additional full industrial partner remained over a number of 
years and this continued to be a barrier for organisations unwilling or unable 
to join the bilateral partnership (Br___ 2010a).  
Complex influencing structures existed within the partner organisations 
(Do___ 2002a), and these remained dominant: controlling the flows of money 
and people as well as imposing organisational change on the HRP 
participants.  Although there was a focus on the processes for jointly 
operating and managing the HRP, the emphasis on maintaining the 
underpinning relationship was missing from the planning (Ja___, Si___ et al. 
2003) and only evident when things became difficult.  A showcase event, with 
invitations to staff sent jointly by the most senior sponsors in the university 
and company (Pe___, Im___ 2007), and subsequent regular meetings at a 
number of senior levels including a bi-annual „stakeholder relationship 
meeting‟ reflected the eventual recognition of the oversight. 
Over time, the university increasingly reinforced the notion that it conducted 
research and teaching in this technical area independent of the HRP, as well 
as inside it, particularly in venues where it might hope to attract new partners 
or collaborators who may be put off by the close relationship with the 
company (Ka___ 2010), (Br___ 2010a), (Case Study A newsletter 2009). 
6.2.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The three way HRP was based on a “ten year contract with public and private 
investment”(Ai).  The contract “was complicated”(Av) but “a fixed document, 
enforceable,  that doesn‟t change”(Av).  Whilst the academic partner “felt that 
the 86 page document was far too complicated, it was all necessary”(Aii).  It 
was noted that each partner came from “a different space, a different 
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dimension and had different success factors”(Aii) and that it was possible to 
“take the individual vision statements independently”(Aii).  The third, funding, 
partner was felt to be “completely ignored once we had the money”(Av). 
“Considerable effort” went into the development of commercial and legal 
frameworks to enable “a range of different operating models to be used” 
(Ja___, Si___ et al. 2003) although it is unclear how extensively these were 
exercised.  “Silly IPR requirements were imposed”(Ai) so that everything was 
owned by the company. Although they were “supposed to be balanced”(Ai), 
they were actually “designed in an unfair way”(Ai), which was “contradictory 
to the internal legal and constitutional agreement”(Ai) and became “a source 
of resentment and frustration”(Ai). 
Although “not commercially driven”(Ai) and “not an enterprise that makes 
money”(Ai), the HRP was described as being “driven by the company”(Avi).  
There was a view that “it doesn‟t matter”(Avi) to the university. 
The HRP‟s strategy was felt to be “set by metrics that we had to satisfy”(Aii) 
to the exclusion of anything else, as the Strategy Board “could never override 
metrics since it had no teeth by comparison”(Aii).  Important but „hard to 
measure‟ factors such as the underlying relationship between the parties 
were not reflected in the metrics, which focused on „easier to measure‟ 
operational factors (Do___ 2002a) such as headcount, funding and 
publications (Case Study A 2005).  Although using “familiar measures”(Av), 
they “didn‟t work across the HRP”(Av) and there was a sense that the 
“system always had to prove itself”(Av). “Metrics to justify your existence 
diverted effort from what it was supposed to be”(Av) and “in the early years, 
the partnership drowned in metrics, which curtailed its ability to evolve and 
take risks”(Av).  There was a view that “all the metrics were based on the 
company‟s objectives” (Avi) and that the university would “do the minimum to 
demonstrate that it was a „good citizen‟”(Avi).  It was felt that to “mutually 
oblige each other to do something and spend a long time measuring it”(Aii) 
was harmful to the HRP, wasting time and effort as each side did “a merry 
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dance seeking to convince each other that we were meeting our 
obligations”(Aii).  It was felt that to be effective “measures must address both 
sides”(Avi) but that “they should be side effects, not why you do it”(Aii). 
6.2.4 Culture 
One interviewee felt that the HRP was based on a “good cultural match”(Ai) 
with an “industry-friendly university”(Ai), where the “history of the relationship 
had aligned the cultures”(Ai), which were thought to be “very engineering-
dominant on both sides”(Ai). 
However, another suspected that since the organisations were “from different 
worlds”(Av) “there would have been a huge amount of misunderstanding, 
even over the meaning of words”(Av) and gave the example that „enhanced 
recognition‟ “was a marketing thing to the company, but meant money to the 
university”(Av).  It was felt that they “could say the words to each other and 
never think that they might mean something different”(Aii). 
There was a recognition that the organisational structure should reflect the 
different roles and needs of the principle partners, and that operational 
processes should range from company-specific to university-specific, with 
two-thirds of the processes being joint in some way (Ja___, Si___ et al. 
2003). 
6.2.5 Resources: People  
One interviewee noted that the issues in the HRP were “mostly about people 
and culture” (Aiii).  People issues were highlighted in a number of different 
ways and it was suggested that partnership was “only between people, not 
institutions”(Aii), based on “establishing what you had in common”(Aii).  
Cooperation between research managers, technical specialists and 
academic staff was identified as necessary to achieve the desired leverage 
from academic research but it was recognised that a „not invented here‟ 
attitude among industrial participants could jeopardise this (Do___ 2007). 
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A key element of the HRP strategy was to identify how the “requisite level of 
expertise” would be established and maintained (To___ 2008).  “Ensuring the 
provision” of an appropriate resource base was always recognised as a 
challenge (Ph___ [undated]), but a number of recruitment and secondment 
strategies were identified at the outset and the risk that it may not be possible 
to transfer enough experienced staff was considered small (Do___ 2002a).  
However, this assessment proved to be misguided. Those involved from the 
university side were “overloaded with other projects in the same domain”(Ai) 
and that the early phases were “put together as your night job, in addition to 
the day job”(Av). “Not enough talent and staff”(Ai) were involved and there 
was a recognition of “relying on heros”(Ai).  The physical location of the HRP 
was “too far away from their home base for academics”(Ai) and “was never 
really sold as „the place to go‟ to enhance your career, so it didn‟t attract 
people willing to collaborate and talk”(Av).  Recognising that it was not 
possible to “buy the right people as „off the shelf‟ components”(Ai) attempts 
were made to “make some of our own”(Ai), realising that these would be 
“critical, long lead items”(Ai).  It was noted that the “risks of relocation”(Ai) 
had not been managed and that the original idea of “cycling through 
secondees was practically impossible”(Aii). 
It was felt that the HRP was “lacking some kind of continuity”(Aiii).  Although 
the “knowledge and will were still alive in people‟s heads”(Av), there had 
been several leadership changes and the original champion was considered 
to have been already past their peak “in terms of influence”(Av).  Notably, of 
the early leadership on both sides of the HRP, four had since passed away 
and another five had retired during its early years.  The handover to an 
Implementation Team meant that “those involved in the design didn‟t carry it 
through to operation”(Aiii).  Whilst the goal “was clear within the small group 
involved in creating the entity”(Av), there was doubt “whether it was clear to 
and bought in to”(Av) by the senior leaders in both organisations.  Changes 
to personnel were felt to impact the complexity of the HRP.  “A lot of what 
went on depended on people arriving and leaving.  Attitudes and ways of 
working changed”(Av). The potential for the HRP to flourish in the future was 
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felt to depend “on who was in charge”(Av).  Furthermore, the original 
structure of nine research themes was felt to spread resources too thinly, 
making it difficult to maintain resource levels and demonstrate leadership in 
every area (To___ 2006). 
Personalities had also played a part in the way the HRP had developed. One 
interviewee believed “that the wrong person was in charge at formative 
times”(Av) as it “needed someone in charge who could work out of the 
box”(Av). “Lots of personalities clashed: in the university, the company and 
between them.  Those clashes were a fundamental cause”(Av) of issues in 
the HRP. “Relationships were strained until the soft issues were sorted”(Ai).  
There were issues “around interrelationships, the set-up of the team, 
outward-facing roles and the relationship to the university”(Av). 
6.2.6 Resources: Funding 
“In the early days, money was easy”(Aii) and costs for users of the HRP were 
“offset by a subsidy from head office” (Ph___ 2005).  As time had 
progressed, funders were “less prepared to give it blank cheques 
forever”(Aiv) and researchers “had to win contract funding from sundry 
business units and others”(Aii) based on a realistic charging rate (Ph___ 
2005).  This led to a “very tactical approach, living hand-to-mouth on yearly 
contracts”(Aii). 
“The university was in the same position.  They thought they had it tough, but 
we thought they had it easy”(Aii).  It was felt that “good academics could get 
money: they worked the system and got the grants”(Aii) although it was noted 
that funding bodies had more high quality proposals than money such that 
“with grant applications, it was a lottery over what would get funded”(Aii).   
There was felt to be a mismatch between the strategic intent of the HRP and 
sources of funding. “The thing that would determine strategy was 
money”(Aii). The expectation of alignment between company and university 
work “totally denied reality and how work came in.  You couldn‟t pick and 
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choose – it was all funding driven”(Aii). It was felt that the concept of a 
strategic research agenda “was only strategic if funding was forthcoming”, 
and whilst it “may not have had all the money, no money was not 
acceptable”(Aii). It was also felt that although there may have been a desire 
to “have work in strategic areas, you couldn‟t do it unless someone would 
pay for it”(Aii).  The HRP was “not resourced in a way to fulfil the vision”(Av) 
and was “constrained by money and no new equipment”(Av).  This was 
reflected in the website which was not maintained and had not been updated 
for two years (Case Study A 2009). 
One challenge was felt to be that “the scale of the HRP was so small 
compared to the scale of interest to a business unit financial director, so if 
you made your pitch at Board level it was down in the noise.  £20 billion 
budget lines were important, not £1 million”(Aii). “Board level support was 
necessary but not sufficient”(Aii): you needed to “establish a clear link to 
where the £1million decisions were made”(Aii). 
There was also a concern that “the business case was based on a flawed 
model which never held water”(Aii) so that “to make value, funding agencies 
would have had to spend money on company problems”(Aii).  Leverage from 
“significant levels of external funding” was part of the business case (Ph___ 
[undated]).  This required a high level of cooperation between the university 
and the company in order to benefit the university‟s pursuit of research 
income (Do___ 2007), whilst ensuring that the metric did not result in the 
capture of “non-aligned funding” simply to achieve financial performance 
(Ph___ 2005). 
6.2.7 Lifecycle 
In creating the HRP, “the people who agreed were at such an elevated level 
they had no grounding in what would actually happen”(Aii) and there was a 
failure to “figure out operationally how it would work first, not after it was too 
late”.  As a result “reality was different from what was thought should 
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happen”(Aii), and this had not been resolved. In comparing the HRP to that in 
Case Study F, one interviewee described it as “a sick old patient”(Ai).  Some 
risks to the set-up of the HRP, such as attracting the right staff, remained 
unresolved and continued to have an impact, but without the early 
management focus on them (Ja___, Si___ et al. 2003). 
The HRP was “in continuous transition”(Ai) and “would continue to 
evolve”(Ai).  The research “needs would continue to evolve rapidly”(Ai) and 
the “academic subject will evolve for the foreseeable future”(Ai).  However, 
there was a risk that this would simply “perpetuate ongoing messing”(Aii) in 
the way that the HRP functioned. 
Within the lifecycle, different „time constants‟ for the different parties meant 
that alignment, whilst not impossible, required agility.  It was noted that the 
university‟s time constant was “three years at best, whereas the company 
had volatility and changed every year”(Aii). 
The operational agreement was based on an expected term of ten years, 
with four exit strategies covering a range of options from breach of contract to 
mutual consent.  It was notable that no option for continuation beyond ten 
years was included (Do___ 2002a). 
6.2.8 Complexity 
Complexity within the HRP was observed in a number of different ways.  
Fundamentally, the topic area was considered “too esoteric”(Avi) and with 
“no product to relate to”(Avi) and “no visible way of exploitation”(Avi).  The 
scope was described at “limitless”(Ai), leading to the expectation that “almost 
every problem would be different”(Ai). 
Although the business processes of the two partners were individually 
considered straightforward, “integrated processes”(Ai) were considered 
highly complex.  It was noted that there were “lots of incompatibilities 
between extant processes such as funding cycles, levels of oversight and 
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styles of management”(Ai). The aim was to “integrate two existing systems 
for added value”(Ai) and it was noted early on that “joint processes needed 
defining”(Aiii).  However, several years into the HRP the “extent of joint-ness 
in areas of the current operation”(Aiii) was in doubt. 
The complexity was felt to be exacerbated by the fact that “other related 
research partnerships were established concurrently”(Ai) and that “the 
boundaries of the system were not scoped”(Ai), leading to “too many 
stakeholders”(Ai) who were “overlapping and confused”(Ai).  It was 
suggested that “at the time we felt we could manage five things at once”(Ai). 
Overall the HRP was felt to be a “complex evolving system which essentially 
depends on two main elements: the contract with its stated constraints, 
limitations & goals and the resources in the system – essentially people and, 
to a lesser extent, technology”(Av). 
6.2.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
It was felt that the effective use of systems engineering varied through the 
lifecycle, to the extent that although “a systems approach was used”(Ai), one 
interviewee felt that “the systems engineering failed”(Aii) and another felt that 
the “hard systems engineering could have been better”(Ai). Overall it was felt 
that “there was inadequate definition of the problem domain”(Ai), and this 
“should have gone up two levels”(Ai). It was felt that “the key was to 
understand the problem”(Aii) but that the team “came up with a solution 
before understanding what we were trying to do”(Aii). Not doing “enough 
systems engineering” at the next level up was felt to be a “big failing”(Ai). “In 
the last year or two, we recognised that we never were doing systems 
engineering, we just thought we were”(Aii). 
At the concept stage, it was felt that a systems approach had been adopted 
successfully and that “the techniques drove the vision”(Av).  A worldwide 
analysis of stakeholders was done (Do___ 2002a).  The team “did the 
requirements specification, functional & non-functional requirements, risk 
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analysis and prioritisation, viewpoint analysis, house of quality (QFD), 
etc”(Av).  There was “a lot of consensus over the requirements”(Av) from the 
various parties involved and it was felt that the team “got the top end of the V 
right”(Ai) within the systems engineering process. Various tools and 
techniques were used at this stage, including a synthetic environment to 
create “virtual reality models”(Ai) of the building and “reviewing all the 
different aspects of the system, for example what would be in the laboratories 
etc”(Av).  Requirements were captured, detailed, prioritised and traced back 
to strategy and objectives in a 51-page document (Do___ 2002b).  
Conflicting academic and industrial requirements were identified but these 
were to be addressed “through the organisation structure” which ensured “a 
balance of academic and industrial views” (Ja___, Si___ et al. 2003).  
However, the aspirations and expectations that were established had many 
dependencies identified which were reliant on understandings and 
agreements with groups and organisations outside the HRP, who were not 
directly party to the agreement.  Ensuring that these commitments were 
honoured had led to “an unintended tactical, piecemeal approach” with 
numerous independent programmes from which it was difficult to derive 
leverage (Ph___ 2005). 
However, there was a “discontinuity in systems engineering between concept 
and implementation”(Av) such that “in implementation and managing the 
place, systems engineering went out of the window and it became a business 
that had to fulfil metrics”(Av). The broad conceptual boundary for the HRP 
(Ja___, Si___ et al. 2003) was not operationalised, and in fact the 
implemented boundary was comparatively narrow. There was uncertainty 
whether “the performance metrics link directly to the requirements”(Ai) and it 
was noted that there were “no verification methods or plan for the 
requirements”(Ai). The requirements themselves were felt to be a “decent 
set”(Ai) although they “concentrated on output”(Ai) and addressed only 
WHAT in terms of “research outputs, themes and topics”(Ai) and not HOW 
these would be delivered.  Overall it was felt that the requirements addressed 
“the products, but not the processes”(Ai). 
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“There was no architectural design in process terms”(Ai) which meant that no 
“research management architecture”(Ai) was created. It was “naively 
assumed that both organisations had processes.  Integrated processes 
weren‟t created”(Ai). The team “never looked at control structures and 
procedures from going live and then evolving”(Av) and didn‟t “design the 
processes making sure they were the right ones for the capability in the HRP 
and the problems to be solved”(Ai).  Following a review a few years ago it 
was felt necessary to “intervene to design the processes because it wasn‟t 
working”(Ai), but although these “research project processes were a recent 
example of trying to improve alignment between objectives(Ai), this “first 
attempt still wasn‟t working”(Ai). 
6.2.10 Perceptions of Success 
Overall it was felt that by “getting to know a small group better and sharing 
the same common interests and insights”(Aii) the HRP was “more value than 
a standard partnership”(Aii) and that “arguably nobody else was doing any 
better”(Ai).  It had “not matched its business case”(Aiii) and had “fallen short 
of the highest aspirations, but was still there”(Aiii), suggesting that the 
“partners must have still seen value”(Aiii) even if they “couldn‟t articulate the 
benefits”(Aiv).  It was felt that it was “not a failed system, but one which had 
evolved outside the perspectives of those who worked on the early 
stages”(Av). Although “from different perspectives it had not fulfilled its 
potential”(Av) and had “never been able to hit the grand strategic 
issues”(Aiv), it was “always trusted and given the benefit of the doubt”(Aiv). 
In considering the future, there was “an awful lot the team got right in the 
early stages of implementation”(Av) and it was felt to be “a great complement 
to its foundations that it could evolve”(Av). “Because it was a working system 
with lots of bits that were good, it was capable of evolving in many 
directions”(Av).  Another interviewee was less optimistic and felt that it “could 
be made to work”(Aii) but would “take a lot of effort”(Aii), and that “it wouldn‟t 
take much to make it go badly wrong”(Aii). 
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6.3 Case Study B 
The HRP in Case Study B was a £32 million aerospace programme 
addressing key technological and regulatory issues relating to unmanned 
autonomous aircraft.  It involved a consortium of major aerospace 
companies, working with a number of small companies and universities.  The 
HRP was supported by Government investment at both central and regional 
levels to ensure that the aerospace industry maintains its global strength and 
develops world class technologies. 
6.3.1 Objectives 
The HRP in Case Study B had a “strong, clear”(Biv) “very simple goal”(Biv) 
and was “aimed at a single solution”(Bii) to “enable the market”(Bii). The 
“super-ordinate goal was to „do it first‟ and provide national advantage by 
being the first market mover”(Bi) and “creating a standard”(Bi).  
There were “three primary areas for research: technical, regulatory and 
demonstration (both to funding stakeholders and for public acceptance)”(Bi).  
“Government funding agencies all had different interests”(Bii) and partners all 
had competitive drivers.  Although clear, the nature of the participants in the 
HRP meant that the “single objective”(Biv) was also “the only thing that could 
be agreed upon”(Bi).  It was recognised that whilst the HRP “needed a 
shared reason and a common vision, the direct benefit didn‟t have to be the 
same to all parties”(Bii). 
The HRP aimed to deliver research at “low TRL, maybe 4-5 for the 
demonstration system.  If the TRL was any higher, the group would struggle 
to collaborate”(Biv) due to competitive pressures. 
There was a focus in the HRP on the longer term business opportunities.  At 
the culmination of the programme there was an expectation: 
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 To understand and agree with the regulator the route to product 
certification  
 To have encapsulated the lessons learnt into the UK regulations and 
to be leading the world regulatory development  
 For the partners to be able (individually or collectively) to develop and 
sell products and services suitable for the new market  
 To have conveyed to the wider community the benefits of the new 
market  
 For spin-off opportunities to have been identified and for exploitation 
activities to be in place (Case Study B End Goal 2011) 
6.3.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP “brings together disparate competing bodies with a common 
goal”(Bi) and involves “all sorts of parties, including well over 80 companies, 
10-15 universities and 7 government agencies”(Bii).  Creating it meant 
“putting together diverse unknown stakeholders”(Biii): generally “people didn‟t 
know each other, and were largely competitors”(Bii). 
The “fragmented industrial membership quickly polarised into three 
groups”(Bii).  Although there were “big problems to start with”(Biv) and the 
“first 6 months was very hard”(Bii), it was “OK when everyone understood the 
boundaries, including what they would share with everyone and what they 
would not give away”(Biv). 
The HRP had “no official lead”(Biv) and since it involved “all competitors 
together”(Bii),  “nobody allowed anyone to have the advantage”(Bi). Although 
it “had no leader, the three top jobs were filled by one company, voted in by 
the other players”(Bii).  “Despite sensitivity of holding all three key posts, the 
company was good at putting strong people into these roles”(Bi), and 
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although “there were occasional leadership challenges, the vote always 
returned to the same leader”(Bii). 
The programme of work comprised “16 separate projects, arranged so that 
there was at least one company per project”(Bii).  “Not everyone was in every 
project: participation was based on mutual interest and capability”(Bii) whilst 
“ensuring that various people run projects”(Biv). 
Remarkably, the participants were “not natural bedfellows and yet were able 
to work as one”(Bi).  After three years it was “a very close-knit community: at 
a recent event you couldn‟t tell where each speaker came from and they 
didn‟t reveal their company as they spoke”(Bii). 
6.3.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP was contractually complex, with “63 signatures on the original 
paperwork”(Bii) and a total of “187 signatures required to launch the 
programme”(Bi).  However, this did have the benefit that “once signed on the 
dotted line, it was difficult to walk away.  If anyone had pulled out it would 
have collapsed”(Biv). 
“Seven companies and eight universities were the basic partners”(Bii), and 
“each company had a representative on the board”(Biv).  It was felt to be 
“very important that those who fund were directly involved”(Bi).  All funding 
bodies had “equal status”(Bi) in governance, independent of the scale of their 
investment.   
There was an “operating group below the steering board for tactical 
management.  In many cases, the same people attended both meetings”(Bi). 
Although “each project had separate intellectual property”(Bii), “the aim was 
not the development of IPR, but the opening of the environment”(Bi). 
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6.3.4 Culture 
The culture of the HRP had evolved through the lifecycle from the 
“spectacular early meeting: venomous, ridiculously long”(Biv) with people 
“ganging up and switching allegiances”(Biv) through “forming, storming, 
norming”(Biv) to performing.  It was necessary “to get through the early 
problems to make it a success”(Biv). 
6.3.5 Resources: People  
Within the HRP there was a “focus on people making things work”(Bii) at all 
stages of the lifecycle.  After they had “struggled to find a programme 
director”(Bii), it was a “great credit to”(Bi) the individual who took that role that 
the programme developed effectively.  In addition, the chairman “had pulled 
everyone together and did such a good job”(Bii), “using facilitation skills”(Bi) 
rather than being “directive”(Bi). These key roles were held on the basis of 
“merit-based selection”(Bi) and although “not without challenge”(Bi) the 
“incumbents were voted back”(Bi).  
It was noted that these partnerships “needed very competent people to run 
them.  Those who were very good at it all tended to have a systems 
engineering background and were able to look at the bigger picture”(Bii).  “It 
needed someone who understood what we were trying to do”(Bii). 
6.3.6 Resources: Funding 
“Funding came from seven industry members and six government bodies”(Bi)  
It was a “mixed investment, large and small, all 50:50 funded”(Bi)  There was 
a “big enough pot of money”(Biv) to attract traditional competitors and 
provide “good leverage”(Bi) on the funding. 
The “funding hiatus in the middle was an issue”(Bi).  The company which 
filled the leadership positions “took a patriarchal role, continued its funding 
and held the HRP together”(Bi).  With only one exception, “all industrial 
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partners committed some level of funding during this period to help keep the 
teams in place”(Biv).  This was “a pragmatic solution: wasted gearing but not 
wasted effort”(Biv). 
The government funding and multiple partners provided “good leverage”(Bi) 
on the investment but added complexity.  The funding bodies were “not used 
to working together: each had to approve the programme individually and 
align as far as possible”(Bi). 
6.3.7 Lifecycle 
It was noted that in the creation of the HRP, “one of few ways to make it work 
was to know the people and the organisations”(Biii).  Nevertheless, the 
nature of the partners meant that “the first year was very tense”(Biv). 
The HRP was a “six year programme in two phases of three years each.  
“The first 18 months was about understanding the problem”(Bii).  During the 
first phase the HRP: 
 Engaged with the regulators to understand the issues  
 Developed appropriate technology to TRL 3+  
 Culminated in an integrated SE demonstration of the art of the 
possible  
 Created an internationally recognised position for the UK (Case Study 
B The Programme 2011). 
When Phase 1 ended in 2008, “there was a funding gap for over a year”(Bi).  
Phase 2 was scheduled to last until 2013 and involved: 
 Agreeing a process with the regulator to establish suitability of various 
engineering solutions from the safety perspective  
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 Creating a process to identify and engage with potential UAS end 
users to establish more detailed and specific user requirements  
 Starting work to increase the TRL of particular technologies to TRL 6  
 Progressing solutions through live flight trials (Case Study B The 
Programme 2011) 
“Phase Two had proved difficult for funding”(Biv) from one stakeholder.  
“Most stakeholders were relatively supportive but wanted Phase One to be 
evaluated first, leading to a year‟s gap”(Biv).  The “interim evaluation and 
quarterly reviews were good”(Biv) but since “nobody‟s going to sign up 
to”(Biv) the full funding on the basis of “a woolly statement”(Biv) it was 
unclear “how the HRP could have got around them wanting to assess the 
impact before entering the second phase”(Biv).  One interviewee noted that 
“we were wearing rose tinted glasses at the start and assumed that it would 
come in with a couple of months delay”(Biv).  In contrast, it had “taken a very 
long time to get the proposal through”(Biv).  “Realism might have helped, but 
interim funding would have dried up if we had been too realistic”(Biv). 
6.3.8 Complexity 
The HRP was “commercially complex with 13 separate funding 
stakeholders”(Bi), one of whom “flowed money through the company into two 
broad programmes, with multiple parts below that level”(Bi).  This approach 
to “funding was the issue: the structural complexity made it a real challenge 
lining up lots of stakeholders and their internal funding processes”(Bii).  In 
addition, “programme division was necessary to avoid transgressing 
European state-aid rules”(Bi).  Any chance of a simple programme structure 
“was compromised from the start”(Bi). 
Overall, the HRP was felt to exhibit both “industrial complexity and 
stakeholder complexity”(Bii). 
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6.3.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
In terms of its research focus, the HRP was a “good example of looking at 
the total system”(Bii).  It was noted that they “were the only people in the 
world tackling this problem from a systems approach: technology, 
regulations, integration”(Bii).  It incorporated “sixteen separate programmes 
with an integration layer that happened around it and brought all the 
elements together”(Bii). 
The HRP took a “Whole system approach” which considered the system and 
its context in parallel: 
 Regulatory requirements 
 System of systems integration 
 Engagement of the regulatory authorities  
 Visualisation and experimentation in synthetic environments with 
validation of certain key technologies in flight tests  
 Collaboration with other international bodies (Case Study B The 
Approach 2011) 
In structuring the HRP the team “used classical systems engineering 
structure”(Bi).  This included “developing the operational concept to 
understand „how does it work?‟”(Biii).  “A lot of it was about capturing 
requirements”(Bii) and there was a recognition within the HRP that users 
views, public perception and ethical issues were all “major issues”(Bii) which 
were to be addressed further in the next phase.  Both projects within Phase 2 
include elements of demonstration and interaction with the regulator (Case 
Study B Current Projects 2011). 
Integration was felt to be “pretty good”(Biv) with “everybody involved in an 
integrated demonstration”(Biv) which involved “defining interfaces and 
exchanging software”(Biv).  “The companies leading the demonstration had 
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done it before.  The necessary focus was achieved by ensuring that there 
was “one project looking after the demonstration”(Biv).  The guys knew what 
they were doing, and understood the timescales and what would be feasible.  
It looked pretty”(Biv).  
6.3.10 Perceptions of Success 
“Phase One was pretty successful, with government stakeholders relatively 
happy that we did what we said we‟d do”(Biv).   There were “at least 100 
suppliers and good interactions”(Biv) with the stakeholders. 
“By the end of Phase One, the team of people worked really well together 
and wrote a really good completion report”(Biv).  An “independent review 
described the HRP as „best in class‟ for collaboration and working 
together”(Biv) and reported that it had “delivered more benefit than promised 
in all the different forms required”(Bii), in spite of the fact that it had been 
“difficult”(Bi) to “show economic advantage”(Bi) for some stakeholders.  This 
success “was the result of the planned delivery of those requirements”(Bii). 
The success of the HRP “both in terms of collaboration and technological 
output is unquestioned”(Case Study B Project 2011). “You could see the 
success”(Biv).  The “focused goal was the main success criterion: everybody 
wanted to get there”(Biv). 
6.4 Case Study C 
The HRP in Case Study C was set up in 2007 between the company and the 
customer to develop a shared understanding of capability drivers, alternative 
solutions and potential exploitation routes for technology, and to reconcile 
these with available research budgets, resources and timescales.  The aim 
was to remove duplication and to understand the impact of decisions on 
programme risk and on the sustainment of relevant industrial capability in the 
military air sector.    
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6.4.1 Objectives 
The HRP was established as an advisory body under the joint chairmanship 
of the customer and the company, providing advice to all its member 
organisations.  It had no direct authority over any research programme, but 
was established to advise on “the likely consequences for industrial and 
research capabilities of any planned course of action” and identify 
opportunities to meet emerging requirements.  There was an intention that 
agreements reached within the group would be “enacted in the partner 
organisations through its members” (Technology Acquisition Plan, Appendix 
2: Joint Technology Acquisition Process 2007).  Significant effort was 
expended in the early stages on agreeing the terms of reference. 
Within Case Study C there was a view that “the bigger picture win had 
become the main objective” (Ciii) of the HRP but there was still difficulty 
articulating “exactly what we wanted to do”(Ciii) and a feeling that there was 
a need to “reconfirm objectives”(Ciii).  Whilst it was felt that “both parties 
wanted to understand the technology and sustainment issues”(Ciii) and to be 
“as efficient as possible with the research budget”(Cii) ensuring “that the 
spend on technology was to maximum benefit”(Ciii), there was a concern that 
although there “may appear to be common objectives, these may not 
necessarily align and may be in conflict”(Ci).  It was felt that “at a senior level, 
only the overall intent was agreed”(Ci) but at a working level there was “a 
recognition of pressures on all of us that helps us all to work on win-wins”(Ci).  
It was felt that the HRP could “support tactical activities”(Ciii) and effort was 
being made to address capability sustainment by “finding out the best way of 
escalating potential issues fast so that something could be done”(Cii), 
recognising that the “danger was the difficulty in restarting independent 
capability”(Ci) once it was lost. A fundamental difference which “couldn‟t be 
solved at this level”(Ciii) was that industry “wanted a longer term assurance 
that they could maintain capability”(Ciii) and government “wanted it to be 
there when they wanted it”(Ciii). 
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Significant time was spent in meetings jointly planning interactions with 
senior decision makers within the customer organisation, with the aim not 
only of getting support for specific recommendations, but also for getting 
recognition and support for the processes being adopted.  It was felt that “it 
would be brilliant to see research getting done in the right areas”(Cii) such 
that it resulted in exploitation onto products, but it was “difficult to understand 
the tangible outputs”(Ciii) of the HRP itself and there was concern that 
“vague and flexible terms of reference made sustaining the momentum 
hard”(Cii). 
6.4.2 The nature of the relationship 
Within the HRP there was an emphasis on the protection of information that 
was shared from both sides, with a significant proportion of reports, 
presentations, meeting minutes etc being protectively marked and such 
markings being respected.  Nevertheless there was “generally caution in 
relations, not sharing differences but exchanging information „without 
prejudice or commitment‟ to avoid unbalancing the field”(Ci).  Financial 
information was typically not shared unless formally requested. 
There was some difference of opinion as to whether the HRP was 
“unique”(Cii) or “similar relationships”(Ci) existed. 
Although “it took a while to build it up, both through exchanging views and 
doing things together”(Ci) there was felt to be “an element of trust”(Ci). This 
was felt to be in contrast to more difficult situations with “more than one 
industrial partner”(Ci) where participants were competitive and  “wouldn‟t 
open up or say anything in public”(Ci).  “Often badged as „talking shops‟”(Ci), 
such groups were felt to “work well when people were open and contributed, 
but not so well when people were defensive”(Ci). 
The HRP was characterised by “lots of ex-committee work, just coming 
together to make decisions”(Cii).  Meetings also comprised presentations on 
work that had been done within the company, presentations on initiatives 
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from the customer, and information sharing on personnel and organisational 
changes, meetings attended etc by both sides.  Discussions on „the 
environment‟ within which the HRP operated tended to dominate meeting 
time. 
6.4.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
Having been established under another joint organisation that had since 
“gone away”(Ci), the HRP “doesn‟t report to anyone”(Ci).  This was a 
concern, since although it “could stand alone without a commercial 
agreement”(Cii), it “needed exposure to get buy-in”(Ci).   
Opportunities for the HRP to fast-track solutions were limited as 
“procurement policy made „single source‟ difficult”(Ciii), with a “pretty 
constant pressure to compete where possible”(Ci). 
It was felt that the HRP “may have reached the stage where there could be 
key performance indicators”(Cii). 
6.4.4 Culture 
Culturally, it was felt that “although there were a range of people around the 
table, most were technical or engineers and spoke the same language”(Cii) 
so that they “understood each other at the technical level”(Ci).  However, one 
interviewee reflected on the “organisational stovepipes”(Ci) within one 
partner and noted that he “realised that I didn‟t understand they had a 
different perspective of the world”(Ci).  Regular reorganisation was felt to 
introduce a “new culture every time”(Ci) and it was observed that there was 
“almost an airgap” between the research and acquisition communities (Br___ 
2010a). 
Within the HRP, in place of the “usual adversarial relationship between 
customer and supplier”(Ciii), “both parties were willing to change, out of 
necessity”(Ciii). 
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6.4.5 Resources: People  
Although “very busy with other work”(Cii) one interviewee noted that he 
enjoyed participating and the feeling that “we‟re making a difference”(Cii).  
Among the “like-minded individuals”(Cii), some were described as “excellent, 
positive and enthusiastic”(Cii); others identified as “key member” and 
“couldn‟t do without”(Cii). 
Although the HRP comprised “all volunteers with no authority”(Cii) there was 
a feeling that participants “maybe also needed the authority to make 
decisions”(Cii) and that “alternates who „had to ask the boss‟ could be a 
problem”(Cii). 
It was felt that the “set-up may be unique: having access to the right people 
who have access to the right people … and if all those knowledgeable people 
agreed on something, it must be right”(Cii).  Working through individuals and 
through multiple contact points was seen to be important. 
6.4.6 Resources: Funding 
The HRP itself received no direct funding with travel costs borne by the 
parent organisations and meeting costs borne on a rotational basis by the 
meeting hosts (Technology Acquisition Plan, Appendix 2: Joint Technology 
Acquisition Process 2007). 
Its effectiveness was, however, impacted by the funding situation within the 
partner organisations.  The chronic funding situation had created “a 
nightmare putting together the research programme”(Cii) with people 
“spending most of their time costing options”(Cii) and “nobody willing to make 
decisions”(Cii) about options which were “politically sensitive”(Cii).  The 
“unaffordable”(Cii) programme which was “increasingly overheated and 
eventually in chaos”(Ci) meant that “a difficult decision had to be made”(Cii).  
It was hoped that a major review  would “bring clarity and stability”(Civ). 
Chapter Six  Case Study Findings 
[156] 
 
Although it was recognised that “funding would be the key issue”(Cii), with 
“acquisition driven by value for money decisions, reversed for political 
reasons”(Ci) “the company never came begging”(Cii) and had worked to 
secure alternative funding sources.  Restructuring within the customer 
organisation may help with “more control given to those better placed to 
decide how the money was spent”(Cii).   
6.4.7 Lifecycle 
The HRP was felt to be in a “continuous”(Ci), “never ending cycle”(Cii). 
Although there was “always research to do”(Cii) within the portfolio of 
programmes, “lifecycles were continually churning, and there were peaks and 
troughs that needed managing”(Ci). 
At the start, as the HRP “moved from political to real”(Ciii), “relationships 
weren‟t fully definable”(Ciii). In implementation they were “still thrashing 
around trying to understand what information we wanted on the table”(Ciii).  
There was “no steady state organisation”(Ciii) and “people changed all the 
time”(Ciii).  This was felt to be “setting up the process”(Cii) and “once the 
hard slog was done it would just be a question of maintaining it”(Cii), 
although there was a concern whether there would be “enough to keep it 
going”(Cii). 
There “was a while when it wasn‟t happening”(Cii) and “we lost our way and 
could have pulled the plug”(Cii).  Participants “wondered if we were getting to 
the point when we „knock it on the head‟ under the „too difficult‟ 
category”(Cii).  However, a way was found to “take it further forward 
again”(Cii).  Nonetheless, it was felt that another “„so what‟ point”(Cii) would 
soon follow. 
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6.4.8 Complexity 
“The inherent complexity due to the scope was fairly high”(Ciii).  This was felt 
both in terms of “many stakeholders”(Ci) in both organisations and those 
stakeholders being “quite stovepiped”(Ci) 
Although terms of reference had been agreed, one interviewee noted that 
without “firm Terms of Reference or a set of objectives”(Cii) there were 
“different perceptions of scope”. They felt that one individual was using this 
“privileged position”(Cii) and “persistently attempting to broaden the 
scope”(Cii) beyond what was originally agreed.  This was consistent with the 
different domain responsibilities, within their parent organisation, of the 
participants. 
6.4.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
Although not explicitly part the HRP‟s approach, one interviewee felt that 
whilst “most people badge systems engineering as process, at a reasonably 
senior level, scientists and engineers just think that way”(Ci).   In contrast, it 
was noted that within the customer organisation “there was a requirement for 
through-life plans, but what was lacking were the tools and ability to use them 
in a joined up way”(Ci). 
Both more broadly and specifically as a means “for expressing 
requirements”(Ci), “roadmapping had been invaluable.  We couldn‟t have 
done what we‟ve done without it”(Cii).  “The whole point was that it was fairly 
universal”(Cii) and although people “may use different tools”(Cii) the output 
was “still recognisable”(Cii) even if “colours and symbols were different”(Cii).  
Based on this, “gap analysis produced a tangible output that could make a 
difference”(Cii). 
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6.4.10 Perceptions of Success 
A self-review conducted 18 months after the HRP was established noted 
that: 
 there had been good technical interchanges on a number of topics 
 there were better links between subject matter experts in the different 
organisations 
 all the right people were around the table 
 there were improved behaviours and a recognition of the different cultures 
 transparency between the organisations had been achieved 
 differences between the planning processes in the different organisations 
had been identified. 
The challenge was to achieve “more tangible results”: specifically, an end-to-
end implementation and other case studies to demonstrate the efficacy of the 
approach, and an agreed process by which to share, understand and 
influence future plans.  Barriers to this included an ever-evolving process and 
schedule with complex and changing stakeholder set, resource constraints 
and financial pressures, together with ongoing sensitivities with respect to 
competition (Ba___, Ho___ 2009). 
Overall, the HRP was felt to have had “a mixed level of success”(Ciii), “slowly 
making progress”(Ci) and having “delivered some benefits, but not all”(Ciii).  
The “size of the network and contacts was massive, enabling influence and 
money to be found”(Cii).  It was “seen as valuable in itself” (Cii) and “even if it 
did nothing else, it would still have been worth it for access”(Ciii) to the right 
people in the other organisation.  Nevertheless, the fact that there were lots 
of areas “where R&D needed doing and nothing was being done”(Cii) risked 
“being terminal”(Cii) for the HRP and there remained a concern that anyone 
should “think we‟re just wasting time”(Cii). 
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6.5 Case Study D 
The HRP in Case Study D was a multi-disciplinary £8.4M research 
programme established in 2006, jointly sponsored by a Government funding 
body and the company and delivered by a consortium of ten UK universities 
and company researchers (Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009).  The programme 
aimed to define, develop and demonstrate approaches to system of systems 
engineering needed to support network enabled capability, but was 
terminated at its mid-term review after three years. 
6.5.1 Objectives 
Fundamentally, the research motivation behind the HRP in Case Study D 
“clearly had good intent”(Dii) and “was a really good question to ask”(Diii). 
There was a “very strong feeling”(Dvi) that there was “a strategic 
imperative”(Dvi) and it was felt that it “was right to fund a major 
programme”(Diii) in this “important”(Dii) area.  The parties involved “all 
wanted the programme to happen”(Di). One interviewee felt that the “overall 
objective was to create a partnership”(Di) in this area: in other words that the 
partnership itself was more important than the research. 
However, “taking the macro view, it was dealing with a very indeterminate 
thing, built around a buzzword.  The lack of clarity wasn‟t tackled”(Diii).  Many 
interviewees echoed this concern about the “nice big woolly statement”(Dv) 
which provided a “big open space and no focus”(Dvi), written around a 
fashionable topic area where “nobody knew what it was”(Diii) and where 
“nobody could specify the problem well enough to agree”(Dvi).  It was “very 
complex and encompassed everything”(Dv) and sufficiently 
“unfocussed”(Dvi) as to leave participants “not knowing what the issue 
was”(Diii).  Without a “common understanding”(Dix) and with participants 
having “nothing in common”(Dvi), the HRP lacked “a shared objective”(Diii).  
There was “a risk of people working to a local agenda”(Diii). 
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With “no clarity of scope and objective, there was nothing to act as criteria by 
which you evaluate and align research”(Diii) and it was impossible to “build a 
clear, coherent research agenda”(Diii).  There were “many stakeholders and 
many objectives”(Di): it was “obvious that company people didn‟t know what 
they wanted”(Div) and “major stakeholders didn‟t know either”(Diii). “Right 
from the start there was a failure to communicate and develop purpose”(Div).  
Noting that “clarity of objectives was critical”(Dv) and it would have been 
“much better to concentrate on a few small areas”(Dv). 
“Nobody said what the advantage would be to the company”(Dv): they “didn‟t 
know what the end product would be”(Div) and “couldn‟t articulate the key 
benefits”(Dii).  It was felt that “no business needed it”(Dix) and that the work 
was “academic and ethereal”(Dii).  It was a “big mistake”(Dv) to select work 
“at low technology readiness levels where it was hard to see progress”(Dv).  
Most of the company representatives “didn‟t understand how it could be 
exploited”(Di).  Expectations of key stakeholders were not fully understood 
(Case Study D Independent Steering Group Meeting 4. 2009). 
6.5.2 The nature of the relationship 
The university participants for the HRP were selected “at the proposal 
stage”(Diii).  “A number of universities”(Diii) were “down-selected and 
grouped into teams”(Diii). Academic theme leaders were then “told „this is 
your team‟”(Diii).  There was “no underlying coherence in the selection of 
universities”(Diii) and the “agreement was seen to be a compromise”(Dviii).  
As a result the HRP was “not a partnership but a set of warring tribes”(Dviii). 
It was, however, “much more transparent and understandable”(Div) than the 
HRP in Case Study E and “didn‟t suffer from the same problems”(Div). 
Although the review panel believed the HRP was a “cohesive partnership” in 
which university relationships and adoption of the HRP branding were both 
particularly and unusually strong (Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009), this view was 
not reflected by many of the participants.  The “composite of company and 
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researchers”(Div) was “not a good research team”(Div), and there was 
conflict between “doing good research and doing the research the client 
wants”(Div). However, there was “no friction between academics, except for 
two universities where the wider area of work overlapped”(Di). The “ultimate 
mechanism would have been to be able to change the academic 
partners”(Diii) but this was not done.  There was also a “bad interface 
between corporate research and company stakeholders who had no clue 
why it was being done”(Div). 
One interviewee felt that the termination “meant that you could never gauge 
long term commitment”(Div) and was “put off going into a partnership where 
they weren‟t under control”(Div).  
6.5.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP was felt to be “contract-led”(Dvi), but was based on an “arcane, 
muddled, Byzantine contract”(Dvi).  The three-way financial and contractual 
structures, covered only by “an eight page proposal”(Dv), “standard grant 
terms and conditions”(Dvii) and “two page memorandum of 
understanding”(Dvii) meant that the company was “trying to run the 
programme with no control over the finance”(Dv).  A fourth part of the 
intended agreement “was never agreed”(Dvii) and “never properly signed 
up”(Dvii).  This was “hard to manage”(Dv) since it was “hard to say you have 
got control when you haven‟t”(Dv), consistent with the view of another 
interviewee who suggested that “it never works if run by a third party”(Dix).  It 
was suggested that “the company won‟t do it again” in that way, but in future 
would “pay for separate parts of the programme on a monthly or quarterly 
basis”(Dv) in order to retain control. 
The customer was “a banker, who needed to show that it had spent its 
money in a way that furthered science”(Dv), but was “not terribly interested in 
outcomes”(Dv).  Its “success criteria were „completion‟ and „money 
spent‟”(Dv), requiring the work to be “groundbreaking new stuff”(Dv) and only 
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recently asking for “an impact statement to identify the benefits to UK 
industry”(Dv).  The experience “made the customer realise they weren‟t 
managing the company relationship”(Di) and it was hoped that this would “get 
them to manage better”(Dii). 
It was suggested that “if you want to lead in systems engineering you have to 
give stuff away”(Di) and “influence tools and processes”(Di) in order to 
“reduce cost and increase collaborative opportunities”(Di).  This implied that 
the “business winning strategy should be to make everyone use your 
system”(Di), but it was felt that a key company stakeholder “didn‟t 
understand”. In contrast, there was a concern that the company were “over-
generous with their corporate investment”(Dii) and should not be funding 
such a significant proportion of the money “if it was going into the public 
domain”(Dv), given that “the rest of industry could come along to the industry 
day and get the same benefits without paying”(Dii).  The termination of the 
HRP “allowed the company to re-engage at a more sensible level”(Dii).  
Ideally, the company would “rather have had twenty partners, especially on 
something like this”(Dii). 
There was a view that the customer and company were “too geared around 
big programmes agreed on „day one‟”(Diii) for funding to be “flexible 
enough”(Diii) and that “milestones needed to be sufficiently high level”(Diii) at 
the outset.  It was felt that “statements of work and funding allocation 
shouldn‟t be firmed up too soon”(Diii) to avoid having to “live with the 
commitment”(Diii).  Although there was “nothing wrong with a lack of clarity 
as long as you had flexibility and could „roll up your sleeves‟ for a year”(Diii) 
to define the problem, there was “not enough recognition of the need for 
flexibility”(Diii) and difficulties came with “trying to manage as a well-defined 
project when it wasn‟t”(Div).  There was “no mechanism to achieve 
flexibility”(Diii), rendering the “need to move emphasis from one university to 
another, cutting across contractual and financial inflexibility”(Diii) 
unachievable.  There was a failure to recognise “the different nature of the 
early stages of the lifecycle, where research was a convergent process to 
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build up understanding”(Diii). “In the last year it was being treated as a 
project: task driven, with fixed milestones”(Diii). 
The “lack of clarity was promulgated through the concept of a „more 
integrated world‟ but thinking stopped there.  Beyond that, everything was so 
unclear it was possible to create the illusion of progress”(Diii).  Although 
“most academics would do whatever you ask them to do and rarely took 
money or support and then followed their own agenda”(Dv), “local agendas 
dominated and drove the programme”(Diii).  With “nothing to act as criteria by 
which you evaluated and aligned research, everyone saw it as a means to do 
what they wanted to do anyway”(Diii).  “As the HRP got further on, the 
incentive to „do their own thing‟ got stronger”(Diii). So “when it came to 
assess it, the company didn‟t know how to”(Div).   
6.5.4 Culture 
One interviewee felt that “the cultural mismatch was within the company, not 
asking the right questions low enough”(Dv).  It was noted that “there were 
two camps”(Dv) in the company: “those asking the right questions but not 
involved, too busy and too remote”(Dv) and “those for whom it was a pet 
subject, who also researched and published”(Dv). There were “loads of 
people in the company who were happy to do research in their own area”(Dv) 
and “got on really well with academics”(Dv).  These seemed to feel that there 
was “no need to show benefit”(Dv); however, “up a level in the company”(Dv) 
it was clear that the benefits mattered but unclear “where the benefit 
was”(Dv).  There was a concern that “we played at these things”(Dix), 
allowing “too much distance between the project and the business”(Dix).  It 
was felt that there was “a lack of coherence across the company”(Diii) and 
that, having “no overall company integrator”(Di), “the company was not well 
structured to exploit research programmes”(Di) of this nature.  The review 
panel felt that the programme would not deliver its full potential unless both 
the researchers and the business sponsor “took joint responsibility for 
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exploitation” and made the necessary resources available (Ne___, Mc___ et 
al. 2009). 
A similar mismatch was reflected in the views of another interviewee who 
observed the “change that happened in the company”(Diii) between the initial 
“technical/research perspective”(Diii) which initially drove the programme and 
the subsequent “change of responsibility”(Diii) towards “a much more short 
term ROI view of research”(Diii).  It was felt that within the company “the 
techies didn‟t have enough clout versus the businessmen who didn‟t see the 
value”(Div).  Given this mismatch, stakeholder engagement “was not good 
enough” (Case Study D Independent Steering Group Meeting 4. 2009) 
Within the HRP, one respondent noted that the “research teams knew each 
other better”(Div) than, for example, the HRP in Case Study E.  However, this 
may have had a negative impact on those without extant relationships, 
leading to a “lack of respect”(Di) from one university for “other non-defence 
participants”(Di).  In addition, and perhaps consistent with the involvement of 
an existing community, there was a lack of adventurous and challenging 
research within the programme (Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009). 
It was felt that “the aim to publish together”(Dv) within the academic 
environment was poorly thought through since there would be difficulties 
agreeing “whose name came first”(Dv).  It was “silly to try to get a whole set 
of universities to come together in that sort of fashion”(Dv). 
6.5.5 Resources: People  
Describing resource capability as the composite of “numbers, skills and 
knowledge”(Dviii), it was felt that “resource capability could meet the 
compromise requirement set, but not what the original intent was”(Dviii). One 
part of the company “worked better relationships and the quality of their 
engineers was good”(Di); another “had the wrong group working on it and 
should have used business process rather than technology people”(Di).  
Overall the resources were “inadequate”(Dviii) although the majority of 
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research groups involved were large enough to have reached a critical mass 
(Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009). 
There was felt to have been a “huge turnover of research assistants”(Dix).  
Inexperienced staff were an issue since “one who was inexperienced could 
be carried but, with this type of partnership, multiple inexperienced parties 
could be a struggle”(Div).  There was a “low tolerance”(Div) to the learning 
that was required. 
The issues were felt to “boil down to a lack of leadership on both sides”(Dvi), 
reinforced by the view that one leader had “no credibility”(Dix) although 
others “felt he did quite a good job of corralling academics”(Dv), “ensuring 
that researchers talked”(Div) and had “a lot of time for him”(Div). Within the 
company the HRP needed “ownership at a more senior level”(Di) from those 
with “influence in the business”(Div).  The HRP suffered “when leadership 
changed and didn‟t support it, causing implementers to flounder”(Dv):  “lots of 
people tried not to get too involved”(Dv). 
The HRP was thought by one interviewee to be “badly project managed”(Dix) 
although another noted that “project control hit with a vengeance”(Diii) in the 
later stages.   It was felt that there was a need to “make people 
responsible”(Dix) for programme outcomes and to “invest in support”(Dix). 
Within the HRP there “were people who had worked together before”(Div) 
although not in all themes.  One interviewee thought that “generally 
academics didn‟t like working together”(Dv), and that “the stuff working 
together was a bit fudged”(Dv).  Another felt that “more frequent exchanges 
would have been better”(Div) and that individual theme leaders were “too 
narrow as a communications channel between theme participants and the 
project as a whole”(Div).  Better use could have been made of “academic 
expertise below theme leader level”(Div). 
Nevertheless, they “generally all worked well together”(Di), “had kept in 
touch”(Div) and “would work together again”(Div) having “got to know each 
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other and what contributions each could make”(Div). Termination of the HRP 
was not felt to “destroy trust between individuals”(Div).  
6.5.6 Resources: Funding 
The HRP was funded jointly by the customer and the company, with one-third 
coming from the customer and two-thirds from the company (Wo___, Os___ 
2009).  One interviewee noted that the „customer‟ funding the research was 
“not very good at multidisciplinary problems”(Diii) and questioned whether 
they were “the right funding body for systems problems”(Diii), suggesting that 
alternatives might “deal with more indeterminate problems”(Diii) more often. 
Recognising the need to get “sufficient scale of effort behind substantial 
business and research challenges”, there was an open invitation to potential 
collaborators from industry and academia to “explore mutually beneficial 
ways of working together” (He___, Gu___ et al. 2007). 
When the company decided to withdraw at the review point, this created “an 
absurd situation, a ridiculous case where the customer had to pull funding 
because they didn‟t have adequate backup funds to cover it.  The company 
could have pulled the funding on a whim”(Dvi). It was felt that “in spite of the 
company pulling out on the business side, the customer should have given 
the project time and resourcing to continue based on the review 
feedback”(Div).  “They could have found a replacement or do research that 
could be done with the available money”(Div) but this didn‟t happen.  
Reflecting on this, the customer subsequently noted that a multi-partner 
approach to collaborative programmes with industry would be considered in 
future (Case Study D Independent Steering Group Meeting 4. 2009). 
In addition to the business model which relied on “a bit of money from lots of 
different parts of the company”(Diii), “lots of universities invested and there 
were a lot of resources that weren‟t paid for”(Di).  Nevertheless, there was a 
significant underspend during the first phase of the programme (Ne___, 
Mc___ et al. 2009) 
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6.5.7 Lifecycle 
The company and lead university “took the original proposal”(Dviii) to the 
customer, after which “lots of different partnerships and lots of different ideas 
got involved, which didn‟t necessarily match the original.  Outsiders from the 
original group brought in another set of requirements, money, stakeholders 
etc.  Eventually there was a resolution but there was a lot of bad feeling, 
resource disposal and wastage, with good ideas and people being put 
aside”(Dviii). Another interviewee took the view that creating the partnership 
preceded “looking for a problem”(Di). 
As a result, the HRP “had a long gestation period”(Di) which was, in part, 
seen as a good thing, since “by the time funding arrived the academics were 
used to working together”(Di).  However, once “the money was there, the 
failure to create a suitable research programme in an acceptable timeframe 
was getting embarrassing”(Di) for the company.  They “failed to fully exploit 
opportunities to shape research direction”(Div) and the project start was slow 
(Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009). 
The HRP was structured around “research and then an interim 
demonstration”(Diii), but “in the last year, effort was dominated by project 
reporting and demonstrations”(Diii). “Lots of effort was spent producing 
reports, milestone reports etc to serve project control”(Diii). Although the 
“universities were not integrators”(Dv) and were “not motivated”(Dv) by trying 
to “push from TRL 0-3 up to technology demonstrators”(Dv), “demonstrations 
became the programme for a good nine months”(Diii). “Hard expectations 
drove behaviours”(Diii) and “actual research dwindled”(Diii). 
After 3 years, there was a review of the HRP.  For some, there had been “a 
growing disquiet that it wasn‟t what we wanted”(Dv) and “we felt that there 
was nothing that said we needed to continue”(Dii). “It was not felt to be a 
good programme”(Diii) and based on “the lack of obvious benefit, funding 
level and IPR arrangements it didn‟t add up”(Dii). Although the customer 
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“rarely terminates programmes early, it can”(Di).  It was thought to have been 
done “in a tactful way”(Dii). 
Others disagreed.  Since it was “always agreed that it would be an 
independent review”(Di) it was felt that the steering body and review panel 
“didn‟t have enough autonomy”(Div).  They “went into the review having 
already decided”(Div): it was “odd”(Div) that the company‟s business decision 
was weighted “over evidence from the internal review”(Div). “The all or none 
nature of the review was strange”(Div).  “The philosophy of the review was to 
redirect the work or terminate it only if “it was failing academically, for 
example it had no publications”(Di).  They felt that “the review was positive 
and strong with only one area of concern, and that was short term 
exploitation - which seemed to become the reason for closure”(Div). “Never 
having known one to be stopped before”(Div), it came as “a shock”(Div) to 
some in both the company and universities: to others it was 
“disappointing”(Div).  It was felt that “the customer failed the project”(Div) and 
that it was “silly to kill it after three years, when „where you were going and 
how you were going to get there‟ was understood”(Div).   
It was recognised that as a result of early programme termination 
“reputations can suffer as the result of an unexpected decision” and so a 
“planned and structured withdrawal process” was needed to allow 
researchers to transition to other work, for the reporting of work done to be 
completed and for outputs to be disseminated (Case Study D Independent 
Steering Group Meeting 4. 2009). 
6.5.8 Complexity 
Although the subject of the research was “not really that complicated”(Dii), 
the HRP was felt to be “inherently very complex with lots of technical and 
organisational complexity”(Diii).  There was “more than one objective and no 
common language to express them”(Diii).  “Given the lack of clarity, 
complexity flourished”(Diii) and “problems inherent organisationally were very 
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difficult to resolve”(Diii).   “Every stakeholder had a different view, either 
slightly or radically”(Diii).  With “100 people, there were 101 
interpretations”(Dv).  The “stakeholder complexity was very high”(Di).  This 
“lack of a working definition” was ultimately cited as one of the problem areas 
for the HRP (Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009). 
The programme structure comprised of four Topic Groups, interlinked by four 
Cross-cutting Themes which were focussed activities of limited duration 
(He___, Gu___ et al. 2007).  The relationship between the two was not 
obvious and gave the impression of unnecessary complexity and unresolved 
differences over the architecture of the programme. 
6.5.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
Whilst requirements were defined for the HRP, there were a number of 
issues.  It was “not set up on coherent, agreed requirements(Dviii); in fact 
one interviewee described the requirements as “tosh”(Dix). The requirements 
were “put in after the programme was established”(Di) and were “not clear or 
agreed”(Dviii) and “not understood”(Dix). Some company stakeholders had 
“hundreds of requirements”(Di) which were “useless except in a specific 
domain”(Di); others had “no requirements”(Di) or developed requirements 
“eventually”(Di); and another group “had no requirements but had nine 
research questions based on them”(Di).  Other company stakeholders 
“couldn‟t think of requirements but took a longer perspective and didn‟t 
expect immediate use”(Di).   
Recognising that “if you got into too detailed requirements for research you 
didn‟t do research”(Di) because it over-constrained the solution, the 
“requirements were reformulated”(Di) and “high level business requirements 
were decomposed into research questions”(Di) “set at the right level”(Di). 
However, requirements verification and validation “to ensure the outputs 
would meet the requirements”(Dix) was not done. “Problems and solutions 
weren‟t identified and didn‟t intersect”(Dvi). 
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Although recognised as a “wide network of organisations, a system of 
systems in itself”(Diii) the HRP was “not scoped as a problem, identifying a 
boundary which defines research topics and organisation”(Dix) and deciding 
“what was in or out”(Diii). 
Having “recognised the problem”(Div) there was a “weak attempt”(Diii) to 
clarify the objectives of the HRP, but with “no methodology”(Diii).  A 
workshop with approximately 60 people “captured people‟s knee-jerk 
reactions to some questions, but didn‟t flesh out what was meant by the 
words”(Diii). Then “half a dozen groupings”(Diii) were created in an “equally 
superficial”(Diii) way, resulting in “half a dozen words representing the key 
attributes”(Diii).  It was the “opposite to rigorous:  wishy-washy! Horrendous, 
glib and very superficial.  Completely inadequate given the complexity of the 
objective and scope”(Diii) and “didn‟t succeed well for the project as a 
whole”(Div). 
The demonstration “brought everyone together and helped researchers see 
how they fitted into the wider picture”(Di).  It provided clear examples of multi-
disciplinary work (Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009) which were “beneficial for 
demonstration but also to integrate the programme”(Di).  The “all-embracing 
scenario could be treated just like a story and used to generate „what-ifs‟ and 
exemplars”(Div). Since there was “no interaction”(Dv) but it simply addressed 
“how they fitted into the story”(Dv), there was a question whether this truly 
represented integration.  Nevertheless the scenarios enabled visibility of 
“how things cut across”(Div) the different areas of research and “what 
research themes were producing”(Div). Driven by the recognition that it was 
“important to demonstrate to stakeholders” (Diii) during the last year there 
“was a very strong emphasis on demonstration”(Diii) at a level that had not 
been previously anticipated.  As a result, “most research stopped to service 
the demonstrator”(Diii). 
For the HRP as a whole, systems engineering “was done a bit at the concept 
stage but not in later stages”(Dviii).  By the end of the first phase, the overall 
Chapter Six  Case Study Findings 
[171] 
 
programme planning for phase two was impressive but this was not matched 
by technical planning of research and demonstration exemplars (Ne___, 
Mc___ et al. 2009). “Systems engineering was used”(Diii) at a theme or task 
level by some groups. However, “nobody wrote down the risks”(Dvi) and 
some “would argue that we didn‟t manage the key stakeholders very 
well”(Di). There was an unmet need for members of the HRP management 
team to assume responsibility for risk management and exploitation 
management (Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009). “The moment anything went wrong 
they had nowhere to go.  No mitigation and no planning”(Dvi). 
6.5.10 Perceptions of Success 
Timing was critical.  Although created when the research topic was “the big 
thing”(Di), it was “spread over a long period of time”(Dii).  By the time of the 
review, “nobody was making those noises”(Diii) any more and the topic “went 
off the boil in the UK”(Dii).  The lack of clarity had “made it difficult to build a 
shared objective”(Diii), and “into that situation all problems blossomed”(Diii). 
Although an “independent review was positive and very impressed by some 
areas”(Di) and the “independent steering group was also very 
impressed”(Di), “right from the start the HRP had been ready for a fall unless 
clarity was created – and that wasn‟t done”(Diii).  “Good, high quality 
scientific research”(Dvi) had been undertaken and “individual stakeholders 
were working hard to deliver”(Dii) resulting in “some local good work”(Diii).  
The “most successful”(Di) areas of work were those who “set the question at 
the right level”(Di) and “best outputs”(Di) came from those who “brought 
different perspectives”(Di) to the problem space.   The research community 
had established “significant momentum” and were “striving hard to deliver 
actionable new knowledge”, but at the time of the review there was a lack of 
both academic dissemination and practical exploitation of programme outputs 
(Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009).  Although one interviewee felt that “publications 
were on target”(Di), this was inconsistent with the findings of the review panel 
who noted that even the modest targets set were not being met (Ne___, 
Chapter Six  Case Study Findings 
[172] 
 
Mc___ et al. 2009).  However, it was felt that working within the HRP enabled 
researchers to conduct better systems engineering than would otherwise 
have been the case, and to integrate their outputs into taught material within 
their university (Ne___, Mc___ et al. 2009). 
Although “the quality of academic output” was not in question (Wo___, 
Os___ 2009), it was “recognised that it was not enough to show good 
research”(Diii) but they “actually needed to demonstrate it”(Diii).  The 
effective utilisation of this type of research was identified as “a wide 
challenge beyond defence and beyond the UK” (Case Study D Independent 
Steering Group Meeting 4. 2009).  Key stakeholders were “not convinced that 
it would materially change the direction of the company”(Dii) and “no 
immediate application”(Div) was identified.  Without clear transition and 
exploitation routes, the company felt that further investment was not justified 
(Case Study D Independent Steering Group Meeting 4. 2009).  Although the 
demonstration was perceived by some as “really successful”(Di) and it meant 
that “questions were now firmer”(Diii), the HRP “failed because the 
compromise was not what they wanted, the resources were not what they 
wanted, and for political and economic reasons”(Dviii). 
“There were good bits and bad bits: it was clearly not all bad”(Div).  Seen as 
“in some ways, very disappointing”(Div), it was “not a good experience”(Diii).  
“In hindsight, it was always going to be a sorry experience”(Diii). 
6.6 Case Study E 
The HRP in Case Study E was established in 2005 by the customer.  It was a 
virtual centre of excellence, managed by an industrial consortium and funded 
jointly by the customer and industry participants, providing an overall budget 
of £60M. Its core goals were to research innovative technologies relevant to 
autonomous systems and, through the adoption of systems engineering 
approaches, to facilitate pull-through of the technology into military 
capabilities. 
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6.6.1 Objectives 
The HRP in Case Study E was “clearly goal-oriented”(Eiii) and driven to 
“generate knowledge via research” (Case Study E Overview. 2005).  
Although there was “only one HRP objective, the partners had more than 
one”(Eii).  These were described as “a spectrum: partners didn‟t always 
declare their objectives – you had to speculate what they were”(Ei).  These 
undeclared objectives were thought to vary between different organisations, 
with large, prime contractor companies wanting to demonstrate “working 
effectively”(Ei) with others and “supporting a systems approach”(Ei) whilst 
establishing the future possibility to “sell products and make a profit”(Eii); 
small companies experiencing “working with primes”(Ei) and universities and 
“enhancing their reputation”(Eii); and universities ranging from seeing it as “a 
source of money”(Ei) and “a productive area for academic research”(Eii) to 
being “motivated by systems ideas”(Ei). One university‟s goal was to draw 
“from multiple funding sources”(Eiv) including the HRP to work in a particular 
research area. Within the HRP, “differing objectives were recognised, 
understood, managed and resolved, although there may be some who aren‟t 
entirely satisfied with it”(Eii).   This was done by “working out what the need 
implied for functionality; applying academic rigour but also focussing on 
outcomes”(Eii).  It was understood that partners within the HRP “worked to 
totally different metrics.  Academics wanted PhDs and refereed papers.  
They wanted to be the „world expert in X‟ and were not interested in the rest 
of their theme, let alone other themes”(Ei).  Recognising their need to be “on 
the cutting edge of hot activity areas”, the HRP needed to help them to spot 
challenges and undertake work of greater benefit” (Br___ 2006c). 
The role of the customer was felt to be important, but he was “not sufficiently 
engaged to know what he wanted”(Eiii).  “Setting boundaries for research 
objectives was tough.  Good applied research needed customer feedback.  It 
had been a bit vague”(Eiv). There was a “weak connection”(Eiv) to the 
customer‟s technical advisers and their “engagement with the research was 
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minimal”(Eiv).  Having provided the funding and participated to some extent 
in the review process, the customer was “not very involved”(Ev). 
From the company‟s perspective, the HRP was a way “to get work done and 
to see if this mechanism would work in getting people together, whilst 
providing an opportunity to direct and manage research”(Ei).  It was felt that 
the aims of all the large partner companies were “to see a net return, to be 
seen to be partnering and to ensure nobody else was getting an 
advantage”(Eiii) as well as recognising that participation in several such 
partnerships was necessary before a company would be given the 
opportunity to lead one.  It was felt that the company “didn‟t see it as seeding 
or growing the research community”(Eiv) in this area. 
Another interviewee felt that there was “some commonality of objectives at a 
level which was meaningless”(Ev), but “competition for prioritisation and 
allocation of funding “(Ev) at the next level, where “common objectives 
emerged for themes”(Ev). As a result of this flow-down, “research objectives 
on projects went through three or four translations and probably didn‟t match 
the higher level”(Ev). 
One interviewee suggested that the objectives were “not at the level of 
research challenges”(Eiv) but were rather “keeping the company and 
customer‟s technical advisers happy”(Eiv).  For other participants, 
competitive positioning and the reinforcement of their network was important 
(Br___ 2006a) and teaming itself was “hugely beneficial”, enabling them to 
learn from other partners, and to be drawn into and to influence their thinking  
(Br___ 2006d).  Name recognition and the ability to demonstrate capability in 
managing and delivering research opened up the possibility of future 
opportunities.  However, the actual value of the competitive advantage was 
dependent on the scale of the market and size of the advantage obtained 
(Br___ 2006a). 
Chapter Six  Case Study Findings 
[175] 
 
6.6.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP was “a partnership in name only”(Eiii) but “run „in the spirit of 
partnership‟ which meant that the prime contractor agreed it wouldn‟t hold 
undue influence over the other players and was prepared to act for the 
greater good”(Eiii).  Other interviewees described it as “a partnership 
between the customer and the company”(Ev), and “an effective partnership 
of big companies, SMEs, academia and the customer”(Ei) with relationships 
between them that “could be drawn as a messy picture of overlapping 
circles”(Eii).  Several of the organisations were different business units of the 
same company, but “treated each other with the same distrust and disrespect 
as anyone else” (Br___ 2006c).  Nevertheless, there was felt to be more 
cohesion in the strategy board for this HRP than for that in Case Study B, 
even though the interests of the participants were much less focused (Br___ 
2006d).  Additional work opportunities were offered where possible to those 
showing a “propensity for cooperation” with others (An___, Do___ 2008). 
The company “regarded it as an experiment”(Ei) and “subsumed the role of a 
minor research agency with the aim of providing research for a third party 
(the customer) on a vague topic”(Eiv).  The HRP was “part of a grand 
strategic approach”(Eiii) which “provides an acceptable face of business: 
behavioural, a goodwill relationship.  It changes the attitude of relationships 
and allows trade on other things”(Eiii). It was “an enabler, not a delivery 
arm”(Eiii). 
A “parallel, un-contracted path”(Eiii) provided data from the customer‟s 
technical advisor but although structured to mirror the HRP structure, this 
was not always as effective as it could have been (An___, Do___ 2008).  
One interviewee felt that the company “acted as a buffer”(Eiv) and seemed to 
“prevent conversations”(Eiv) with the academic researchers who “gradually 
lost confidence in the company‟s ability to judge requirements”(Eiv).  There 
was a concern that “not enough time and thought was given”(Eiii) by the 
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customer.  “We had to predict internally what they would want if they could 
express it.  We got decisions on the wave of a hand”(Eiii). 
In order for the HRP to be effective, participants needed to “subordinate 
outcomes to the HRP rather than their companies”(Eiii).  It was obvious that 
“some were better at this than others in terms of both personal behaviours 
and influence”(Eiii), resulting in “conflict galore between participating 
businesses”(Ev) and “the worst example of partnership I‟ve ever seen in my 
life”(Ev).   There was “no doubt that partners came at it with a less 
magnanimous view, and that the prime had to moderate their view far more 
to make the overall partnership work”(Eiii).  “In order to have that role, the 
„big player‟ had to moderate to make it acceptable for the others, motivated 
by a belief that there was a bigger picture and that it was something that 
would serve the company well”(Eiii).  For all the partners the “fear of not 
being involved”(Eiii) was a huge driver but it was nevertheless “very hard to 
describe the steering group as a partnership”(Ev).  One company “tended to 
stand mostly on its own” and although “teamy” were not really “partners”.  
Nevertheless, they were considered a good part of the HRP and their 
research area “would be well run” (Br___ 2006b). 
The relationship between the leadership and academic researchers was not 
entirely happy.  One academic noted that they “always felt on trial, and that 
they needed to survive.  The workshops felt judgemental rather than for 
constructive sharing”(Eiv).  Another likened the HRP to a plantation, 
describing the customer as the “plantation owner”, the company as 
“plantation manager who writes the rules”, universities and research centres 
as “slaves”(Ev), and the theme leaders as “overseers”(Ev).  Although “they 
chose to run the HRP through the overseers”(Ev) there was “no partnership 
between the overseers”(Ev) and  in fact the “control system was in conflict 
with itself”(Ev).  “Pre-existing relationships between the slaves and 
owner”(Ev) were not taken in account, and as a result the “slaves 
revolted”(Ev).  In effect, “they couldn‟t „buy-in‟ research the way they thought 
they could”(Ev). 
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Throughout the HRP, considerable effort was put into communications, both 
internally and externally.  This included the maintenance of a contacts list, 
used for invitations to conferences and showcase events and for the 
distribution of HRP newsletters, and internal mechanisms such as a shared 
data environment and wiki (An___, Do___ 2008). 
6.6.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP did not exist as a contracting entity in its own right (Br___ 2006a) 
but was structured around a prime contract with the lead company.  It was 
“contractually fairly straightforward”(Ei) and “hinged on effective programme 
management”(Ei).  The contract itself was “based on the contract from a 
predecessor programme, making negotiation very short and easy”(Eii).  The 
HRP was “very stable in terms of operation”(Ei) and the “core reporting 
mechanisms of milestones and the quarterly technical digest operated 
throughout”(Eii), together with “basic stakeholder contact management”(Eii).  
Other things had “changed quite a bit as we went gone through”(Eii), but 
recognising that “tools and mechanisms could be used in other 
partnerships”(Eii) “some things that worked well were subsequently used 
elsewhere”(Eii) in the HRPs in Case Studies B and F.  Overall operation was 
felt to be “complicated, not complex”(Ev). 
Contractually it was “not that complex”(Eiv) but since it used “three-tier 
contracting”(Eiv) it was “not efficient, with lots of contracts”(Eiv).  It was felt 
that “considerable commercial and management effort was dedicated over 
quite a long period” to establishing the HRP‟s agreements and into “debating 
minute detail of wording of some clauses in them”, and that it seemed 
“disproportionate to the benefit obtained” (An___, Do___ 2008).  Although 
“every provider had their own standard”(Eiv), there were “lots of instances 
rather than lots of types”(Eiv).  Commercial relationships between the prime 
contractor and other partners were not always good, and certain contractual 
terms relating to IPR were “really disliked” (Brown 2006d).  With “typically fifty 
to sixty research projects active at any one time, there were 300 live 
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contracts with associated invoicing etc”(Eii).  The contractual cycle meant 
that these all had to be updated each year (Brown 2006b).  At the start the 
HRP was felt to have been “naïve about the financial management”(Eii) and 
“some of the disciplines and process management should have been set up 
earlier”(Eii).  A time-based financial model of the research programme was 
developed and this was very valuable to support the planning processes 
(An___, Do___ 2008). 
The HRP‟s “role was bounded by TRL 1-3”(Eiii).  It was noted that a possible 
evolution of this HRP “aimed to go to higher TRL, but if you went much 
further it would risk conflict between consortium members”(Ei).  Intellectual 
property was owned by the organisation generating it, but the customer and 
other HRP members had user rights (Case Study E Overview. 2005).  All 
research suppliers had both “a business agreement”(Eii) and “an agreement 
with the customer to guarantee the customer‟s rights”(Eii).  The collaboration 
agreement addressed IPR and there were some “limited examples of merged 
IPR”(Eii) in some of the demonstrations.  It was felt that the “current IPR 
agreements were largely OK for this as long as goodwill remained”(Eii), 
although “the jury was still out on this and issues were still expected”(Eii) to 
arise. 
The HRP‟s centralised, independent technical leadership was beneficial but 
also faced constraints.  Research was organised around six themes, with 
three areas of cross-cutting systems engineering work (Case Study E 
Overview. 2005).  Although theme leaders would progress potential research 
areas, contracts were “approved and issued centrally”(Ei).  The process was 
“not totally democratic”(Ei), providing the ability to “steer things and have the 
final say”(Ei) whilst “understanding the aspirations of consortium members 
and the need to achieve balance between the themes”(Ei).  There were 
“extra mechanisms to demonstrate fairness within a reasonable limit” and this 
applied both between themes, and between large and small companies and 
universities.  The funding of small and medium-sized companies was 
typically “around thirteen percent, but self-limiting”(Ei), constrained by their 
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ability to do the work.  During research task execution, this independent 
leadership could also deal with instances of consistently poor performance.  
It was noted that the customer “couldn‟t do what we‟ve done, and chuck out 
underperforming studies”(Ei), and that “it would be difficult for companies 
too”(Ei). 
It was felt that the HRP would be “better if organisations were more open to 
sharing best practice”(Eii).  The “closed nature of the conference”(Eiv), in 
terms of the sources of papers,  was also felt to be a mistake: it “should have 
been an open conference for systems engineers”(Eiv) in order to draw in and 
leverage from other related work, and to “lead to a field of research inspired 
by”(Eiv) the HRP, “without which, the critical mass will be lost”(Eiv).  It was 
noted that the HRP in Case Study D had “the same problem”(Eiv). 
6.6.4 Culture 
Within the HRP the “culture was quite complex, with customer, industry, 
research organisations and academia all different”(Eii) and a “need to 
translate customer culture and goals down to research”(Eii). Another 
interviewee felt that the representatives of larger companies “had a different 
attitude, not a different culture”(Eiii) and that “a chain of incidents put them in 
the job, so that as individuals they were very similar”(Eiii).  Although there 
were “a significant number of overseas researchers”(Eii) involved in the HRP, 
there was not felt to be “much multi-national culture”(Eii).  In fact, there was a 
view that organisational culture dominated national culture and that within the 
companies, “organisational character also worked internationally”(Eiii) . 
One interviewee “never felt there was the development of a community of 
enquiry and interest”(Eiv) and that the “sharing of ideas never went on”(Eiv) 
in spite of the “huge trust component”(Eiii) which another interviewee felt 
characterised the HRP.  Of the academics who were not interested in other 
themes, “some didn‟t work and exited.  Others changed”(Ei).  There was 
concern that the HRP had too much of a contractual emphasis and that some 
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theme leaders were seen as project managers rather than part of the 
extended research team.  Such “constructive relationships” were felt to be 
important for output, not only within a theme but also across themes (Br___ 
2006c). 
Within HRPs in general there was felt to be a “danger that you only 
collaborated with an element of an organisation which was allowed to „play‟ 
and didn‟t permeate the organisation itself”(Eiii), so that HRPs were “played 
by adjuncts to organisations, not the organisations themselves”(Eiii).  Whilst 
the adjuncts were able to participate because they were “allowed to be 
different”(Eiii) they “couldn‟t achieve success because they didn‟t change the 
direction of the juggernaut”(Eiii) and therefore were not “dealing with the real 
problem and changing organisational behaviour”(Eiii). 
6.6.5 Resources: People  
There was significant difference of opinion regarding the effectiveness of the 
leadership team between industrial and academic interviewees.  Whilst one 
felt that overall the “team was very good and mutually supporting except for 
one bad apple”(Ei) for which “a variety of means were used to mitigate the 
effect”(Ei), others felt that “research leadership was missing”(Eiv) and that it 
required “more than just good management of the project”(Eiv).  One felt that 
“company people didn‟t have enough freedom to allow greater variability in 
direction”(Eiv), but there was also a recognition that “individual theme leaders 
managed differently: some were better than others but since it was 
„Contribution in Kind, you couldn‟t dictate”(Eii).  Another interviewee 
suggested that the HRP was “made up of a series of subsystems, some of 
which were in complete conflict – effectively an interacting system with more 
conflict than collaboration”(Ev).  These “subsystems had local partnerships 
and occasionally partnerships between them”(Ev). 
There was a view that industry people who were “academically aware and 
had those behaviours and skills”(Eiii) were more effective in HRP roles and 
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that “certain roles required the ability to work with people across a range of 
areas as a „subtle bulldozer‟”(Eii).  This required “not just systems 
engineering skills but also interpersonal, communication and organisational 
skills too”(Eii) and was not helped by the fact that “systems engineers were 
trained to be conservative and risk-averse”(Ei).  It was suggested that there 
“may be a need for a person description for these roles”(Eii) since the “wrong 
person could stymie progress”(Eii).  Successful exploitation of low-TRL 
research was felt to benefit greatly from the involvement of individuals who 
were already engaged with related higher-TRL research in their companies 
(An___, Do___ 2008) 
For those in leadership positions it was “a balance of interest between the 
greater good, public sector duty and longer term interests of the 
company”(Eiii).  However, with experience in this type of role this was not 
seen as a problem.  Without a “project hierarchy by right”(Ei) HRP leaders 
felt the need to “carry people with us by diligence and effectiveness”(Ei).  
Several leaders were specifically identified as “respected” (Br___ 2006d) and 
“important” to the programme (Br___ 2006b). 
Although the “same people stayed with it all the way through”(Eiv) in some 
areas, in others there was “a high churn of people”(Eii) and this was a 
particular issue in the theme leader roles where “newer theme leaders were 
heavily disadvantaged without the programme history”(Ei).  The effectiveness 
of the HRP was “partly down to individuals in roles”(Eii) and it “had worked 
best where there was consistency of direction”(Eii). In one case, however, 
there were “four people in that role who got pulled off to do other things, then 
the wrong person with no motivation”(Eii) was appointed, from which the 
HRP “lost some time”(Eii), possibly up to 12 months.  For most theme 
leaders their involvement in the HRP was part time, and it was a challenge 
for their parent organisation to “try to make a full-time job” from this and 
similar or related roles (Br___ 2006c). 
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There was a view that the HRP “needed to approach the complex customer 
and material separately to the research community development, and explore 
jointly the domain and application”(Eiv), but that “lots of different 
participants”(Eii) meant that it was “hard to do that with something the size of 
the HRP”(Eiv).  Effort was put into meetings where technical specialists could 
“come into contact and „rub-off‟ on each other” (An___, Do___ 2008). 
One interviewee noted that the “repetition of players was quite high”(Eiii) 
between HRPs and questioned whether it was “good to have the same 
players”(Eiii) in this type of partnership.  Although this may enable the team 
to become effective more quickly, he felt that the “weight of evidence said 
„no‟”(Eiii) and that “an element of old and new”(Eiii) was needed. 
There was a concern about the “adequacy of the research base in academia” 
to support the programme (Br___ 2006b), and recognition of the importance 
of “attracting the interest of people with the right skills” and retaining that 
interest and involvement as the programme developed (An___, Do___ 2008).  
It was felt that the HRP should “have had much more commitment to 
education and training”(Ei) in order to grow the national capability in this 
area.  The Engineering Doctorate programme was felt to be “a way of 
combining research and education to feed good people into companies”(Ei) 
but “hadn‟t really worked for recruitment”(Ei) in this case.  There was a 
feeling that the HRP was “still too dependent on overseas scientists”(Ei) who 
were “a good source of money for universities”(Ei) but “couldn‟t be 
recruited”(Ei) by the industrial partners working in defence resulting in “no 
proper exploitation”(Ei) of the research.  In part, the “rapid loss of expertise 
built up over several years”(Ei) was attributed to “waiting until the end of a 
contract to decide on continuation”(Ei), since “three to six months before the 
end, universities told their Research Associates to find another job”(Ei). 
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6.6.6 Resources: Funding 
The HRP had a total of “six funding stakeholders”(Eiii), providing “customer 
direct funding, with Contribution in Kind from the partners to equivalent 
value”(Eii).  For the partners, there was often a lot of “smorgasbord 
management”: trying to “operate as seamlessly as possible” between related 
programmes and get coordination between different funding sources (Br___ 
2006c).   
The HRP was “running a very lean management team.  Artificially lean.  The 
project manager was a charge on funding but put in many more hours than 
charged”(Ei) and the technical director only charged for certain things, and 
for example “not for time spent reading reports”(Ei).  As a result it was an 
“effective consortium running on incredibly light overhead: averaging 5.4% 
over six years”(Ei) “with most of that funding the independent technical 
director”(Eiii). 
The funding enabled research organisations to work in partnership with 
universities: something they were keen but generally unable to do as 
universities needed funding to support research staff and students (Br___ 
2006a).  
As the HRP approached the end of its six-year contract, there was 
recognition that the customer may not have had funding to continue, but that 
“our job was to try if asked to do it.  We all understood the challenges”(Eiii). 
6.6.7 Lifecycle 
Although “different from the HRP in Case Study A, this HRP had a lifecycle in 
the same way”(Ev) although it was considered to be “artificial, and driven by 
the customer‟s funding regime”(Ei). 
Before bidding for the HRP, there was “a big argument about who the 
partners should be” and who should lead, based on both technical and 
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political factors (Br___ 2006b).  The resultant team was considered to be 
“excellent technically, but a commercial „B‟ team” which “signed up to the 
launch without commercial cover in place”(Br___ 2006d).  The bid team drew 
experience from individuals who had recently bid for a similar HRP and lost, 
in part because they had made “too good a case for exploitation” such that 
the customer expected that the work would be done anyway with internal 
company funding (Br___ 2006c).   
Having “identified thematic areas and asked academia for research 
proposals at the start”(Eiv) it had an accelerated creation phase and was “set 
up and running from nothing in the first year, at the same time as starting 
research”(Eii).  This was a challenge because it “started at the wrong time of 
year for academic recruitment” (Br___ 2006b), and the “unknown” delay 
between bid submission and contract award led inevitably to the bid team 
“drifting apart and getting engaged in other work” (An___, Do___ 2008).  The 
research focus of the HRP was “vague at the start”(Eiv) and ideally needed 
“a through-life connection to the customer”(Eiv).  The need to establish a 
three-year programme at the start “seemed to surprise people”, resulting in a 
programme which “seemed to be thrown together in a panic” and which 
“differed in detail and in spirit from the original intent” (Br___ 2006b).  The 
HRP “should have thought about the customer stakeholders earlier on”(Eii), 
as this would “probably have provided a better idea of areas for meaningful 
outcomes and focus”(Eii).  Nevertheless, it was felt that “it was always going 
to take 1-2 years to get everyone on the same page” (Br___ 2006b). 
Since the contract was for “three years with an option for a further three”(Eii), 
“after about 18 months or two years”(Eii) the focus moved to “persuading the 
customer to continue and explaining what would be done in the second 
phase”(Eii).  At that point the success of the annual conference was 
considered to be key, not only in terms of the conference itself, but also the 
interactions around it at all management levels, managing expectations 
carefully to ensure a positive response from the decision makers (Br___ 
2006c).  The two-phase approach led to uncertainty in planning (An___, 
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Do___ 2008): the customer had been told by the HRP leadership that “two to 
three year contracts were inappropriate for university research, since this 
enabled PhD candidates to be appointed in only two years out of six”(Ei) and 
that “an evolving, rolling programme with something like a five year 
horizon”(Ei) was needed.  
In the “fifth year of a six year contract”(Eii) the HRP was “moving from the 
basic research phase and trying to draw together outcomes”(Eii).  The “plan 
for the last 18 months”(Eii) was to create “three systems exemplars”(Eii) to 
“pull together the strands of work”(Eii) and to “demonstrate and experiment 
with outcomes, as a springboard to exploitation”(Eii).  At this stage “the 
theme basis was less important”(Eii).  The research had produced “relatively 
mature building blocks”(Eii) making people “more comfortable to go 
broadly”(Eii) and work with the exemplars.  
The last year was seen as the “termination or evolution phase”(Eiii).  It was 
felt that generically this was a good thing, although the HRP did not want to 
terminate and “would have continued”(Eiii) or even “fought for 
continuation”(Eiii) if funding had been available. 
The “HRP was always changing, with very little steady state”(Eii).  Although 
“some things do just carry on, some change was needed to make things work 
better”(Eii). 
6.6.8 Complexity 
The HRP was “not complex in itself”(Ev) as an organisation, but “only 
complex because of the politics involved in it”(Ev).   
The “structure and remit were complex, as were the relationships with 
research providers and how you made the stuff come together”(Eiv).  
Contractual relationships were “individually not complex”(Eii) but the 
“multiplicity of items was complex”(Eii).  This “started to be obvious when you 
see multiple interaction relationships that exist”(Eiv).  There was “complexity 
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in simply managing the totality of relationships, goals and reasons for 
involvement”(Eii) with “so many providers and research activities”(Eiv), but 
although “size was an issue”(Eiv) it was felt that it “was such that complexity 
was manageable”(Eiii). 
The nature of the work was complex since for the research being undertaken, 
“nothing could be taken from the engineered world: there was no instance to 
draw upon”(Eiv) and “variables and relationships were not understood”(Eiv) 
making “climate research easy by comparison”(Eiv). 
6.6.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
In general, systems engineering was not “applied to set up and run”(Ev) the 
HRP: the “systems engineering was all in the work that was done”(Ev).  
However, there was some “thinking about the HRP as a system: how you 
sustain it, social aspects and design to minimise conflict between 
competitors”(Ei).  Although the research area was “a vast field, with so many 
ways to cut the cake”(Eii), the research architecture was based on “major 
systems contributors”(Ei) as an “analogy to the body”(Ei) and it was felt that 
the “initial grouping was good”(Ei).  “Project management”(Ev) was used, and 
there were “rows about configuration based on a systems engineering 
view”(Ev).  A data model of the HRP was “created in UML, looking at the 
processes and data flow”(Eii).  This “forced logical thinking” about the HRP 
as a system, and about where there might be process elements and 
interactions which needed development” (An___, Do___ 2008). It was noted 
that the “flaws organisationally sat on the periphery: they were all boundary 
issues”(Eiii). A „Stakeholder Maturity Model‟ was also developed to analyse 
the effectiveness of the complex relationships within the various partner and 
customer organisations (Br___ 2006e) but no significant use was believed to 
have been made of this. 
The HRP was “driven by needs, taking a light touch, not being prescriptive 
and recognising that in many cases nobody would consider requirements 
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until they could see a way to meet them”(Ei).  However, there was “never a 
formal exercise to capture requirements”(Eii) and it was felt that there was 
not good understanding of the “diffuse”(Eiv) customer and user needs by the 
research community. Researchers who normally “contributed by 
understanding the domain well”(Eiv) “never got exposure to the problem 
domain: state of the art technology was secret and it was not a rich area of 
experience”(Eiv).  “It was hard to have a view of what was needed”(Eiv) and 
“even an impoverished view would have been better than nothing”(Eiv).  It 
was felt that “done again, people should be given more access”(Eiv).     
The application of systems engineering in the research context of the HRP 
was “not easy” and not always as successful as was hoped (An___, Do___ 
2008).  Achieving integration of the research was a pervasive theme and 
considered “a measure of success of the systems engineering approach”(Eii) 
throughout the lifecycle of the HRP, although the mechanism for this evolved.  
The process was a mixture of top-down and bottom-up activities enabling 
needs to be expressed in terms of vignettes and capability challenges, and 
system concepts to be developed based on generic concept classes.   
Evaluation involved operational analysis, modelling and synthetic 
environments (Case Study E Overview. 2005), and was conducted at four 
different levels from the individual research package to the overall 
programme (An___, Do___ 2008).  The focus on autonomous systems was 
“essential to provide a route for proper integration in a systematic and 
thought-out way” (Br___ 2006b).  It was recognised that the “traditional 
approach was to disaggregate complexity to make it manageable”(Eiii) but 
that “the sum of the parts wouldn‟t necessarily add up to the original goal.  
Command intent would be lost and strategic intent eroded”(Eiii).  In order to 
“get it back, you needed threads to keep people aligned to the broader goal.  
This became a trade between vertical and horizontal: a force of will”(Eiii).  It 
was recognised that, especially in the research environment, requirements 
should not be flowed down “beyond the point where the science runs out” 
(Br___ 2006b). 
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The first step was a mechanism to “provide guidelines”(Ei) which “captured 
requirements for products or outcomes”(Eii) and gave each project “a 
scenario to relate research to, to give a way of thinking about the 
problem”(Eiv).  These “worked very well, with very little resistance from 
researchers, helping them and providing a focus to channel innovation”(Eii).  
However, some participants were more focused on “higher TRL but very low 
SRL concept work” (Br___ 2006a) and there were still presentations using 
TRLs when systems readiness was the real issue (Br___ 2006c). 
Recognising that “academics didn‟t always think about links”(Eii), the next 
step was to “force this thinking”(Eii) by “simply looking from another 
angle”(Eiii) in order to “associate research projects”(Ei).  Working both “within 
themes and across themes, this approach had variable success depending 
on the individuals, with greater success in some themes than others”(Eii).   
Demonstration was an ongoing theme, although one interviewee felt that the 
research challenge “to build a demonstrator”(Eiv) was “not a challenge at all, 
but just a methodological component”(Eiv). Integration “was led and carried 
out by the company”(Eiv) and “somehow the ownership of demonstrators by 
the researchers was never achieved: it wasn‟t co-construction, and there was 
separation of what they were trying to demonstrate”(Eiv).  This “integration 
through demonstrations seemed to be internal rather than shared by the 
community”(Eiv).  It was recognised that there was a need to “think carefully 
about the goals of the demonstration”, and to address the specific concerns 
of contributors (for example academic rivalry, IPR, business objectives or 
funding).  Agreement on responsibilities for the various elements, and where 
possible a view of „what next?‟ if the demonstration was successful, were 
also seen as important.  Technology roadmaps were generated to “visualise 
innovation efforts” across the HRP but there was also a need for a formal 
toolset to support planning of integration and demonstration across different 
research packages (An___, Do___ 2008). 
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In the end, this evolved to a new construct: “not just demonstrators, but a 
mechanism for integration, demonstration and evaluation”(Ei).  This 
incorporated “integration by conceptual link or nitty-gritty interfaces to build 
sample systems”(Ei) which were “neither horizontal nor vertical, almost 
amorphous, scalable, based on what means we put into them”(Eiii).  The 
approach avoids the problem of disaggregation and brings it back to 
something an external player would recognise”(Eiii). This had “some effect on 
people”(Ei) in both the customer and academic communities, helping them to 
“think of things as systems”(Ei).  Although one industrial partner “enthused 
about”(Ei) this approach, there was a concern that this would “only work if it 
captures explicit research goals”(Eiv).   
It would have been desirable to apply “more company effort to do trade-off 
studies in the early stages of research – either informally, or even better 
formally – and then review these with the results, combine them in different 
ways and assess the contribution of different research outcomes”(Ei) but the 
resource was not available to do this. 
6.6.10 Perceptions of Success 
In spite of “decent research outcomes and proof of concept 
demonstrations”(Eii) the “frustrating”(Eii) challenge remained “how do you 
take it forward to use”(Eii).  “Exploitation was outside the remit”(Eiii) of the 
HRP but was “how success was measured” by both the customer and 
industry.  There was a need to “see a path to market” (Brown 2006d) and to 
“understand what they would do with the research output”(Eiii) and it was felt 
that “the customer wasn‟t internally joined-up enough to carry this 
through”(Eii). It was felt that “the environment it operated in made it fail”(Eiii) 
and that “in spite of good intent and goodwill, the wider environment was not 
shaped to make it succeed”(Eiii):  in effect, that research “still faced the 
chasm of death, although we had moved it a bit”(Ei).  The HRP was likened 
to a conveyor belt with “nothing at the end.  Goods fell on the floor and 
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broke”(Eiii) because of the “complexity of the customer‟s acquisition 
system”(Eiii). 
Exploitation was important in different ways to different participants.  It was 
“very important for survival” that what the HRP did had exploitation routes, 
perhaps through “niche marketing, licensing agreements, as systems 
integrators” or in other ways (Br___ 2006a).  Academia viewed exploitation 
as both “academic publication to act as a basis for further research”(Eiv) and 
“exploitation elsewhere, making use of the research”(Eiv) but saw this as a 
broader responsibility and noted that “the company never took things forward 
itself: it was an intermediary, not an exploiter of the resources it put 
together”(Eiv).  Noting that although “at first we just did what they said”(Eiv), 
over time there was effort to “do extra stuff if we could sell why it was 
relevant”(Eiv).  This made it possible to “see routes to exploitation in other 
domains, extending the company‟s business case”(Eiv).  However, it was felt 
that “the desire to exploit and develop beyond the formal contractual 
boundary”(Eiv) was lacking and that a “separate funding stream”(Eiv) could 
have been pursued “right from the start”(Eiv) to provide a “push for 
exploitation”(Eiv). 
Internally, it was felt that conflict within the HRP “impinged on the ability to 
get anything done”(Ev) but that “most big projects are like this”(Ev) and it was 
“not uniquely bad”(Ev), “reflecting other similar systems in applied 
research”(Ev). There was a concern that in spite of the emphasis on 
integration, “individual projects had no vision or picture of the whole.  Even 
the demonstrations weren‟t tied together, and how the projects fed in was 
unclear”(Eiv). 
The HRP was assessed annually against the customer‟s assessment 
framework.  In addition, a complementary set of metrics was introduced 
during the third year (An___, Do___ 2008). 
There was a view that HRPs could “make a difference”(Eiii) although it was 
“never as great as the original aim”(Eiii), raising the question “what is 
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success?”(Eiii).  The HRP was felt to have had value in “understanding the 
skills and relationships that existed”(Eii), but ultimately “everyone measured it 
by what it did”(Eiii). 
6.7 Case Study F 
The HRP in Case Study F was a customer-funded strategic initiative 
established in 2007 to enhance through life capability management for 
software intensive defence systems, and thus to reduce risks, delays and 
cost overruns. Case Study F was an open consortium of industrial and 
academic organisations, which comprised core members who managed the 
programme, and associates who participated in delivering the broader HRP 
objectives. 
6.7.1 Objectives 
Although the “vision was couched in very simple terms”(Fiii), the objectives 
for the HRP in Case Study F were felt to be “confused”(Fiv), with the original 
“vision and objectives bearing no clear traceability to what we were 
doing”(Fiii).  The original concept, “proposed in pubs and bars and on the 
fringes of other meetings”(Fii) was for “a national, all-inclusive 
enterprise”(Fii).  “The original vision had „big ideas‟ with lots of parallel 
approaches”(Fiii) and was “a lot broader, including working with the customer 
to come up with a set of implementation strategies”(Fiii).  One interviewee felt 
that the HRP had “one dominant objective and lesser conflicting ones”(Fii). 
Although the “traceability from the vision to what we were doing ought to 
have been agreed”(Fiii), it was felt that “the real goals didn‟t align to the 
needs”(Fiv); that the vision of “helping on projects”(Fiii) was disconnected 
from the research projects that were actually funded, and that “many 
problems arose from not contracting for what they wanted and needed”(Fiv). 
The constraints of implementation were “preventing the vision from being 
delivered”(Fiii) and whilst the original aim was to “bridge the valley of 
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death”(Fiii), the “selection of low TRL research tasks which couldn‟t be 
deployed on projects”(Fiii) meant that the HRP was “set up to fail”(Fiii). 
As a result, there was a concern that “nobody knew what it was supposed to 
be doing”(Fiii) and “many within the HRP did not understand how what they 
were doing fitted”(Fiv). It was felt that “everyone had different objectives but 
they were not discussed or resolved”(Fiv). Going further, “with one exception, 
the customer guys didn‟t seem to have had an objective except „career 
damage limitation‟”(Fiv).  It was felt that the customer “should have had the 
courage to say „this is what we need, go and create it‟”(Fiv) but instead “they 
created a monster which didn‟t fit with what they wanted and we hadn‟t done 
much to fix it”(Fiii). 
The “four aims from a technical perspective were applied research, pull-
through of other research, mentoring and project-support interventions”(Fiv). 
However, following the selection of “a set of tasks far too close to basic 
research”(Fiv), it was felt that the HRP was “being inappropriately 
constrained to doing a small set of research problems and not a lot else”(Fiii).  
It “should have had people tackling organisational culture, but they wouldn‟t 
have „bought‟ it.  Instead we needed to do technical stuff and build the socio-
technical stuff on top of it”(Fiv).  It was felt that some of the customer‟s 
problems “would be solved by good practice which could be solved by 
mentoring”(Fiv).  Process research was aimed at TRL6-8 but there were “a 
surprising amount of gaps in knowledge at TRL 1-3 that needed filling”(Fiv). 
There was a “joint intention and a degree of contractual commitment to 
transfer to being self-sustaining by the growth in additional services such as 
consultancy, solution recommendation and review”(Fi).  This was the 
“intention, but was dependent on the customer demanding such services”(Fi).  
The aim was “to move towards a body of knowledge”(Fiv) and to “train the 
trainer”(Fiv).  There was also an intent to develop best practice guides, but 
the issue of how these would be validated was only “starting to be thought 
about”(Fi). 
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The aims of one partner were unclear, but it was felt that “even if the end 
goal or ambitions were different, the architecture could still work if the route 
was common”(Fii). 
6.7.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP was a “customer-funded research programme”(Fi) within which the 
relationship was one of “prime and subcontractors, not a partnership of 
equals”(Fi).  Although the customer “forced a partnership, it hadn‟t 
worked”(Fi).  One partner “appeared to still be sulking”(Fii) and “had chosen 
to be unequal”(Fii).  The main partners provide theme leadership as 
„Contribution in Kind‟ (CiK) and the “company‟s main role was project 
management”(Fi). Overall, with “lots of organisations involved”(Fiv) there 
were “some reasonably good relationships in parts, but not all”(Fiv).  “By and 
large the organisations with theme leads did a good job”(Fiv) and “quite a 
number of partners delivered their side of the bargain”(Fiv).  “Others just 
didn‟t do things and didn‟t reply to email”(Fiv).  One partner was felt to be “in 
self-protection mode”(Fiv), but in spite of difficulties it “hadn‟t walked away as 
it wouldn‟t have been good for their reputation”(Fiv). 
The company recognised that “sometimes it had to represent UK industry, 
not just the company.  It was not just self-centred”(Fii). Another interviewee 
noted that the company “believed in pre- / non-competitive work”(Fiv) and 
that “raising the community competence was in their self-interest”(Fiv).  It 
was, however, “partly altruism”(Fiv).  The company “took the role of leading 
this seriously, and was not hiding behind the contract”(Fii), recognising “how 
far away from the „need‟ the contract was”(Fiv).   It sought to “deliver the right 
thing, without breach of contract”(Fii).   The customer had “been quite 
impressed with this attitude”(Fii). 
Although the customer was a “full partner”(Fii) it was felt that they “were not 
behaving in the way that was intended: weren‟t receptive, and couldn‟t use 
the information in the right way”(Fiii) leaving the HRP “unsupported”(Fiii). 
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Parallel reviews of research proposals conducted by the customer, and the 
HRP leadership (including the customer) underlined this issue: the 
heterogeneous nature of the customer resulted in some strong differences of 
opinion between the two reviews (Br___ 2009a).  The relationship had been 
“very friendly although not entirely effective, with little pockets of success but 
a lot of problems being hidden”(Fiii).  Changes to personnel brought “a lot 
less ownership”(Fiii) and “more formal, traditional ways of working”(Fiii). 
Further reorganisation meant “no formal contact”(Fiii) with this customer 
group in the future.  There was a “productive tension between the customer‟s 
technical authority and the industry and academic views which worked very 
well, prompted debate and enabled issues to be resolved”(Fi).  Nevertheless, 
it was “hard getting it to stick”(Fiv) in the customer community and it was felt 
that they “didn‟t understand the big picture and so managed the detail”(Fiv). 
The “weak and fuzzy boundaries”(Fiv) within the HRP made it difficult to 
“present a coherent message”(Fiv).  The “loose consortium”(Fiv) and 
“changes in personnel”(Fiv) didn‟t support that. 
6.7.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP was “nominally fully funded”(Fii), leaving the customer feeling 
“more able to direct”(Fii) than with other comparable HRPs such as that in 
Case Study E.  There was “contractual complexity”(Fiv) but it was felt that 
this may be attributable to “incompetence”(Fiv).” The inability to “solve simple 
problems made the whole more complex”(Fiv).  Although the “contractual 
position was pretty simple”(Fii), the “governance structure was very 
complex”(Fiii), “unwieldy at best, and untested”(Fiii).  “Trying to operate as „a 
family‟ rather than in parent/child mode made it complex”(Fii).  It was 
“operationally difficult to “balance this with „cracking the whip‟”(Fii). 
This complexity started early on with “enormous tender documents”(Fiv) and 
a “massive compliance matrix”(Fv) resulting in a very expensive bidding 
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process in which “most of the detail was irrelevant”(Fiv).  It was felt to be 
“how not to do a research contract”(Fiv). 
The HRP was “not a legal entity”(Fiii), so as “lead partner”(Fiii) the company 
“took the contract and subcontracted out”(Fiii).  Although this was a “simple 
contract”(Fii), the fact that it had “more subcontractors than most R&D 
programmes”(Fii) meant it was “commercially hideous”(Fiii) and the “amount 
of nightmare it created far exceeded expectation”(Fiii). Although it was 
“contractually required”(Fiv) to be able to put tasks on contract within days, 
there were examples of tasks which took six to ten months.  It could take 
“four to six months to change a paragraph”(Fiv) in the contract and changes 
to the consortium paperwork had to be flowed to over 25 companies.  Overall 
the HRP was felt to be “commercially a complete nightmare:  and hard to say 
whether the customer or company was worse”(Fiv). The need “to get much 
more agile”(Fiv) was recognised. 
“Relationships were strained between everybody in commercial”(Fiii) with 
some commercial people adopting the “attitude that „you were stupid and 
didn‟t understand‟”(Fiii).  It was felt that “everyone did this badly”(Fiii) and 
“there was a need to be much smarter”(Fiii) about commercial issues. 
Highlighting the problem, the original „agreed‟ copyright statement was 
“inadequate and incorrect”(Fiii), resulting in “the re-issue of fifty 
documents”(Fiii).  
“Astonishingly”(Fiv) all research task deliverables were “written into the 
contract”(Fiv) and in the early stages of the HRP, action was taken in 
response to any “deviations”(Fiii).  As a result, people tended to focus on cost 
and schedule rather than the real engineering progress being made (Br___ 
2009b).  Subsequent changes in the customer organisation meant that 
although the “contract had not been amended”(Fiii), “implementation became 
based on quality, not timeliness”(Fiii).  For the next phase the delivery 
schedule was covered by “research management plans”(Fiii) and the 
judgement of the management team regarding “satisfactory progress”(Fiii) 
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was accepted by the customer. This approach was “common sense and 
more hands off, but with less customer engagement”(Fiii).  As a result, 
however, it was “harder to get hold of commercial people”(Fiii). 
There was also tension in the HRP regarding the release of material.  The 
“original vision relied on the vast majority of output going into the public 
domain”(Fiii), with “two document types”(Fiii) being created to facilitate 
appropriate distribution.  However, “at least half of the research tasks were 
done in industry, with no vested interest to put the outputs into the public 
domain”(Fiii). The “focus going forward was for the customer to retain access 
but allow external publication and distribution of work”(Fiii).  However, only 
one formal publication and “around twenty HRP-related papers”(Fiv) had 
been released.   
Customer commercial practice meant that “the bidding process for research 
work was a nightmare”(Fiii) with everything subject to “open calls”(Fiii) which 
made “evaluation a nightmare”(Fiii).  With “some of those bidding also on the 
evaluation team”(Fiii) there was a clear conflict of interest.  Every 
requirement for “additional services was also to go to competitive 
tender”(Fiii).  Out of “fifty or so members and associates”(Fiv), “most may 
want to bid for the work”(Fiii), making the whole process unmanageable. 
Although “‟theme lead review‟ works as the governance structure for 
research document outputs”(Fiii), it was unclear “how this would work for 
additional services”(Fiii) to enable the delivery of consistent quality advice 
and guidance.  The “plan was that one individual was technically responsible 
for the quality of all outputs”(Fiii) and to ensure “consistent advice from 
consultants”(Fiii), but the feasibility of this was constrained by resource 
availability. 
6.7.4 Culture 
The HRP was “a cultural disaster”(Fii) with some academics who “didn‟t 
understand a contract”(Fii) and “had no idea on delivery to 
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time/cost/quality”(Fii).  One university was “by far the worst”(Fii), and 
highlighted as delivering “nearly always late, and not what was 
contracted”(Fii).  Others were “OK”(Fii) or “excellent, and did what they 
said”(Fii). 
On the supply side, there was quite a lot of common ground and a shared 
view of “what was wrong with the customer”(Fiv), but there was “currently no 
way of having an informed discussion” without “connecting technical 
problems to schedule and cost”(Fiv).  There was a view that “ultimately to 
succeed, it needed cultural change”(Fiv) within the customer.  Although 
“close contacts”(Fiv) were “OK”(Fiv) there was seen to be “quite a big gulf 
between us and the customer” which made the original vision for the HRP 
unrealistic.  A “characteristic problem”(Fiv) was the “need to write a six to 
eight page executive summary for long reports”(Fiv). 
The change in “lots of personnel”(Fiii) within the participant organisations 
caused a “huge cultural shift”(Fiii) in the HRP. 
6.7.5 Resources: People  
The management team appeared to have had clarity of roles with individuals 
describing themselves and others as “chair”(Fi), “senior sponsor”(Fi), “having 
technical focus”(Fiv), “having programme focus”(Fiv), “technical adviser”(Fiii) 
and “customer”(Fii); although the structure did require someone to “wear two 
hats as a member of the team and the customer, creating „interesting 
tension‟”(Fii).  Within the management team one “triumvirate worked pretty 
well”(Fiv) with “great engagement”(Fiii) before being impacted by the 
departure of a key individual. In another case the “relationship was generally 
good but with occasional misinterpretations”(Fiv).  There was a feeling that 
the team were “getting to be experts at managing contracts under extreme 
uncertainty”(Fiii).  However there were several negative references to 
different individuals “talking like he ran it”(Fiii), “doing what he thought was 
right for him”(Fii), “always active but in the wrong direction”(Fiii), “having his 
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own agenda”(Fiii) and “not having that sense of ownership”(Fiii) and well as 
those who simply “didn‟t understand”(Fiv).   
There was a general sense that the loss of two key people had been 
detrimental.  In the first case, someone with the “intellectual capability to help 
define how to tackle things”(Fiii) “got pulled out in the later bid stages”(Fiii) 
and was “replaced at a critical time”(Fiii). More recently, a “good guy”(Fiv) 
who was “very helpful”(Fiv) and “had a feel for it”(Fiv), and had been able to 
“make up for the problems with broader engagement”(Fiii) was replaced by 
someone “less competent” who “couldn‟t understand” and “didn‟t seem to 
have the same ownership”(Fiii). Although these two individuals had “different 
views of implementation”(Fiii), they had a “shared objective”(Fiii).  The HRP 
was “seeing change in personnel at all levels”(Fiv) and change within the 
customer organisation meant that many felt “they were about to be „sacked‟ 
and didn‟t seem very interested”(Fiii).  “Strategically, the cycle of two-year 
postings was a big problem, made harder by the very technical nature of the 
research”(Fiv).  In general, “customer project team staffing was a problem: 
they expressed user needs but couldn‟t deal with the technical stuff.  Even 
money wouldn‟t help”(Fiv).   
Within the „supply‟ side of the HRP there were “two extremes of 
behaviour”(Fiii): those who “behaved very independently, were proactive but 
with little accountability or visibility to the management team”(Fiii) and 
“everybody else who exhibited almost total apathy, not doing anything unless 
specifically requested”(Fiii): who were clearly “competent but not 
motivated”(Fiii). The management team “spent quite a lot of time digging 
others out of holes”(Fiv).  There was a sense that the degree of management 
control may initially have been inadequate in respect of actions which “made 
the management team very uneasy”(Fiii) and “proved to have a very negative 
impact”(Fiii), and that “in hindsight should have pulled the reins earlier”(Fiii). It 
appeared that this was changing and it was noted that a key individual “had 
recently grown a backbone”(Fii). 
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The “team didn‟t get enough time to talk to each other”(Fiii) and 
“opportunities were minimal”(Fiii) for the team to gel.  As a result, the HRP 
was “not a cohesive whole, but couldn‟t retrench as it needed to be 
inclusive”(Fiv).  Although it “took a while to build links”(Fiv) it was felt that 
“implementation was constrained because of the people”(Fiii) and there was 
a “lack of project engagement”(Fiv).  Overload was a common theme, with 
various people described as being “very busy”(Fiii), “too busy to do their 
roles”(Fiii), being “short on time for research”(Fiii), having “not enough hours 
in the day”(Fiii) and having “more to do than the resources available”(Fiii).  
Even though one partner “had the money, they still couldn‟t find the 
people”(Fiv).  One commercial manager was “minimising their input” as they 
had “fifty-three contracts to manage, making this a „spare time‟ job, not a 
priority”(Fiii). 
At the proposal stage, it was noted that “engineers understood the technical 
bits and worried about the other stuff, where they expected the same clarity” 
but were unable to get it (Fv). 
6.7.6 Resources: Funding 
Since the customer “didn‟t want to contract with a legal body (i.e. pay for 
bricks and mortar)”(Fiv), the HRP relied heavily on the level of management 
support provided by the company.  However, “the longer it went on, the 
harder it would be to go to a legal entity”(Fiv).  The “initial aspiration of 
becoming self-sustaining”(Fiv) had already been discounted as “no longer 
feasible or appropriate”(Fiv). 
Funding for the HRP came from the customer‟s research budget, with the 
associated constraint that it had to be spent on research.  This was in conflict 
with the HRP‟s broader vision and objectives (Br___ 2009b). 
The HRP‟s effectiveness in respect of its broader ambitions was limited by 
the scale of the investment.  If it was “bigger and had more money”(Fiii) it 
would have been feasible to “name five people and train the trainer”(Fiii) in 
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order to promulgate a consistent message on the major issues -  but “not at 
this scale where we‟re spending £3M/year if we‟re lucky”(Fiii). 
In order to alleviate the difficulties of dealing with very technical reports, it 
was suggested that a technical author could be employed, but a question 
arose over “who would pay?”(Fiii) There was an unwillingness to “ask the 
customer to pay again for research output”(Fiv). It was also suggested that 
two tasks “should have been”(Fiv) funded from another source better suited 
to low TRL research. 
6.7.7 Lifecycle 
The original concept for the HRP was for a “national all-inclusive 
enterprise”(Fii) which was then modified by “the need to compete”(Fii).  In 
“re-writing the question to frame it as a competition, they took a good idea 
and ruined it”(Fii). The attitude seemed to be “never mind the outcome, let‟s 
have a competition”(Fii).  “Those who would have been involved”(Fii) in the 
original concept “tried to form into one team but it fell apart”(Fii).  Unable to 
“talk to the customer”(Fiv) “until they got through the compliance 
process”(Fv), the teams “had to guess what the problems were”(Fiv).  In 
order to create “unique selling points, both teams diverged from the central 
position, resulting in completely incompatible solutions”(Fii).  In reviewing the 
bids the customer “almost decided not to do any of them”(Fiv) but instead 
opted for “cherry picking”(Fiv) elements of the different bids and 
“merging”(Fii) them.  As a result of this “forced marriage”(Fii) which “took as 
much effort as the original bid”(Fv), the HRP went through a difficult creation 
phase with a lot of change.  Participants wondered “how on earth did we get 
here having started there?”(Fii)  The original vision of the customer sponsor 
was not widely supported (Br___ 2010b). 
The HRP was based on a “five year contract with a breakpoint after three 
years”(Fiii).  After two years, the contract was extended to cover the full five 
year period.  There was a desire to “create a rolling contract with no end 
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date, just adding to the duration two or three years ahead”(Fiii) but with 
changes in the customer organisation it was unclear whether this would 
happen.  The HRP was “in the sustainment phase with new tasks 
starting”(Fiii) at the time of the interviews. 
There was an initial desire to create an “initial operating capability”(Fiv) and 
then “full operating capability”(Fiv) but this was “a model which the „lords and 
masters‟ didn‟t buy into”(Fiv).  This model “would probably have had a better 
chance of working”(Fiv) but it would have been “harder to bring in other 
companies”(Fiv). It was felt that the “management structure should be 
designed to evolve”(Fv) and that “improving capability over time may be 
possible, but we needed to show benefit first”(Fiv). 
Although the HRP was seen as “a growing little baby, still on life support”(Fi) 
which “would die if you stopped funding”(Fi), there was originally a “degree of 
contractual commitment to transfer it to be self-sustaining”(Fi).  However, it 
was “hard to see how this would evolve to a sustainable entity”(Fiv).  There 
was a “danger that the future business model was not really transpiring”(Fi) 
that the HRP may “go into traditional research management, losing the 
novelty and technology transfer intention”(Fi).  Despite the original objective 
to “become self-funding”(Fiv), there was “no demand”(Fi) from the customer 
for the additional services required to do this.  It was felt that “an explicit step-
change was needed”(Fiv) and that there would be a “need to change the 
model, re-write the contract and re-implement”(Fiv).  As a result “it had been 
agreed to give up on the self-funding idea”(Fiii).   
However, there was a concern that the HRP had produced insufficient 
outputs for the customer rather than industry and had the potential to be 
sidetracked by “individual agendas”.  It was “at risk of dying from lack of 
relevance” (Br___ 2010b). 
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6.7.8 Complexity 
The HRP approach was “not novel, just business as usual”(Fi).  It was a “little 
enterprise that wasn‟t novel or complex”(Fi), following a “well-trodden 
path”(Fi).  There was “nothing novel about processes or stakeholders, all 
extant processes were reused”(Fi) and it “shouldn‟t have been difficult to 
manage”(Fii).   However, “organisationally, it was very much more complex 
than the HRP in Case Study E”(Fii) although the reason for this was unclear. 
The “technology transfer process was more complex: trying to make the 
organisation behave in a way that products were used and valued”(Fi).  It 
was felt that the “exploitation process was the complex bit”(Fi).   
The research itself was “technically complex”(Fii) with “some problems that 
were genuinely hard”(Fiv) and “some individual research tasks that 
represented novel and complex thinking, although some were simpler”(Fiii).  
“If we really understood what we were trying to do it would be very complex.  
There were multiple causes we needed to address and any solution was 
necessarily complex”(Fiii), but the “complexity should have been in how 
these delivered the vision and what else was needed.  We obviously had a 
gap”(Fiii). 
6.7.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering was not used “in any formal way”(Fi) in establishing the 
HRP.   
From the company perspective, the “usual process”(Fi) was followed, raising 
a concern that the associated “„embarrassingly large‟ level of effort and 
intolerable overhead cost was ignored”(Fii).  At the bid stage, no “formal 
technique”(Fv) was used.  However, the solution was sought 
“holistically”(Fv), “starting with a bundle of constraints, identifying „what were 
all the bits‟ and prioritising”(Fv). This involved “looking for things that were 
important but not obvious”(Fv).  It was likened to the work of a chef: “some 
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things in presentation added to the taste and brought out flavours: ambience, 
crowd, music, noise etc”(Fv). 
Although by “specifying the organisational outline in the Invitation to 
Tender”(Fiii) the customer “had decided what the HRP was going to do and 
what the architecture was”(Fiii) there was “no evidence of a systems 
engineering approach”(Fi) in this.  This did not leave “a lot of room for 
manoeuvre”(Fiii) and although they had “subsequently done things like 
„combining‟ (dropping) themes”(Fiii) and discussed “rationalising 
meetings”(Fiii) this was felt to be “just tinkering around the edges”(Fiii).  The 
company “had no input to the architecture”(Fiii). 
The HRP was “thought through „to a level‟ by both customer and 
contractor”(Fi).  It was “conceptualised and contracted for, but there were 
dependencies.  The concept was not validated, not proven, and was not 
working”(Fi). It was felt to be “all about modelling: context, environment and 
interventions necessary”(Fi) and it had been necessary to decide whether to 
“just throw it in, or model it so that you knew”(Fi).  Noting that “the latter may 
not have been do-able”(Fi), the HRP could “arguably have been designed up 
front more rigorously “(Fi). Nevertheless, the “architectural design of 
processes for resource management”(Fi) was done. 
The integration of the programme was not planned, and with 26 individual 
research tasks “building a coherent whole out of the bits was tricky”(Fiv).  
Whilst the three themes were useful from a technical management 
perspective, they were less effective in engaging with the customer and on 
projects.  A second framework of „Hard Problems‟ was introduced to assist, 
but there was felt to be a danger that a number of discrete „pet topics‟ were 
being pursued and that the structure was merely superficial (Br___ 2010c). 
The vision for the HRP implied a culture change in the customer community, 
but no modelling was done to identify the stakeholders, to understand the 
role of the HRP in this change or to identify what else would be needed for 
the vision to be achieved.  It was far from obvious that the majority of 
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participants recognised the socio-technical problem that was being faced, or 
that the expenditure of effort and funding in this area would have been 
supported (Br___ 2010c). 
6.7.10 Perceptions of Success 
Although “not set up to have the greatest chance of success”(Fiv) the HRP 
was “trying to do something worthwhile”(Fiv) and “may succeed in small 
areas and see benefit”(Fiv).  “Most researchers were delivering useful 
output”(Fiii); however in some cases, though “intellectually sound”(Fiv), the 
content was inaccessible to non-experts and the “customer couldn‟t 
understand them”(Fiv). 
Indicators of effectiveness were not directly linked to the objectives but 
addressed: 
 National recognition of the HRP 
 Improvement to government acquisitions 
 Commercial exploitation of the HRP‟s capabilities 
 On-time reporting 
 Internal and External Communications 
 Application to real systems 
The associated measures were set against numerical standards, but where 
these changed over time it was unclear how this related to increasing 
confidence in each indicator or indeed to expected behaviours.  In some 
cases, for example the generation of additional income streams, the 
standards were highly unrealistic given the lack of architecture or planning to 
deliver the change in business model over a relatively short period of time 
reflected by the figures (Case Study F [undated]).  Furthermore, there was no 
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connection between the indicators of effectiveness and the HRP‟s contract: 
to deliver research tasks (Br___ 2009b). 
The fact that the “real goals didn‟t align to the needs”(Fiv) meant the HRP 
was “not entirely without events and incidents”(Fiv).  There was a difficulty 
“getting the customer to engage: they were „down in the weeds‟, not 
managing what we should have been doing next”(Fiii).  Nevertheless “we 
tried very hard to make it work”(Fii). 
There was a concern that it “would end up with internal clashes”(Fiv).  One 
interviewee was “dubious of the ability to meet the overall aim”(Fiv). 
6.8 Secondary Case Studies 
Secondary case studies arose as a consequence of primary case study 
interviews, where the interviewee compared a primary case study with 
another HRP from their experience.  In most cases they were based on the 
input of a single interviewee, and information was provided in an unstructured 
way.  The information for these case studies was generally more limited than 
in the primary cases and typically highlighted only a small number of 
characteristics of the HRP.  Sections within these case studies where only 
the title is listed indicate that there was nothing in the respondent‟s 
comments, or in the published material that was accessed, relating to that 
characteristic. 
6.8.1 Case Study G 
The HRP in Case Study G was a £6M 5-year research programme 
established in 2005, jointly sponsored by a Government funding body and the 
company (both at a corporate level and through its business units and joint 
venture companies).  Delivered by a consortium of four UK universities, it 
was focused on novel distributed information systems. There were four 
research themes within the overall programme. 
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6.8.1.1 Objectives 
Within the HRP, it was felt that the “research goal had to be exploitation”(Gi) 
and that there was “pretty much a shared view”(Gi) that “maximum 
exploitation”(Gi) was “a good thing, not a distraction”(Gi).  However, 
“exploitation didn‟t happen by accident”(Gi). 
Although “publish or perish”(Gi) drives academics, in this area it was possible 
to “write a paper about demonstrations and get a good paper”(Gi).  It was felt 
that this “might be a characteristic of this field”(Gi) which helped to align 
industrial and academic objectives. 
What was “in and out of scope”(Gi) was clearly defined, unlike the HRP in 
Case Study D where “nothing seemed out of scope”(Gi).  There was a 
recognised “need to focus on key points, not 1000 different things”(Gi). 
6.8.1.2 The nature of the relationship 
The nature of the relationship was clearly shaped by the collaboration of 
competent individuals with an understanding of their partners‟ needs.  Within 
the company, the key architect knew the technical area and could “judge 
people who were good and those that weren‟t, and down-select on merit 
rather than the „good mates‟ principle”(Gi).  In a complementary role, the lead 
academic “was a good supporter”(Gi) and “got universities to do a statement 
of work”(Gi).  “Everyone had deliverables and they got chased if they were 
late”(Gi).  The academic partners had “complementary capabilities”(Gi) in 
different areas which provided a nucleus and a way for other partners to get 
involved”(Gi) 
6.8.1.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP was “contracted directly”(Gi) to the lead university.  Its governance 
architecture comprised “a strategic steering board which included the 
principal investigator”(Gi) and “looked beyond the immediate programme to 
further and future work”(Gi) and an extant company research committee.  All 
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the funding partners were members of the committee in which they “reviewed 
the statement of work, etc”(Gi).  HRP results were “presented to the group 
twice a year”(Gi) and included academic measures such as “publication 
statistics”(Gi).  The partners “were involved and could be challenged on 
exploitation”(Gi).  In contrast, one of the non-industrial funding customers 
“was much less interested in the outputs”(Gi).  They “got the programme 
running but didn‟t have anyone involved in monitoring”(Gi) 
The programme was reviewed under the normal company processes.  This 
was felt to support the programme, and “kept you on your toes”(Gi).  
Reviewers were “generally helpful”(Gi).  “Design reviews were very hard”(Gi) 
however, and as a result of “the breadth of programme and seniority of 
reviewers”(Gi)“tended to focus on exploitation”(Gi). 
There were “two big meetings per year, plus an internal workshop”(Gi).  
Invitees to the symposium included the participants, the company‟s other 
business units and government bodies, but excluded organisations that were 
“too much of a competitor”(Gi). 
6.8.1.4 Culture 
Although there was a need to “translate between academics and the 
business need”(Gi), this burden appeared to be shared by both sides. It was 
noted that “an artefact of industrial research is the need to change.  Part of it 
was changing the people you work with, and we have already done that”(Gi). 
6.8.1.5 Resources: People  
The HRP was “very much about people”(Gi).  The “academic lead was very 
good, with standing in the academic community”(Gi) and was “very keen to 
work with us”(Gi) whilst others were identified as a “key person”(Gi), “very 
well respected”(Gi) “key in creation and technically knows the area”(Gi) and 
“worked together well”(Gi).  There were “people with sufficient standing on 
both sides of the equation”(Gi), i.e. in both industry and academia. 
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In contrast, one “difficult individual”(Gi) was singled out as “much more of a 
problem”(Gi).  He “didn‟t listen and didn‟t collaborate”(Gi) such that his 
contribution “could have had much greater value”(Gi) and was “not as 
powerful as it could have been”(Gi).  His objectives were unclear and he was 
“tolerated”(Gi).  It was suggested that as a “grand standing”(Gi) type of 
academic, it “could have been that he couldn‟t find a niche for himself”(Gi) 
but nevertheless “more than one „problem child‟ would be intolerable: it 
affected the feel of the project”(Gi). 
The programme was based on the known skills of the key participants and 
designed to “play to the strengths of the team”(Gi) rather than “tell them too 
much how to do it”(Gi). It was felt that “strong characters who didn‟t like 
direction could lead to a lower calibre team”(Gi). 
6.8.1.6 Resources: Funding 
Funding was split between the customer and the company.  Within the 
company the “bulk of the money”(Gi) came from the central research budget 
with the remainder from four business units.  Other related projects within the 
company made it possible to “connect internally”(Gi).  Although recognising 
that this was “not something you could do in all situations”(Gi) this provided 
visibility of “windows of opportunity”(Gi) to the HRP. 
6.8.1.7 Lifecycle 
Within the HRP some of the “relationships were pre-existing”(Gi), enabling 
decisions to work with people on the basis that “he knew his stuff”(Gi).  Since 
“you couldn‟t know how you were going to work with someone unless you 
had” (Gi), carrying out a “smaller project beforehand and then building on 
success”(Gi) was felt to be a good approach.  
Having the programme structured as “three plus two years was a good thing.  
Three years was enough to assess if it was working”(Gi).  The “three year 
review criteria were „were we working with the right people‟ and „could we 
work with them‟?”(Gi).  Although an issue for other HRPs, “taking on new 
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PhDs in the third year was not considered a problem, as it was assumed the 
programme would continue”(Gi). 
As the programme was in its final year at the time of the interviews, the 
leadership were “looking for a way to follow-on”(Gi) with the intention that 
company funding would address “contribution in kind and exploitation”(Gi) in 
any future derivative programme. 
Programmes funded from the central research budget “had a very hard 
annual cycle”(Gi).  Although “small, niche problems could be tackled, you 
couldn‟t do fundamental, ground-breaking research on an annual basis”(Gi).  
There was a “need to back universities over the longer term and avoid setting 
a programme of work over a one year period”(Gi).  
6.8.1.8 Complexity 
6.8.1.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
Although the HRP was not „systems engineered‟, “a set of requirements was 
developed before the project started, against which the programme was 
judged”(Gi).  The importance of the „right requirements‟ was recognised: “if 
you were too requirements-led it wouldn‟t work in the university environment 
– but with no requirements nothing would get done”(Gi).  It was possible to 
have “great departments and great people doing great stuff, but with no 
alignment to the business, the understanding could still be poor”(Gi).   
Demonstration was felt to be “a really good tool: more exploitable and 
providing a focus for academics”(Gi).  They could “define the problem 
space”(Gi) and show “how did each bit fit”(Gi).  “Noddy demonstrations”(Gi) 
were felt to be particularly useful in these technical areas “to avoid getting 
lost in the mathematics”(Gi).  Although the company was available “to assist 
with the demonstrations”(Gi) these were done by the lead university.  It was 
felt that “if academics resisted”(Gi) involvement in demonstrations then 
“problems with integration in general”(Gi) should be expected, but it was 
recognised that “lots of variables needed to come together”(Gi) to create the 
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demonstration and “it was OK if some weren‟t perfect”(Gi).  The 
“demonstration domain was disaster relief, enabling academics to be 
involved without a problem but easily transitioned”(Gi) to a parallel domain of 
direct interest to the customer. 
6.8.1.10 Perceptions of Success 
In spite of the “risk that these big, quite complex programmes could go 
wrong”(Gi), the HRP was felt to be successful, attributed to a combination of 
“a very good academic lead and exploitation on the business side”(Gi).  Over 
its 5 year lifespan the HRP produced more than 150 publications, won 
several awards and “generated a number of patents and technologies that 
have been exploited by the associated industrial partners”. A follow-on grant 
has been awarded to continue the work in this area (Case Study G, The 
Project undated). 
6.8.2 Case Study H 
This case study was based on the perspective of a UK partner in the HRP.  
The HRP conducted research for a European governmental customer in a 
consortium led by a multinational company based in Europe. 
6.8.2.1 Objectives 
The HRP in Case Study H was a multinational research programme focused 
on enabling technologies in a specific, security-sensitive area.  There were 
“national differences in requirements”(Hi). 
6.8.2.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP was a European programme with four different countries involved. 
To prevent a “stove-piped solution”(Hi) there was a “management committee 
with representatives from the different organisations who agreed the 
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deliverables”(Hi).  Partners “often didn‟t know anyone in the other 
organisations”(Hi) and “had to work through the company”(Hi). 
The subcontract relationships included “academia, some of whom had never 
done this sort of thing before”(Hi). 
6.8.2.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The contracting arrangement for the HRP was complex.  Although the 
customer was in Europe, there was a UK body acting as “national bill-paying 
authority”(Hi) for “funding UK work”(Hi). They “had no contract” but “had a 
technical arrangement with the company”(Hi) in Europe.  Deliverables from 
the programme “were sent to the company, then to the customer”(Hi) and “IP 
was freely available to all parties”(Hi) 
A UK partner felt that they were “perceived as being obstructive wanting to 
cross „T‟s and dot „I‟s”(Hi) while the company “just wanted to move 
forward”(Hi).  In hindsight, this may have been attributable to the partners 
“playing a waiting game”(Hi) until contractual cover was in place at the higher 
level. 
Even between organisations who were familiar with working together, there 
were issues due to different operational and contractual requirements for this 
HRP.  An existing partnership agreement between one partner and a 
university was “not seen as „enabling‟ but „disabling‟”(Hi) in this context and 
the intent was “to agree a different arrangement to facilitate progress”(Hi). 
Since the research could touch upon “issues of national security”(Hi), “certain 
tangible and intangible assets couldn‟t be discussed”(Hi).  However, since 
academic participants “may have needed to talk to partners in other 
countries”(Hi), they would “either need an export licence”(Hi) or would need 
to “communicate through the partner”(Hi) who does have an export licence.  
A working assumption was that “everybody should have an export 
licence”(Hi) to avoid handicapping the programme with unnecessary 
communications constraints”(Hi).   
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There was a concern that “there were insufficient project reviews”(Hi) to 
ensure that “things that needed to be in place before starting, such as IP 
agreements, export licenses and payment arrangements”(Hi) were ready. 
6.8.2.4 Culture 
The HRP faced “different ways of working”(Hi) in different companies and 
countries, for example in commercial areas. 
There was insufficient “customer relationship management activity”(Hi) – 
certainly at the UK partner level – to allow them to “build up a customer 
database”(Hi) and facilitate the establishment of “a collaborative group to 
support the customer”(Hi).  Without the database, the UK partner didn‟t 
“know who to go to”(Hi) to proactively set up such a collaboration. 
6.8.2.5 Resources: People  
The primary contact within the company “wore many hats: technical, 
commercial, contracts, project management etc”(Hi) and appeared to have 
“no targeted expertise acting in support”(Hi) for example on topics such as 
export licences.  Similarly, there had been “only one person dealing with 
it”(Hi) in the UK partner and as a result, other individuals “hadn‟t built 
relationships”(Hi).  “Personalities and relationships”(Hi) were seen to be 
critical issues but “people didn‟t understand the relationships”(Hi) and 
“organisations were structured differently”(Hi). 
6.8.2.6 Resources: Funding 
The complex commercial and contractual arrangement for the HRP meant 
that “funding routes were diverse”(Hi) and this had caused “issues with 
cashflow”(Hi). 
6.8.2.7 Lifecycle 
The HRP was “due to start delivery of research”(Hi) after about two years, 
having spent “one year in preparation”(Hi) when the UK body‟s delay in 
Chapter Six  Case Study Findings 
[213] 
 
signing the enabling technical arrangement brought subsequent delays in the 
UK partner‟s involvement.  This indicated that the HRP was already 
“operational whilst still in the implementation phase”(Hi). 
6.8.2.8 Complexity 
6.8.2.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
6.8.2.10 Perceptions of Success 
6.8.3 Case Study I 
The HRP in Case Study I was a 5 year, £6.5M research programme being 
undertaken at ten UK Universities sponsored by the company and a 
Government funding body. Launched in 2004, it was undertaking research 
into novel technologies for the next generation of unmanned air vehicles. By 
designing and building a representative unmanned air vehicle and conducting 
a real flight campaign demonstrating the new technology, it took the 
technology to a higher Technology Readiness Level that was usual in 
academia. 
6.8.3.1 Objectives 
The HRP aimed to stimulate academic research which was better suited to 
the needs of industry, with an emphasis on achieving a specific integrated 
outcome “of practical relevance for industrial exploitation” (Jo___ 2010). 
The HRP had “two „Grand Challenges‟ set by industry: to research and 
demonstrate new technologies for achieving a maintenance-free Uninhabited 
Air Vehicle (UAV), and to achieve enhanced research impact through 
effective academic/ industry management and the exploitation of large-scale, 
integrated academic research”(Ii).  Compared to the HRP in Case Study D, it 
had a “much clearer problem”(Ii) to solve, a “clearer scope”(Ii) and a “clearer 
objective”(Ii). 
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Although often not done explicitly, industry efforts to “explicitly link the 
research outcomes to their business needs and opportunities”, for example 
through roadmapping, was essential to enable exploitation (Jo___ 2010). 
6.8.3.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP involved an innovative approach to industrial/academic 
collaboration which involved fourteen research groups across ten universities 
(Jo___ 2010). 
The HRP was “led by one university on the basis of an extant strategic 
relationship with the company”(Ii).  “Relationships between academics were 
generally good, with a cooperative approach taken by all”(Ii).  In one specific 
technical area, two of the universities were “in competition”(Ii) and this 
caused “tensions between academics”(Ii) within the HRP.  In addition, there 
were “ongoing niggles”(Ii) in a technical area, attributed to “inadequate 
communications”(Ii) between three universities. 
6.8.3.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
It was recognised that the academics involved in the HRP needed to be able 
to publish in respected journals.  A review process was established whereby 
all universities signed non-disclosure agreements and papers were reviewed 
by the company prior to submission to remove any commercially sensitive 
content.  The company “did not impose unnecessary or unreasonable 
restrictions” enabling a balance to be struck between publication and 
company exploitation (Jo___ 2010). 
The company was the major stakeholder in terms of both funding and control.  
As the programme progressed “the company‟s emphasis and expectations 
increased regarding exploitation of research outcomes and on short-term 
delivery of specific cost-benefits”(Ii).  Discussions on future funding 
possibilities emphasised “academics finding other sources of funding for 
research that the company could benefit from”(Ii). 
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However, it was noted that “for such leverage, the research needed to appeal 
to other applications and hence be a more general programme”(Ii) and that 
“to get someone else to fund, you had to release control to broaden the 
appeal”(Ii). 
6.8.3.4 Culture 
The HRP succeeded in “building an integrated team approach” around the 
development, integration and testing of a demonstrator.  Without such a 
stimulus it was “very unlikely” that the HRP objectives would have been 
achieved (Jo___ 2010). 
Within the company, there was a “transition of „owner‟”(Ii) responsible for the 
research funding during the programme and this led to a focus on “much 
more short term, tangible outputs”(Ii).  As a result, the “big picture of 
establishing a sustainable academic capability suffered”(Ii). Although the 
“overall collaboration across the programme and the outcome focus exhibited 
by academics were good”(Ii), “on occasions this change in focus caused 
problems for some of the academics”(Ii).   
Although the “academics were used to operating in stovepipes, and didn‟t 
usually get exposed to such a high degree of collaboration”(Ii), within this 
HRP the clarity of focus and objectives established by the Grand Challenges 
gave “an overall unity of purpose”(Ii) which meant that the  “dispersive 
influences were easier to align”(Ii).  However, special efforts were required to 
overcome the barriers, for example, conventional academic measures such 
as publications.  Flexibility and cooperation were essential from all parties 
(Jo___ 2010). 
6.8.3.5 Resources: People  
One of the primary aims of the HRP was to develop “industrially relevant 
multidisciplinary skills” in academia.  The focus on exploitation meant that the 
universities‟ involvement went beyond technology research to systems 
integration.  As a result, academics were able to develop these skills and 
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knowledge which would normally only be developed in industry.  An 
important lesson, however, was that “the expertise and experience that is 
gained should be primarily vested in permanent academic staff” and not in 
doctoral students or postdoctoral staff who tend to be more mobile and 
therefore contribute in a less predictable way to the development of 
sustainable academic capability, although some may join industry as a direct 
result of their research (Jo___ 2010).  
The tensions between short-term exploitation and long-term capability 
development were “felt by many people”(Ii) involved in the programme and 
“caused some strain on relationships”(Ii) and “ambiguity in some roles”(Ii).  
For example, “the lead person on the programme for the company effectively 
wore two hats:  one as a research collaborator within the team and another 
as the main company representative engaging with the academics”(Ii).  
Whilst the former role “focused on making a valuable technical contribution to 
the research“(Ii), the latter was often associated with “financial and timescale 
pressure being put on academics”(Ii) and a “more adversarial”(Ii) relationship. 
Within the overall research team an “open collaborative attitude was 
essential”(Ii) and some people “found this more difficult than others”(Ii).  One 
academic “took the view that „if I approved something and it went wrong, I 
would get blamed”(Ii): “his whole attitude was to protect his own back”(Ii).  
This was “not helpful to the programme”(Ii) and frustrating for other 
researchers who “wanted to shout at him „start collaborating‟”(Ii). 
The involvement of “appropriate industrial people, with technical expertise, 
knowledge of industrial priorities, and the ability to influence internal industrial 
attitudes towards academic research” was felt to be crucial.  The change in 
outcomes that was sought could not be achieved “by an administrative or 
financial relationship alone; close technical and programmatic engagement is 
essential” and this required a strong and ongoing commitment from industry.  
The assignment of “a highly experienced senior engineer” as Exploitation 
Manager was an example of this (Jo___ 2010). 
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6.8.3.6 Resources: Funding 
When the programme started in 2004, the customer‟s funding model did not 
allow for the charging of academic staff time.  This was a significant 
disadvantage for the programme which meant that the lead university in 
particular had to invest in the programme in order to support integration.  The 
rules have since changed (Jo___ 2010). 
Funding from the company was flowed through the customer and then 
provided as a “grant to universities”(Ii) in the same way as the HRP in Case 
Study D.  It was noted that “when money gets tight, the long term, blue sky, 
speculative stuff goes”(Ii).  As funding priorities changed, the HRP relied 
upon the “cooperation and understanding of academics” to maintain good 
relationships (Jo___ 2010). 
6.8.3.7 Lifecycle 
In the early stages of the programme, the “inevitable focus within each 
research group was on establishing the fundamental research progress in 
their area of expertise”.  As the programme progressed, the focus turned 
increasingly to integration.  Around the mid-point in the programme, weekly 
coordination meetings were introduced. These were held face-to-face for 
about 12 months and subsequently using remote technologies over the 
Internet (Jo___ 2010).  This clearly represented a significant financial 
investment simply in enabling the partners to meet. 
Behaviours in the HRP were driven by the funding cycle.  In the “run up to the 
three year review”(Ii), the company  “declared that they wanted to see more 
rapid progress”(Ii).  “There was a lot of effort and significant spending on an 
early demonstration system, in order to show progress at the mid-term 
review”(Ii).  “After the review, that effort was largely nugatory”(Ii) 
On the other hand, the “maturity of research at the review point helped focus 
the programme”(Ii).  The “tangible-outcome question could be asked, to 
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enable changes to the programme”(Ii).  As a result, at this stage some things 
“were discontinued as there was no obvious route to exploitation”(Ii). 
6.8.3.8 Complexity 
The “establishment of the Grand Challenges at the outset”(Ii) helped to 
“provide a shared purpose and a degree of clarity in the requirement”(Ii) and 
“reduced the complexity”(Ii) perceived within the HRP.  Having a “clear, 
single „customer‟”(Ii) on the company side meant that the programme “didn‟t 
have to struggle with the problems associated with multiple stakeholders”(Ii). 
6.8.3.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
The solution to competition between the two competing academic partners 
was architectural: by “trying to partition into separate streams of work, both 
could do useful work and they didn‟t have to collaborate so closely”(Ii).  It was 
noted that “otherwise, they may have been at loggerheads”(Ii). 
Two significant demonstrations were part of the programme, with the smaller 
system “providing a stepping stone for progressive risk reduction”(Ii). 
6.8.3.10 Perceptions of Success 
Although “it had been going the same way”(Iii) until a new project manager 
was assigned, the HRP had “a lot less problems”(Ii) than the HRP in Case 
Study D.  It would have been “better if the weather hadn‟t affected planned 
demonstrations”(Ii), but was generally considered successful. 
The publication review process was successful in enabling academic 
publication while protecting commercially-sensitive information (Jo___ 2010). 
6.8.4 Case Study J 
The HRP in Case Study J was established in 1979 by UK aerospace 
companies to demonstrate the credibility of UK industry to deliver a future 
fast jet.  The five member industrial consortium was self-funded and 
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managed, and continued to work together through its working group and 
steering group on “the development of technologies and strategies of mutual 
interest” (Case Study J 2010).  With only industry participants, it is not strictly 
an HRP on a continuous basis, but periodically works with the customer on 
specific contracts. 
6.8.4.1 Objectives 
The HRP‟s “original clear objective”(Ji) was “to demonstrate the viability and 
credibility of UK industry”(Ji) in a particular technical area, “driven in 
response to the belief that the customer thought the UK no longer had a 
viable capability”(Ji).  There was a “common threat that all competitors would 
go out of business”(Ji) if they did not work together. 
A secondary objective was to then “prove that UK capability was dominant in 
Europe: to maximise UK benefit and jockey for position”(Ji), and to enable 
the customer to “fight for the UK position, confident that UK industry wouldn‟t 
let them down”(Ji).  The construct evolved to providing “leadership of 
thought”(Ji) in this area. 
Over time, the objectives of the HRP had changed.  Having succeeded in its 
original objective, the group evolved and “started doing R&D for the money, 
with less deep thought”(Ji).  This persisted as the “motivation until two or 
three years ago”(Ji). 
The HRP‟s “purpose was reviewed repeatedly, for example as it bid for work, 
to ensure that the aspirations were sufficiently compatible with the aspirations 
and ethos of the group”(Ji) 
6.8.4.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP had “a family relationship.  It had its ups and downs, it stuck 
together and aimed for survival”(Ji).  As with any family there was “some 
conflict, but not a lot”(Ji).  No company had ever left, and we had never 
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seriously debated ejecting anyone”(Ji). Leadership of funded work was 
“neither by turn nor seniority, but by appropriateness”(Ji). 
“Originally, all the partners were under threat and petty differences were set 
aside”(Ji).  The focus on survival led to what was “almost a joint activity with 
the customer, although the customer didn‟t realise”(Ji). 
Over time, businesses had “changed hands and changed names”(Ji), but 
despite “lots of change in the industry”(Ji), the HRP had been largely 
unaffected. 
6.8.4.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
This HRP is notable in that it existed with “no non-disclosure agreement, 
teaming agreement or partnering agreement.  Just a handshake!”(Ji).  Whilst 
the “leaders understood the commercial arrangements”(Ji), there were 
typically “new commercial people each time it bids for work, who didn‟t 
understand”(Ji). 
The HRP “in no legal sense exists, and therefore cannot accept 
contracts”(Ji).  Although “contracts were awarded in its name, they actually 
went to one member in its name”(Ji).   “Commercial people found it very 
difficult: for example terms and conditions, penalties etc were not flowed 
down to partners”(Ji).  There were “no penalties”(Ji), simply an “agreement 
between honourable gentlemen who had never let each other down, and 
never would”(Ji). There was a commitment to “honour agreements”(Ji).  
When the HRP bid for work, this approach could cause difficulties internally 
for the lead company as “whoever led on a particular piece of work took all 
the liability”(Ji). There was “no markup on subcontracts”(Ji) and this “became 
a problem as we became more prescriptive about company processes”(Ji). 
The HRP had “never accused anyone of failing to deliver.  If there were 
problems, you‟d roll up your sleeves and fix it.  It was a family 
partnership.”(Ji)  If something did go wrong then members “could retaliate, 
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but it would be MAD: mutually assured destruction, the nuclear option.  
Retaliation was never part of the HRP‟s culture”(Ji). 
Although the viability and purpose of the HRP had been questioned over the 
years, members recognised the unique arrangement and had “never had the 
nerve to stop it”(Ji) recognising that they would “never manage to form it 
again”(Ji). 
6.8.4.4 Culture 
The HRP had a very strong sense of identity, founded on the stability of its 
membership.  Most steering group members were originally working group 
members and had been involved for seven to ten years: for one member that 
figure was twenty-two years!  “Corporate memory and passion”(Ji) were 
distinctive attributes and the most common “cause for departure”(Ji) was 
retirement.  “Most members had „gone native‟”(Ji) and the relationship was 
more like a family than a collaboration of partners and competitors. 
Its effectiveness was founded on “two relationships of trust: between the 
people in the working group and steering group, and between individuals and 
their employer”(Ji), where the emphasis was on “not doing anything to 
damage the HRP”(Ji). 
6.8.4.5 Resources: People  
Members of the HRP were “intelligent people with enthusiasm, capable of 
wide-ranging debate”(Ji).  The style and focus of leadership of both working 
group and steering group was therefore important.  For the working group, 
one former chairman “managed to draw them together to a conclusion”(Ji); 
another who was less effective but “absolutely delivery focused”(Ji) tried to 
“control the working group to deliver a „thunk‟”(Ji). 
The former steering group chairman “only missed one steering group 
meeting in fifteen years”(Ji).  Others who were “probably too busy”(Ji) and 
missed many meetings were seen as “an embarrassment”(Ji).  After many 
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years of leadership from the company, an independent chairman with “a 
passion for the HRP”(Ji) was appointed. 
6.8.4.6 Resources: Funding 
“When it became clear that the HRP was successful, the second hurdle was 
finance.  It wouldn‟t have mattered without technical capability”(Ji) 
Within the HRP, “no money changed hands except under specific 
contracts”(Ji).  “Manpower costs etc, which amounted to a few days plus 
travel, „lay where they fell‟”(Ji), and “there was internal funding of specialists 
as needed”(Ji). 
6.8.4.7 Lifecycle 
The HRP was quite a remarkable entity, having recently celebrated its 30th 
birthday. 
After its initial success, it “went into „deep thought‟ mode: it had got used to 
itself, and to working together”(Ji).  From an engineering perspective, 
individuals “liked working together, being able to „do deep thoughts‟ and think 
about future challenges”(Ji) to ensure that the UK retained its reputation for 
leadership “ready for the next round”(Ji); and it “became the market survey 
on private venture funding”(Ji). 
“Then it changed again.  Someone in commercial asked it to justify „just 
spending money‟.  The decision was made to go bidding for money in areas 
of its technical expertise”(Ji).  Over time, it started to get funded work and this 
focus continued until a few years ago when the importance of re-establishing 
„thought-leadership‟ was recognised.  Members felt that it had become 
“moneygrabbing”(Ji) at the expense of its original purpose.  The steering 
group chairman stood down, recognising that having led up to that point, it 
“would have been difficult to lead the change back again”(Ji), and a new 
independent chairman was appointed to lead this next phase. 
Chapter Six  Case Study Findings 
[223] 
 
The HRP appeared to be in a “repeating cycle of sustainment and transition, 
which may be overlapping”(Ji).  Some thought had been given to termination, 
but “it was not so simple as just not having the next meeting.”(Ji)  “There was 
a point where the culture became self-sustaining and now resists 
termination”(Ji).  Reflecting the sense of family, there “would be a hell of a 
party/wake if it was decided to terminate”(Ji). 
6.8.4.8 Complexity 
6.8.4.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
SInce most members of the HRP were “systems engineers by 
background”(Ji) they had a “better understanding of impacts”(Ji) and tended 
to “behave in a systems engineering manner – but not always”(Ji).  “Systems 
thinking rather than process”(Ji) was used. 
Systems engineering “processes and techniques from the companies”(Ji) 
were used “in delivery of tasks”(Ji). 
6.8.4.10 Perceptions of Success 
“To a greater or lesser extent, the HRP had succeeded in its original 
objective”(Ji).  Since then, it had become “the obvious and natural supplier of 
research work in the UK”(Ji) within its technical area and was “a team that 
was fielded in the international marketplace”(Ji).  Companies that were not 
formerly members of the HRP competed for funding: they “lost, learned their 
lesson and asked to join”(Ji). 
6.8.5 Case Study K 
The HRP in Case Study K was launched in 2008 as a Centre of Excellence 
on a university site (Case Study K, About Us 2007). Initially four industrial 
core partners each committed £1 million over five years to support 
technology research relating to maintenance, repair and overhaul for high-
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tech, high-value vehicles.  Local government also invested £3 million (Case 
Study K Centre undated). 
The HRP was used by interviewees to illustrate a different type of 
commercial model with multiple industrial partners. 
6.8.5.1 Objectives 
One interviewee described the HRP aim as the development of “technology 
as an enabler for Availability”(Kiii) of high value equipment.  The emphasis 
was on “low to medium TRL enabling each partner to take it forward”(Kii) and 
exploit research outputs.  The topic area was well defined and “people 
understood what it meant”(Kii). 
The HRP Vision was to deliver sustainable integrated solutions “that industry 
cares about” in the chosen technology area.  This implied providing “a steady 
flow of incremental improvements as well as game changing opportunities 
that result in added shareholder value and competitive advantage for our 
partners”.  Its mission was to “become a globally recognised centre” 
developing innovative solutions through research, knowledge integration and 
coordination (Case Study K, About Us 2007).  The focus was to “provide 
breakthrough performance and extreme affordability”(Case Study K Centre 
undated). 
HRP operations were in three main areas: research, business development 
and knowledge base, which included teaching (Case Study K, Centre 
Operation 2007).   
The strategic aims were: 
• To Attract Investment – supplement launch funding by attracting additional 
investment from new core partners/members and research funding bodies 
• Achieve World Recognition – working with industry and academic leaders 
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• Provide Technology Transfer – implementation of concepts and 
technologies within the industry and develop the associated skills base 
• Become Self Sustaining – after 5 years 
• Deliver Competitive Advantage – to the key stakeholders (Case Study K, 
About Us 2007). 
6.8.5.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP was managed by a “steering board”(Kii) which “decided the 
research agenda”(Ki).  It was established by one industrial partner, and 
“although they no longer led it, their emblem was still on the paperwork”(Kii). 
Nevertheless, the HRP was described as a “club” in which the funding 
partners were “members”. 
6.8.5.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The organisation of the HRP was felt to “trade off leverage, control and 
exploitation”(Ki) in a positive way. As well as sharing the majority of the 
costs, Tier 1 partners jointly directed the programme.  “It was a 
democracy”(Kii).  “Common voting meant you couldn‟t just spend your own 
money”(Kii), but that the centre pursued research into topics selected by the 
funding partners (Case Study K, Frequently Asked Questions 2007). 
6.8.5.4 Culture 
6.8.5.5 Resources: People  
The centre‟s core competencies were: 
• Business Modelling & Simulation 
• Business Transformation & Culture Change 
• Demonstration & Fast Prototyping 
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• Analysis & Algorithm Development (inc. Data Exploitation) 
• Systems Engineering /Architecture & Systems Integration 
• Knowledge Integration (Case Study K, About Us 2007). 
Among the key participants it was noted that the “technical director was a 
professor from industry”(Ki). 
6.8.5.6 Resources: Funding 
The HRP was based on “industrial collaborative funding”(Ki), supplemented 
by “consortium bids into a funding agency”(Kii) and some local government 
funds.  The research programme was initially “completely funded by the 
partners”(Kii) with “Tier 1 partners each contributing £200k per year and Tier 
2 partners paying £50k per year”(Kii).   
By attracting multiple participants, partners and members benefitted from 
“highly leveraged R&D spend (from 1:10 to 1:20)” (Case Study K Centre 
undated). 
6.8.5.7 Lifecycle 
The company approached the UK government in 2006 with regard to setting 
up a research centre in the UK. An open competition was run and the 
university was successful in securing the Centre (Case Study K, Frequently 
Asked Questions 2007). 
6.8.5.8 Complexity 
6.8.5.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
6.8.5.10 Perceptions of Success 
The Centre was interested in high TRL (Technology Readiness Level) 
research and so the technology developed would be planned into the 
partners‟ roadmaps and take the next step of going into service. This 
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commercialisation of the research was considered the ultimate measure of 
success (Case Study K, Frequently Asked Questions 2007). 
Early progress in the HRP “seemed very positive”(Kii).  After one year the 
feeling was “so far so good”(Ki) and that the HRP had the potential to be 
“huge”(Kiii). 
6.8.6 Case Study L 
The HRP in Case Study L was used by one interviewee from the Commercial 
function to illustrate some of the challenges faced. 
6.8.6.1 Objectives 
The HRP took recent research findings from engineering, technology, 
business and the social sciences and turned them into tools, techniques and 
processes suitable for widespread adoption by UK industry and the public 
sector.  It aimed to enable organisations of all sizes and across sectors to 
realise value from complex, product related services (Pe___ [undated]). 
6.8.6.2 The nature of the relationship 
The government-funded programme built on the work conducted as part of a 
consortium led by the university and jointly funded by the government and 
one company (Pe___ [undated]). 
6.8.6.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
Within the partnership discussions, protection or release of intellectual 
property became a key trade-off and there was a “need to decide who made 
the decision, i.e. „who could say no to IP‟”(Li) and allow it to be released.  
However, “typically nobody made that decision”(Li) and “there was no 
process to check what background intellectual property was being put in”(Li) 
to a partnership. 
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6.8.6.4 Culture 
When the interviewee became involved in the HRP it had been “working for 
nine months without non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), contracts, etc.  
Absolutely nothing”(Li).  “The Commercial function was not typically involved 
in partnership discussions.  When there was a quote to do or bid/no bid 
decisions, you needed to have Commercial there – but with a partnership you 
could do all this talking as there was funding for these people‟s time”(Li). 
It was noted that “many commercial people wouldn‟t be proactive at the 
beginning.  It‟s not a priority for them at that stage”(Li).  However, “the person 
leading the development of the partnership might not know the right people to 
ask, for example to bring in the IP experts”(Li).  “Admittedly commercial 
people were very busy and ignored emails if they didn‟t understand the 
problem or what was needed”(Li).   
Overall this was considered to be a significant issue but it was unclear “who 
should have been supporting this from a commercial viewpoint”(Li). 
6.8.6.5 Resources: People  
6.8.6.6 Resources: Funding 
6.8.6.7 Lifecycle 
The HRP was “derived from”(Li) an existing partnership.  “At creation, the 
stakeholders were not the correct stakeholders: they were typically technical 
people, a champion etc.  These were people at a suitable level with the 
authority to go and commit, but they were not in a proper structured area” to 
ensure that relevant checks and controls were in place.  “All this had been 
going on, discussing with other partners, with technical and programme 
management people involved – they were all there at the creation stage but 
without anyone from Commercial”(Li).  The first Commercial involvement was 
not until four months after funding had been received. 
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6.8.6.8 Complexity 
6.8.6.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
6.8.6.10 Perceptions of Success 
6.8.7 Case Study M 
The HRP in Case Study M was established in 2003 as a customer-industry 
partnership which was governed and funded by the customer.  Working 
across the customer-industry space to analyse problems, examine options 
and de-risk requirements, it was created to help the customer to make better, 
faster and more informed, decisions (Case Study M 2011).   
Its mission is “Serving defence as the definitive partnership providing 
decision support to enhance current and future military capability”(Jo___ 
2008). 
6.8.7.1 Objectives 
This HRP was “a huge undertaking to provide decision support to the 
customer”(Mi) which “did anything the customer wanted from a three month 
experiment to a one day facilitated workshop”(Mi). 
Following the three year review, it was asserted that the HRP “provides a 
vehicle for maximising alignment, securing stakeholder buy-in and mobilising 
resources” and that with these three components in place, the HRP could 
secure its desired position as a UK strategic asset (Jo___ 2008) 
6.8.7.2 The nature of the relationship 
The partnership comprises major UK defence providers and a diverse 
community of industry associates including small and medium enterprises, 
specialists, research establishments and major consulting companies (Case 
Study M, The Partnership 2011).  However, although described as “a 
partnership in the truest sense”(Je___ 2008), the customer “didn‟t see it as a 
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partnership”(Mi) in which they participated but rather as “the partnership 
which the company ran”(Mi). This was illustrated by the description that the 
industry partners were all represented on the Partnership Board and that key 
customer stakeholders are “also represented”(Case Study M, The 
Partnership: Industry Partners 2011) 
Even having “spent a great deal of time, we only scratched the surface for 
the customer to realise it was a partner”(Mi).  This was further complicated by 
the customer characteristics such that “calling the customer „a partner‟ didn‟t 
work.  It was amorphous with no singular view”(Mi). 
Although “the UK didn‟t have the same organisational conflict of interest 
policies as the USA”(Mi), there were “tensions in the partnership”(Mi) and 
concerns over “the matter of trust when advising the customer”(Mi). 
6.8.7.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
One industry partner held the prime contract, with 15 partners and fifty or so 
associate organisations who were “small in the UK”(Mi), including 
multinational primes. The “Partnership Board meets quarterly, and provides 
support and guidance to the strategic direction”(Case Study M, The 
Partnership: Industry Partners 2011). 
The HRP was “an enterprise in which commercial interests are put to one 
side and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are freely shared”(Jo___ 2008).  
The “inner ring of partners got access to all intellectual property (IP) 
irrespective of their involvement”(Mi) in a particular activity, but “had to bring 
background IP”(Mi) in return.  The “associates only got access to IP for those 
activities in which they were involved”(Mi).  The approach offered “the chance 
for an open and frank industrial discussion where MOD owns the output” 
(Case Study M newsletter. 2010). 
The “open book”(Mi) nature of the contracting approach meant that the HRP 
was “behaviourally different”(Mi) and the flow-down of contracts through the 
HRP was felt to be “not bad”(Mi). 
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The HRP underwent a review after three years, which led to the renewal of 
the contract almost 18 months later.  It was clear that this review was the 
focus of management attention even 18 months before the review (Case 
Study M: Capability through partnering. 2005), effectively creating a period of 
three years of uncertainty which “could easily have destabilised” the HRP 
(Je___ 2008). 
6.8.7.4 Culture 
“The partnership has a unique culture and behavioural ethos based on 
collaboration, impartiality, transparency, agility, high performance and trust” 
(Case Study M, The Partnership 2011).  However, it was felt that the HRP 
could also be “quite political”(Mi) due to the nature of the partners and their 
relationship with the customer.  The HRP was “in competition with”(Mi) one of 
its partners and another had “„channel conflict‟: they had to play, but it was 
cannibalism”(Mi) with respect to their other work. 
However, of the 300 people who passed through the HRP during its first 4 
years, “each has displayed the desire and ability to work together. This sense 
of cohesion reflects the behaviour of the partnership‟s core team and they 
have been instrumental in creating the same values” in temporary members.  
This culture and these behaviours were felt to have enabled the HRP to 
overcome many of the obstacles faced in its development (Je___ 2008). 
The HRP is considered to be the “model opportunity” for the customer and 
the Defence Industrial Base to “capitalise on their symbiotic relationship and 
demonstrate the close harmony, trust, and partnering behaviours required to 
deliver truly innovative support to both the warfighter and the UK‟s defence 
industry”(Case Study M newsletter. 2010) 
6.8.7.5 Resources: People  
The HRP “is unique in its ability to draw on the combined expertise” of the 
customer-industry partnership (Case Study M, The Partnership 2011) and 
“establishes „best athlete‟ teams” from the partnership that “combine the 
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breadth and depth of UK defence knowledge and experience” (Case Study 
M, The Partnership 2011).  This provides the additional benefit that industry 
staff seconded to the HRP develop skills and experience (Case Study M, The 
Partnership: Industry Partners 2011) and are “able to broaden their 
understanding of how military personnel conduct their business”(Case Study 
M, The Partnership 2011), free from the constraints “their own companies 
may place on them in other partnering situations”(Je___ 2008).  
HRP publications contained a regular feature covering details of new people 
joining the team, indicating a high turnover of seconded staff but also the 
recognition that staff changes needed to be communicated. 
6.8.7.6 Resources: Funding 
The HRP was “fully funded by the customer”(Mi) with “no industry cash 
contribution”(Mi).  The “core customer funding was used to define”(Mi) the 
problem to be solved before “competing across the partnership for the work 
to be done”(Mi).  Although the “sponsor also had to bring funding for 
activities”(Mi), the partnership “did work with very high quality people at less 
than the going rate”(Mi) and was felt to represent very good value for the 
customer. 
6.8.7.7 Lifecycle 
The original contract was, to some extent, “an experiment in 
experimentation”. Although the construct eliminated the risks involved in 
developing a new organisation, the HRP would have failed if the original 
industrial partners had not been supported by their industry peers (Je___ 
2008, p98). 
After the first 3 years, the HRP underwent a thorough review.  As a result, the 
mission of the HRP evolved from being a customer/industry partnership 
“providing an experimental environment which allows our customer 
community to assess the benefits of NEC for its effective and timely delivery” 
to “serving defence as the definitive partnership providing decision support to 
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enhance current and future military capability”(Jo___ 2008, p100).  At the 
same time, the business model also changed.  Moving from the original 
single, guaranteed funding line, the HRP‟s new contract had a mixed funding 
model, drawing some core funding from the original source but 
supplementing this with the potential for sponsor funding from a range of 
sources within the customer organisation.  This “subtle but significant change 
was driven through necessity by the competing investment demands” faced 
by the customer, and although “workable”, was “quite demanding in terms of 
management attention”. The change provided what was described as an 
“opportunity‟ for growth, set in the context that such growth was essential “to 
attain sustainable critical mass” (Jones 2008, p100).  Such a sustainable 
business was viewed as a “necessary, but not sufficient” condition to meet 
the challenge laid out at the start of the new contract: for the HRP to 
establish itself as a UK strategic asset. 
6.8.7.8 Complexity 
6.8.7.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
6.8.7.10 Perceptions of Success 
It was felt that the HRP delivered demonstrable value to the customer by 
providing both a gateway to breadth and depth of expertise without company 
bias, and a means of delivering trusted evidence quickly (Case Study M 
website. 2011) and that it “came up with solutions to problems”(Mi) in a 
particular area, although “there have also been criticisms in the past of [the 
HRP‟s] tempo and pace of delivery”(Je___ 2008). 
In preparation for the three-year review there was an emphasis on capturing 
and measuring the benefits achieved for the customer, recognising that the 
benefits, including how they had been exploited by the customer, would be 
key criteria in the assessment (Case Study M: Capability through partnering. 
2005). 
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Customer feedback noted that the process was “excellent and delivers real 
value to my programmes" and that it “adds significant value to our ability to 
make better decisions about how to deliver operational effect" (Case Study 
M, The Partnership 2011). 
Industry partners derived “substantial benefit from their involvement”, 
including “improved understanding of the defence environment and [the 
customer‟s] capability needs, the ability to make better investment decisions 
in relation to experimentation and NEC issues, improved commercial 
positioning and decision-making through understanding of [customer] 
programmes, and improved relationships with the ... customer” (Case Study 
M, The Partnership: Industry Partners 2011).  
6.8.8 Case Study N 
The HRP in Case Study N was a 3 year £1.8M Government-funded 
programme which ran between 2003 and 2006. This project involved seven 
universities, four industrial partners and four funding sources with the aim of 
extending the capabilities of aerodynamic prediction tools. 
6.8.8.1 Objectives 
The HRP involved research into “external and internal aerodynamics”(Ni) and 
“a number of the fundamental techniques which were relevant to both”(Ni).  
Its “three objectives were very clear”(Ni) and the “universities created sub-
objectives”(Ni). 
6.8.8.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP was “technically driven”(Ni) with “lots of sharing of very 
fundamental stuff”(Ni).  The “partnership was simple”(Ni) and work was only 
undertaken in areas where there were no commercial or legal sensitivities. 
Compared to the HRP in Case Study D, “people were a lot clearer about how 
the different groups would interact”(Ni).  There was an emphasis on 
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“ensuring the work was done in both areas but only sharing where there was 
benefit”(Ni) in doing so. 
6.8.8.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP was “highly complex commercially”(Ni) and it “took a long time to 
agree a contract involving two government bodies”(Ni) who “couldn‟t agree 
on common terms and conditions”(Ni) to place on contractors.  Industry 
contracts staff “did lots of brokering”(Ni) to resolve the issues.  In the 
meantime there was “reasonable confidence that the programme would 
happen”(Ni) and the “technical people went ahead anyway”(Ni) and “started 
before we had a contract”(Ni). 
“Quarterly reviews involved expert judgement from the customers‟ technical 
advisers”(Ni). 
6.8.8.4 Culture 
6.8.8.5 Resources: People  
Individuals and relationships were viewed as key to the success of the HRP.  
“People representing the industrial organisations had a good understanding 
of the academic environment”(Ni), and the “customer technical adviser was 
also a visiting professor”(Ni) at one of the partner universities.  Both industry 
and academic participants “respected each other intellectually”(Ni). 
Within one company, the representative had less experience in this 
environment but was “compliant”(Ni).  “Although interested, this company 
probably exploited the research less”(Ni) and this may have “reflected the 
lower level of technical expertise of that particular industrial 
representative”(Ni).  In contrast to the HRP in Case Study A, “the partnership 
was with the technical expert at the university, not the university itself”(Ni).  
“Having partnerships and working relationships with individuals was 
important”(Ni) and provided the additional benefit of “expert consultancy in 
times of urgent need”(Ni) from “academics with in-depth knowledge”(Ni). 
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6.8.8.6 Resources: Funding 
Funding for the HRP in the form of “real cash”(Ni) was provided by three 
government bodies and industry, with each contributing “approximately 
25%”(Ni). 
It was noted that the “funding of universities moves with the individual 
whereas in industry it stays with the company”(Ni).  This had implications 
when particular academic staff moved between institutions and the funding 
moved with them. 
6.8.8.7 Lifecycle 
In contrast to other partnerships, it was felt that the “funding was separate 
from operational relationships”(Ni).  When the partnership first came together 
in 1999 there was “no money”(Ni).  When it “won about £1.8M in 2001”(Ni) 
the “partnership was already functioning”(Ni).  Since the HRP was effectively 
operational “before the money arrived, when the money came along they 
were ready for it”(Ni).  It was felt that “maybe it transitioned into”(Ni) the 
funded HRP. 
Academics “weren‟t just doing this HRP, but other programmes too”(Ni).  “A 
lot of relationships went back quite a few years”(Ni) and academics were “still 
working together three or four years later”(Ni). 
6.8.8.8 Complexity 
It was noted that within the HRP “complex technology was being 
developed”(Ni). 
6.8.8.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
At the outset of the HRP the industrial leadership “set out three 
requirements”(Ni).  They “didn‟t fuss too much after that, but just let the 
academics get on with it”(Ni). 
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“Work could be partitioned effectively”(Ni) such that the “academics had 
unique roles and weren‟t treading on each other‟s toes or trying to steal from 
each other”(Ni).  With one exception, universities “worked together rather 
than trying to do the same thing”(Ni).  “Integration responsibilities were 
defined”(Ni) and “meeting the objectives needed contributions from all 
participants”(Ni). 
6.8.8.10 Perceptions of Success 
The HRP proposal was “rated most highly”(Ni) of similar funding proposals.  
“One of the reasons was that it had actually started doing work before writing 
the proposal”(Ni).   
People “worked together to pull research through more rapidly”(Ni) and in the 
end it “met all the requirements”(Ni).  One senior industrial partner 
representative was “very impressed and became a keen sponsor”(Ni): as a 
result the industrial partner expanded its usual set of academic partners to 
new relationships developed in the HRP.  
6.8.9 Case Study O 
The HRP in Case Study O was a £1M, three-year bilateral arrangement 
between the company and a major university (Le___ 2009), which was 
among the top 10 in the UK for student numbers. 
6.8.9.1 Objectives 
There were “currently several objectives”(Oi) but a “win-win”(Oi) based on 
potentially complementary technical interests was the “common goal”(Oi). 
The university “wanted to build up credibility, and establish a centre of 
excellence”(Oi) with the “aim to have a world class research centre across 
multiple fields by 2017”(Oi). They wanted “to be recognised as a centre of 
excellence by industry”(Oi) as well as “turning around underprivileged 
students”(Oi).   
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Although the stated aim of the HRP was “just research”(Oi) and the company 
“wanted to do good work and get leverage”(Oi), the primary driver for both 
company and university was described as “positive publicity”(Oi).  For the 
company, working with the university was “an opportunity for us to 
demonstrate our support for research activity in the North West of England, 
where we employ around 15,000 people” and a way to address future skills 
gaps”.  Underlying this was the desire to ensure the UK remained a world 
leader in engineering and technology (Le___ 2009). 
6.8.9.2 The nature of the relationship 
The partnership involved the establishment of a research centre, launched in 
2009 to contribute to the university‟s vision “to be recognised as a centre of 
excellence for research by 2017” and to be the Company‟s first choice 
academic provider of research in this area. The centre‟s mission was to 
“achieve step changes in the value delivered from R&D against market driven 
requirements by exploiting the synergies, integrating the skills and 
capitalising on the capabilities that exist across different industry sectors, 
their supply chains and universities” in the specific research area (Ge___ 
2010). 
It was clear that the university, and in particular its senior leadership, “wanted 
a long term, strategic partnership”(Oi).  The aim was to move towards a 
centre of excellence “based on the HRP model used in Case Study K”(Oi) but 
it was unclear what would be offered or “sold”(Oi) to encourage other 
participants to join. 
6.8.9.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP was both operationally and “contractually simple: initially bilateral 
but expected to become more complex”(Oi).  The partnership was delivered 
under the guidance of a company/university governance group (Le___ 2009). 
This “steering board was set up to enable stakeholder management”(Oi) and 
“prevent criticism”(Oi) from key areas within the company. 
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“Internal funding went through the usual company approval processes”(Oi).  
The “easiest option would have been to create a £1M work package but that 
wouldn‟t have been a good idea.  The better option was to „prime the pump‟ 
and help the HRP to become self-sustaining”(Oi). 
6.8.9.4 Culture 
The university “only had one company link”(Oi) and little or no “industry 
experience”(Oi).  “Unlike most traditional universities, who had other 
organisations they were involved with”(Oi), they came with “no baggage”(Oi) 
Individuals within the university had a “really interesting mindset”(Oi): “bubbly 
but focused”(Oi), and “pragmatic” (Oi).  They were very open, even offering 
to “jointly interview a new professor”(Oi) with industry colleagues.  It was felt 
that they were “desperate to make it work”(Oi). 
6.8.9.5 Resources: People  
The HRP had very high level support.   Senior figures from the company and 
university were “implicated”(Oi) and met on a biannual basis. 
6.8.9.6 Resources: Funding 
Funding for the HRP came from the “corporate sponsorship pot”(Oi) with the 
aim of “supporting the local community”(Oi).  As the HRP progressed, there 
was an expectation of joint “business development”(Oi): “working 
together”(Oi) to secure national and European research funding. 
6.8.9.7 Lifecycle 
At the time of the interview, the HRP was in the creation phase.  The 
statement of work and commercial / legal terms and conditions were 
“matured in parallel streams”(Oi).  It was felt that there was the potential “to 
shape it to do what I want”(Oi).  The intent was to transition over time from 
the bilateral agreement and to “grow to be self-sustaining”(Oi). 
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6.8.9.8 Complexity 
6.8.9.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
6.8.9.10 Perceptions of Success 
The HRP was too new for success to be judged but it was noted that there 
were “no measures of success except programme delivery”(Oi). 
6.9 International (non-UK) Case Study: P  
The HRP in Case Study P was based on a 5-year contract to establish a 
systems engineering research centre, supported by researchers from 20 
universities and research centres.  It aimed to enhance the definition, 
synthesis, integration and test, deployment, and support of complex systems 
and enterprises.   
The interviewees used the term „sponsors‟ when referring to the „customers‟ 
in this case study and their terminology has been retained here.  The HRP 
had two sponsors.  There were no industrial participants directly involved in 
the HRP. 
6.9.1 Objectives 
The HRP was established as a “concerted effort to look at harder 
problems”(Pi).  Recognising the subject as “a national issue”(Pi), the 
sponsors “knew systems engineering research was needed”(Pi) in order to 
develop “a rigorous way to look at future problems”(Pi).  Within this 
“application-oriented problem space”(Pi), there was a tendency for one 
sponsor to “want people to come and sort out problems”(Pi), and it was a 
challenge “to get the sponsor to have a long term strategic vision rather than 
short term needs”(Piii).  However, the other sponsor wanted “a way to not 
only respond to „nitty‟ problems but to broaden the understanding of systems 
engineering as a solution driver”(Pi).  They were “more interested in the 
vision of taking systems engineering to the next level”(Pi). 
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The HRP‟s mission was perceived and stated in different ways by the HRP 
itself, the sponsor and individuals within it: 
 “to enhance and enable (the sponsor‟s) capability in systems 
engineering for the successful development, integration, testing and 
sustainability of complex defence systems, services and enterprises” 
(Case Study P. 2009). 
  “to research and analyse advanced and emerging systems 
engineering practices and relevant technologies to address the full 
spectrum of (the sponsor‟s) systems ... , from capability areas, 
enterprise systems, systems of systems, net-centric set of services, 
and interoperability down to subsystems and configuration items with 
the goal of ensuring consistency and systems engineering excellence 
throughout the acquisition life cycle” (Initiatives: Case Study P 
undated) 
 “systems engineering research”(Pii) 
The three objectives of the research program were to “make modest 
improvements to the state of the art, to maintain the competence of high 
quality people and to embed the concept of keeping people „refreshed‟ as 
part of the corporate culture”(Pi).  This drove the “notion of developing a 
community of systems engineering researchers”(Piv) and “engaging the 
broader community and getting other people to work on our problems”(Pi).  It 
was “a way to grow and attract young people to the field”(Pi).  HRP 
operations were focused on “performing high-impact research, building the 
community of researchers and putting research results to work”(Case Study 
P 2009 Annual Report. 2009). 
The two sponsors “came at this with different viewpoints”(Pi) and whilst their 
objectives were “not aligned”(Pi), they were “able to find common 
ground”(Pi).  Although the lead university had “defined a strategic goal for the 
research”(Piii), it was recognised that each sponsor, university and individual 
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“had their own needs and expectations which needed to be honoured”(Piii).  
The “shared sense of purpose was growing”(Pii) and they were “finding ways 
to ensure alignment”(Pi), including the establishment of a forum for key 
stakeholders and a high-profile community engagement though conference 
keynotes. Overall it was felt that the HRP had “passion and a shared set of 
objectives”(Pi).    
The sponsor and lead university went “back and forth on the development of 
research objectives”(Pi).  The sponsor “wanted to be engaged in the 
discussion”(Pi) but the university was “responsible for delivery”(Pi).  There 
was a recognised need for “a mix of near term and more strategic”(Pi) 
research: although focused on the future, the HRP was also ready to respond 
to current sponsor needs (Case Study P 2009 Annual Report. 2009).  It was 
“OK to have a couple of programs which were more open-ended”(Pi), but 
“where you had nuggets there should be a mix”(Pi). 
6.9.2 The nature of the relationship 
The HRP had a special relationship with the sponsor which was 
characterised as follows: 
 Responsiveness to evolving requirements 
 Comprehensive knowledge of sponsor requirements and problems 
 Broad access to information, including proprietary data 
 Broad corporate knowledge 
 Independence and objectivity 
 Quick response capability 
 Current operational experience 
 Freedom from real and/or perceived conflicts of interest (Case Study P 
2009 Annual Report. 2009). 
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Since the breadth and depth of the objectives ensured that no single 
university would have the required skills and knowledge, twenty leading 
institutions were brought together, giving “pervasive access” to a significant 
part of the nation‟s systems engineering research and educational programs 
and creating a stable, inclusive research orgainsation (Case Study P 2009 
Annual Report. 2009).  
Within the HRP the lead university had the “responsibility to look after the 
sponsors and „feed‟ the university partners”(Pii).  The “governing twenty 
entities were not used to collaborating”(Piv).  Usually, “two professors would 
work together, not two institutions”(Piv).  It was necessary for the relationship 
to “evolve from individual to institution, and from single contact to multiple 
academic staff”(Piv).  It was recognised that “to cause collaborative research 
to happen took a lot of trust building, openness and transparency”(Piv).  This 
was “easy on paper, but hard to do”(Piv). 
There was a need to “build loyalty”(Piii) among the partner universities.  A 
key factor in this was thought to be “giving them business”(Piii) which meant 
that “most of the work (90%) should go to other universities rather than 
„feeding‟”(Piii) the lead university.  Nearly every project included multiple 
collaborators (Case Study P 2009 Annual Report. 2009).  A metric had been 
created to monitor “the percentage of work going to other universities”(Piv) 
and this was “tracked internally to ensure that it was equitable”(Piii).  The 
HRP was seen as “a collaboration, validated by „walking the talk‟”(Piii) 
There was also a desire to “find ways to partner with other organisations”(Pi).  
Persuading other organisations to collaborate with the lead university 
received some “push back”(Pi) but the “solution was to get one organisation 
that could see the bigger win involved, so that others would be 
interested”(Pi).  It was recognised that “you couldn‟t force them to talk to 
each other”(Pi).  One view was “the larger the team, the better”(Pii).  
Recognising this as “a unique opportunity to create a systems engineering 
research community”(Pii) there was a desire for it to be “a bigger 
Chapter Six  Case Study Findings 
[244] 
 
collaboration”(Pii) and to “take potential competitors off the street by getting 
them into this team, not someone else‟s”(Pii). 
Roles within the HRP were evolving through time.  “For some research 
projects, the lead university largely shaped what was in them.  Others were 
more shaped by the sponsors”(Pii).  This was felt to be a good thing, 
reflecting “increasing maturity”(Pii).  The preferred approach seemed to be 
for the sponsor to “write an initial problem statement”(Pi) and then open the 
bid, and for the lead university to “do an initial assessment”(Pi) of proposals 
and “engage the sponsor in a discussion of opportunities”(Pi) but this was 
clearly evolving and varied between projects. 
Overall, there was a recognition of the need to “maintain boundaries”(Piii) 
between the sponsors and universities and to “build rapport and trust”(Piii) by 
“honouring the sponsors‟ needs to be impartial and objective”(Piii). 
6.9.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
The HRP enjoyed “special status”(Pii) within the sponsor organisations and in 
related organisations which enabled them to receive work without 
competition “if the HRP‟s mission fitted their need”(Pii).  
“Two types of agreement”(Pii) were in place: an “umbrella agreement 
containing 80% of what was needed to do the work, and specific research 
subcontracts”(Pii) which could be issued quickly.  In addition, a “management 
plan established the business rules to oversee and manage the HRP”(Pi).  A 
detailed listing of deliverables enabled the sponsors to “feel comfortable 
rather than just hoping for the best”(Pi), although even with this it was a 
challenge for the lead university with “responsibility for delivery”(Pi) to 
“inculcate timeliness and deliverables”(Piv).  In the early stages the level of 
contracting activity required “regular weekly meetings between contracting 
people”(Pii) in the lead university and sponsor organisations.   “Every time 
there were cross-university issues, an extra contract was required”(Pii) 
between them. However, several universities were “in a quiet state”(Pii) 
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without work or funding awaiting the removal of certain contract terms which 
were in conflict with their university policies. 
The two sponsors were “equal partners”(Pi) who “had oversight management 
controls”(Pi) and each “had control over their share of the funding to prioritise 
work/effort and the problems to be tackled”(Pi). They “reviewed draft 
deliverables, which provided lots of opportunity for direction”(Pi).  Although 
“each research team was responsible for quality”(Piii) it was recognised that 
the “integrity of the research had to be monitored”(Piii) by the lead university 
and that there needed to be “the rigour to filter out bad or mediocre 
researchers”(Piii), although this was seen as “the tough part”(Piii). 
There were differences in contractual culture within the HRP, with one 
sponsor being used to “micromanaged pages and books of rules”(Piii). The 
lead university “established an infrastructure which supported the sponsors 
needs, including procedures, bookkeeping rules and on-time reporting”(Pii).  
Although all the partner universities “had to conform to the standard 
management plan”(Piv), accounting could be “slow and unreliable”(Piii) and 
“bookkeeping systems were not up to it”(Pii).  “Invoicing and getting 
paid”(Piii) were non-trivial tasks.  Although some people “were impeccable in 
the application of funds”(Piii), others were “less so”(Piii).  The lead university 
“needed to ensure trust without being too overt and too much scrutiny”(Piii) 
but could not “accept mis-invoiced claims”(Piii) which were a “risk to the 
relationship with the sponsor”(Piii). 
Four people managed the HRP: Executive Director, Deputy Executive 
Director, Director of Research (all part-time management roles) and a full-
time Director of Operations.  The management team were “responsible for 
the success of” the HRP mission: aligning strategy and execution with 
external stakeholders and ensuring research quality, managing resources 
and meeting contractual requirements (Case Study P 2009 Annual Report. 
2009). 
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6.9.4 Culture 
Cultural differences between the various parties were recognised.  The 
sponsor was “trying to be transparent, viewing research as something that 
was very open and which benefitted from others who contributed to the 
problem space”(Pi).  This was in contrast to many universities, where 
“transparent growth of knowledge was not how they would behave”(Pi). 
“Universities had many different needs”(Piii): there was a “sense of 
competition in each faculty member and the spirit of cooperation would take 
some doing.  They flew their own university flag each waking moment”(Piv).  
As a result, “universities didn‟t know how to team well”(Pii) and “academics 
by predisposition were not the best team players”(Pi).  Although they would 
“sometimes work well together, sometimes they wouldn‟t”(Pii), and “sharing 
data was always a problem”(Pi).   This was illustrated at a research 
programme review where “half gave the sponsor what they wanted and the 
other half marketed the university instead of opening the books and showing 
stuff”(Pi).  The challenge was “how to get them to change”(Piv). 
There were also “two cultures in the sponsors”(Piii) and “a differing sense of 
urgency”(Piii) between them, and between the sponsors and the lead 
university.  One sponsor was “risk averse”(Piii) and had the tendency to “put 
the brakes on if the pace seemed too fast”(Piii) and it was recognised that it 
“could derail the relationship if there wasn‟t a sense of matched pace”(Piii).  
The sponsors “wanted to grow the investment slowly.  They didn‟t move 
quickly: it was counter to their culture”(Pii).  The “cultures and bureaucracies 
needed to co-exist”(Piii). 
The culture of the lead university was apparent.  It earned trust by “people 
coming to respect them technically, by working pretty collaboratively and 
through transparent contracting”(Pii): by being “collaborative and open and 
flexible – increasingly flexible”(Pii). 
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6.9.5 Resources: People  
The HRP was “totally driven by people and relationships.  Like a small 
company, it was dominated by personalities”(Pii).  Key people were identified 
as “great”(Piv), “incredibly good”(Pii), “a great teammate”(Pii), “marvellous at 
marketing”(Pii), “very good at identifying strategic initiatives”(Pi), and as 
having “collaborative DNA”(Pii) and a “big mind, good understanding and 
wide range”(Pi).  A “successful mode of operation” for one individual was 
“continually updating himself”(Pi).  This level of drive and competence was 
contrasted to “other people who got ideas and shopped them around lots of 
contacts without actually solving them”(Pi).  
Within the leadership team, relationships were described as “a marvellous 
partnership”(Pii) and “based on personal credibility”(Piii).  Leaders could 
“manage a group with conflicting interests and pull them together”(Piv) and 
there was an emphasis on “creating relationships to support collaborative 
thinking”(Piii). 
Relationships and individual motivation were seen to be important factors.  
Behaviours and ways of working went beyond the “contract to 
collaborate”(Piii).  The special relationship with the “principle academic 
partner had no contractual requirement but relied on integrity and 
behaviour”(Piii). It was recognised that having got it “contractually right, the 
HRP needed to build credibility and trust”(Piii). “Trust and consistency”(Piii) 
and “keeping people satisfied”(Piii) were important. In spite of “complicated 
relationships”(Piii) there was an emphasis on “keeping people happy – not 
because we have to work together, but because we want to!”(Piii).  One 
interviewee summed this up by noting “I love what I do.  I get paid, and it‟s an 
opportunity to work with smart people.  My expectations are met”(Piii). 
Nevertheless “some sceptics thought we were just playing.  Doing it was 
what counted.  Not everyone understood”(Pii). 
The sponsor also recognised the “benefit of engagement”(Pi) with the HRP. 
Although this was a “high overhead for fairly small amounts”(Pi) of research 
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investment, the sponsor “got value by the overhead”(Pi).  People with 
“responsibilities for furthering systems engineering tracked and advised on 
each task”(Pi) within their technical area and benefitted “because their job 
was to answer that problem”(Pi).  However, there had been “three cycles of 
change”(PiII) within one sponsor and the “key people had changed each 
time”(Piii).  New people questioned the HRP‟s value and it was necessary to 
“send the big guy in, get in there often and become a trusted friend”(Piii) in 
order to rebuild the relationship each time and “convince them”(Piii).  
The success of every research project depended on the expertise of 
collaborating researchers and was “carefully staffed” (Case Study P 2009 
Annual Report. 2009).  The process of selecting academics to tackle a 
particular research topic was merit-based and involved “the sponsors 
bringing a problem” and then “understanding who was best through personal 
contacts and the literature, so that peers figured out who was in the best 
position to do the work”(Piv). This involved “knowing the capabilities of other 
universities: knowing what they were capable of, but also using their contacts 
and pulling contacts in”(Piii).  Ideally each programme had two or three, up to 
a maximum of five, university participants”(Pii).  Selection of Lead 
Investigators was initially from the lead and principal partner universities and 
“people who were known”(Pii), but this was expanded as the programme 
grew and matured. The “collaboration was big enough that there were 
multiple source options”(Pii) and “general calls for collaboration”(Pii) were 
starting to be used to widen the pool further. 
In spite of this there was “still a divide between those out there doing it, and 
those researching”(Pi) and one sponsor “had a greater need for research to 
be presented in layman‟s language, that ordinary people could 
understand”(Piii).  In order to meet expectations there was a need for 
“consistency in research output”(Piii) and “greater focus on its practical 
purpose”(Piii).  There was also a concern that the “state of academic systems 
engineering was not keeping pace with industry”(Pi), although “leading 
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institutions kept their staff refreshed and recognised the need for today‟s 
information and understanding”(Pi). 
6.9.6 Resources: Funding 
Since the HRP was guaranteed only a relatively small annual amount of 
research funding, there was a need to “do something”(Pii) to grow by five or 
ten times in order to “make sense to even do it”(Pii).  It was seen as “having 
potential”(Pi), and “aimed to form strategic relationships”(Pii) and to treble the 
average size of projects from the initial level.  The HRP was “trying to find 
partners with deep pockets and big problems”(Pii).  Although “legally, the 
HRP could take money from industry, culturally the sponsors weren‟t ready 
for that”(Pii). 
“Ninety percent of the research cost paid for professors, graduate students 
and travel”(Pii).  In scoping new work there was “generally a sense of the 
money available”(Pii) which enabled “probing the community to shape the 
scope, working backwards from the available investment”(Pii).  From that it 
was possible to propose a sensible programme: “not crisp, but more 
standardised by scale as the HRP grew”(Pii). 
The HRP was considered to be a “good thing financially”(Pii) for the wider 
systems engineering research community and there would be “a lot less 
spending in systems engineering research without it”(Pii). 
6.9.7 Lifecycle 
Creation of the HRP was a “long and difficult process which took eight years 
to come to fruition”(Pi).  It was “hard to establish a new entity”(Pi) and it 
suffered an “eight year push back from a strong community who questioned 
the nature of systems engineering research”(Pi).  One key figure within the 
sponsor organisation had said that having launched it, it was “up to the HRP 
to convince others and to grow”(Piii). 
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The HRP “took its shape in the proposal phase, driven by the need to win the 
competition”.  Although there “wasn‟t a pre-existing community”(Pi), the 
leadership team was “a known commodity”(Piii) and key participants “had an 
existing relationship”(Piii).  Since the “„Request for Proposals‟ had indicated 
that collaboration was valued”(Pii), a small group from the lead university and 
principle partner “reached out to sixteen universities in a range of areas”(Pi). 
“Partner selection was driven by geography, with at least one partner within a 
30 minute drive of key sponsor locations.  The aim was to transfer talent into 
the sponsor‟s talent pool”(Piv) as the HRP matured. 
In the first year, the HRP established an infrastructure, worked collaboratively 
with sponsors to define its research strategy, and began critical research 
(Case Study P 2009 Annual Report. 2009). 
The HRP was subject to a five-year review as part of contract renewal (Case 
Study P generic Management Plan: Appendices A & B. 1996) at which three 
questions would be asked: “was there still a need?, was the need still stated 
appropriately?, and was the HRP fulfilling that need?”(Pi).  This would be “an 
opportunity to change the mission”(Pi) although “the vision was something 
that would stay”(Pi).  Although at that stage the HRP “could be re-
competed”(Pi), the aim was to have created “credibility and sustainability so 
that the sponsors would want to continue”(Piii).  It was “up to the HRP to 
grow the initial concept into something continuously valid”(Piii) recognising 
that “university expectations would change”(Piii) and continue to change 
through time.  Although in all the HRP had been “fifteen years in the 
making”(Pii) there was an expectation that “in five years we may do things 
differently”(Pii). 
6.9.8 Complexity 
“Systems engineering is a young field”(Piii) and the sponsor “had to be 
convinced that systems engineering research was needed”(Pii).  Even then, 
uncertainty around the nature and principles of systems engineering research 
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brought complexity to the HRP‟s programme. Even those who “understood 
systems engineering”(Pi) were “very uncomfortable about systems 
engineering research”(Pi). The “fundamental issue remained: what should 
the principles be”(Pi) for systems engineering research? It was felt that “for 
something like systems engineering which was not research-oriented it was a 
challenge to identify what the research was, and what we meant by the 
problem”(Pi).  There was a concern whether typical primary systems 
engineering research instruments such as surveys and workshops “were a 
way to do research”(Pi). There was a view that researchers would “hold lots 
of meetings, make assumptions from random sets of inputs and get stalled if 
there was not enough data”(Pi), and doubt that “what we were seeing was 
research”(Pi).  This concern was not unique to the HRP and was compared 
to another context where “systems engineering research was the hardest 
area of the research programme to do”(Pi). 
The scale and scope of the HRP added complexity, both in “trying to market 
nineteen partners and put together a balanced team”(Pii) and having “various 
people to work”(Pii) among the sponsors and potential sponsors in order to 
grow the HRP.  The problem space was “so complicated you could only get 
there by collaborating”(Piii).  It “couldn‟t be done with „my agenda‟ at 
heart”(Piii) but there was added “complexity in unknown expectations”(Piii).  
The lead university “had never dealt with this level of complexity”(Pii) before.   
Complexity was compounded by the fact that the charter was also “very 
broadly defined”(Piv) and included “any key word you could think of”(Piv).  
The scope was “intentionally so broad you could drive a truck through it”(Pii), 
but “couldn‟t be any other way”(Piv) to allow adaptation as understanding 
grew. Most similar HRPs were “based around technologies.  This was the 
only one around a discipline: it had to be broader”(Piv) in order to tackle the 
complex problem space.  The “cases were very difficult with so many 
variables, it was not easy to have an academic institution come in and work 
with the sponsor”(Pi).  “The last thing we needed was to let researchers get 
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into programmes and mess them up.  They shouldn‟t have had to bother the 
programmes to do research”(Pi). 
6.9.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
The role of the HRP was seen as “putting together tangible systems to 
conduct research to enhance the sponsor‟s mission”(Piv).  It was felt that 
systems engineering had been used “to the extent that you could apply 
systems engineering to an existing adaptive system”(Piv).  There had been 
“lots of thinking on organisational structure and system dynamics”(Piii) and a 
“flowchart of relationships”(Piii) had been developed.  There was “lots of 
management involvement”(Piii) and “typical management tools”(Piii) had 
been used “to look at internal and external strengths, and to align the 
management plan to the sponsor‟s research strategy”(Piii).  The need for a 
systemic balance in the HRP was understood and it was recognised that for 
the HRP to be effective the key players “all had to pull at exactly the right 
tension”(Piii).  “If they were all aligned, the HRP would lift.  If they didn‟t 
consider expectations, the emergency brake got pulled”(Piii).  “Sponsors and 
universities needed to be aligned, and pace and objectives needed to be 
aligned”(Piii). 
“Organisation for long term flexibility”(Piii) was seen as important, which 
demanded a “robust architecture”(Piii) and “an organisation structure to 
navigate changing leadership”(Piii).   However, “management techniques 
were used to build the business, but not to analyse it”(Piii) and there was 
scope for “using business tools more systemically”(Piii). It was “probably a 
systems process to draw clarity to success and failure based on 
understanding risks and expectations”(Piii).  
In architecting the research programme the HRP “went through a „crawl‟ 
phase, taking a few steps and falling now and then”(Piv).  “Our lesson was 
that we needed some time to assemble what the strategic initiatives should 
be - top down and bottom up – to form the key strategic initiatives”(Pi).  It was 
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hoped that “over time it would focus on key strategic initiatives, recognising 
that that knowledge just wasn‟t available up front”(Pi).  One sponsor “laid out 
a broad set of problems, chopped them up into areas and picked research 
foci in those areas, both in an integrated and modular way.  Depth in one 
area was considered good, and integration was even better.  The other 
sponsor was asked to identify those areas where they could derive value and 
where they could contribute”(Pi).  This was a “really productive approach, 
which created several discrete active projects which could build towards a 
grander area”(Pi). 
Systems engineering had been used to “identify the problems”(Pi) and “to 
develop the research agenda”(Pi), and a “roadmap of research going 
forward”(Pii) had been created.  Roadmapping was “likely to get used 
more”(Pii) as it “allowed the universities to be paid to frame the work”(Pii) and 
was “a community activity, engaging researchers, users, potential funders 
and adopters in building and vetting white papers”(Pii). “Pathfinder projects” 
were used to create research roadmaps to tackle very hard, very important 
problems over a 3-5 year timescale, identifying promising research with the 
potential for major impact (Case Study P 2009 Annual Report. 2009). 
Nevertheless, the sponsors still “struggled with getting the academics to 
understand what the problem was and why it was an issue”(Pi).  It “took 
forever to get over that”(Pi) especially as they were “mostly individual 
technologies people”(Pii).  However, projects which were “easily 
relatable”(Pii) meant that “in some areas they had been largely focused on 
point solutions but were now thinking about the overall picture”(Pii). The 
“oldest programme was most coherent”(Pii) while “other areas were less 
mature”(Pii). 
6.9.10 Perceptions of Success 
The HRP was felt to be a “good marriage”(Pii) with “impressive breadth”(Pii).  
A “very good team”(Pii) had “created credibility for systems engineering 
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research”(Pii) and was “seen as a national asset”(Piii). One interviewee was 
“not totally convinced that the university partnerships were going to be 
successful”(Pi), in spite of the 90% rule “which was how collaboration was 
made to work”(Pii), but “still had high hopes”(Pi). 
The culture and relationships which were such a strong characteristic of the 
HRP were seen to be key to its success.  One individual felt that they “would 
be successful if relationships were good after five years”(Piii) and they had 
made “no mistakes”(Piii), and noted that they were “looking to build 
relationships, develop a vision and create emotional ties – like Kennedy and 
space”(Piii). 
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7 SYNTHESIS OF CASE STUDY RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction 
Drawing on the wealth of data in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven now integrates 
the case study findings by identifying common and contrasting messages 
across the sixteen case studies. This was done by reviewing the text of each 
case study in detail and highlighting key messages, and then combining 
messages across all the case studies, one theme at a time.  New messages 
were added to each section as they were identified, whilst common 
messages were simply updated with additional data and case study 
references.  As with the pilot study, the analysis of the text was done 
manually in order to identify related issues which would not have been 
apparent simply by identifying the same word or phrase in different 
passages. 
The ten themes from Chapter Six were found to overlap in some areas (for 
example Resources: People and Culture) and similar issues were identified 
under different theme headings.  Within Chapter Seven, these issues were 
brought together and the original ten theme headings only retained in a 
supporting role to give structure to the chapter. 
Where specific message have been derived from a particular case study this 
was noted in parentheses thus (X).  Absence of a particular case study 
reference does not imply that the issue was not relevant to that case study, 
but that no explicit evidence was obtained. 
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7.2 Common and contrasting messages  
7.2.1 Objectives 
7.2.1.1 Clear, agreed, focused goals 
Some HRPs had a very clear, simple goal with significant benefits which 
enabled the partners to „rally together‟, and which gave clarity to the required 
programme (B, G, I, J, N).  In one long-lived case this purpose had been 
reviewed and revised over time (J). 
7.2.1.2 Clear Boundaries 
Clarity regarding what was in or out of scope for the HRP was a key element 
for some HRPs (G, I, K).  Others found this clarity very difficult and 
boundaries were unclear (A, C, D).  In one case the loose definition of the 
boundary was identified as deliberate, in order to give the HRP flexibility in 
dealing with the breadth of the topic (P). 
7.2.1.3 Different Benefits 
In HRPs which shared a common objective, it was considered acceptable for 
the direct benefits to different partners to be different (B, E, F).  This is 
slightly different to the concept of stakeholders who had different objectives 
which were not aligned, but nonetheless understood each other‟s needs and 
were able to find common ground (A, P). 
7.2.1.4 Idealistic Objectives 
In one case the objectives were idealistic and there were no effective plans to 
deliver them (A). 
7.2.1.5 Agreed goals but unclear function 
Although the overall goal was agreed for some HRPs, the actual function of 
the HRP was unclear in terms of „what it would do‟ to meet that goal.  This 
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made it difficult to demonstrate progress (C, D) and to be clear about the 
business needs that were being addressed (D).   
7.2.1.6 Contract in conflict with objectives 
In two HRPs the contracts were not aligned with the vision, such that contract 
performance alone would not deliver the objectives (A, F).  This problem was 
particularly acute on programmes where there was limited management 
discretion over how funding was spent (F). 
7.2.1.7 Structural Effects 
In one HRP the management structure and approach resulted in competition 
between its research themes and a dilution of the objective, such that 
although the objective was understood at a management level it was lost by 
the time it reached researchers (E).   
7.2.1.8 Teaming an objective in itself 
For several programmes, simply forming and working within a team on the 
topic was important (D, E, M, O, P).  In some cases this was a political 
demonstration of „the correct behaviours‟ (E, O); in others, it was a way of 
„taking the competition off the streets‟ (J, P). 
7.2.1.9 Low-TRL Programme 
Several programmes deliberately constrained themselves to low TRL (up to 
TRL 4-5 for demonstrations) in order to avoid competitive pressures close to 
product development maturities (B, E, K). 
7.2.1.10 Consolidated Technical Programme 
Levels of integration of the technical programme varied.  One HRP only 
shared information between partners where this was perceived to be of 
benefit (N).  Several HRPs had no consolidated technical programme and it 
was therefore difficult to see how the programme would deliver the intended 
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objectives (A, F).  Lack of clarity in the overall objective meant that one HRP 
could not evaluate the alignment of research projects and struggled to retain 
control of the overall programme (D). 
7.2.1.11 Focus on Industrial Exploitation 
Despite working at relatively low TRL levels, a number of HRPs were focused 
on the longer term business opportunities from exploitation (B, E, I, K).  This 
was seen as a joint responsibility between researchers and business sponsor 
in one HRP (D).  Another HRP instigated a bi-annual review in which 
industry‟s plans for exploitation could be challenged by researchers (G).  
There was evidence that the customer (or equivalent) implicitly carried the 
responsibility for ensuring research exploitation (E, I).   
7.2.1.12 Focus on Academic Exploitation 
One HRP found that it was possible to derive good academic publications 
from industrially-beneficial work such as demonstrations (G). 
7.2.1.13 External Dependencies 
Several HRPs were heavily dependent on external factors to achieve their 
objectives.  The achievement of those objectives was not in the control of the 
HRP (C, F).  This also manifested itself in reliance on engagement with the 
customer (E, P). The extent to which the customer was engaged in the 
programme was significantly higher in one HRP (P) than the others. 
7.2.2 Nature of the relationship 
7.2.2.1 Leading by example 
Where HRPs were run through a prime contractor, there was an expectation 
that the organisation would not abuse its privileged position but would if 
anything subordinate its objectives to those of the HRP (E, F, P).  Such 
organisations had responsibilities to both the customer and research 
Chapter Seven  Synthesis of Case Study Results 
[262] 
 
suppliers. One HRP made it clear that partnership was not defined by the 
contract, but by behaviours (P).   
7.2.2.2 Government partners 
Several HRPs had government bodies as partners.  The nature of the 
relationship and the closeness of government participation were constrained 
by competition rules and the need to retain perceptions of fairness (A, C, E, 
F, M, P). In some cases the organisations in prime contract roles had 
expectations placed upon them regarding their access to and understanding 
of government needs and their ability to communicate and address these 
through the research programme (E, F, P).  
7.2.2.3 Government funding agencies 
Funding agencies were involved in a number of the HRPs, but having 
approved the funding proposal their role was largely as „banker‟.  The nature 
of the relationship varied from the agency being largely ignored after the 
money was secured (A) to the agency only being interested in spend and 
milestones rather than the quality of the work (G). 
7.2.2.4 Competitors can be partners 
In one HRP, the industrial participants were largely competitors.  After a 
difficult start the group developed robust and effective relationships with a 
delivery focus (B).  Competitor companies also participated in a number of 
other HRPs where the development of a relationship of trust was critical to 
success, and where work had to be architected in a way which addressed 
intellectual property and other legal concerns (J, K, M, N). Other HRPs 
involved universities who were in competition with each other (G, I, N, P).  In 
general, conflict was tackled by ensuring research programmes did not 
overlap to eliminate the need to cooperate in these areas. 
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7.2.2.5 Management control 
HRPs applied different approaches to management control and the extent to 
which management intent was implemented through a formal technical and 
project management structure.  Some HRPs expended significant effort on 
management control (A, D, E, F, P), whilst others allowed much more 
independent action (J).  Higher levels of control caused a cultural clash and 
operationally difficult for some of those being managed, but met the 
expectations of those funding the programme.  Researchers in several HRPs 
felt that, at times, there was too much emphasis on budgets and milestones 
and inadequate technical leadership (D, E, F).  This balance got worse close 
to review points in some HRPs (D); in another it got better with a change of 
personnel (F). 
Some HRPs attempted a more engaging management style (E, G).  One 
found that the scale of the partnership made this challenging (E). 
7.2.2.6 Missing layers 
In one HRP, there was clearly a strategic intent for partnership and individual 
researchers worked well together.  However, there were „missing layers‟ at 
an operational management level where partnership practices were not 
implemented (A). 
7.2.2.7 Maintaining the relationship 
Even where the existence of the team itself was seen as part of the 
objectives of the HRP, deliberate efforts to nurture the team were not always 
adequate (A) although some HRPs were better at this (E, P).  In one long-
standing HRP, the internal culture had developed to such an extent that it 
was self-sustaining and resisted external influence (J). 
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7.2.2.8 Intra-partner relationships 
Several HRPs suffered from dysfunctional relationships between different 
stakeholders within one or more of the partners.  This made it very difficult for 
relationships between the partners to be effective (C, D, F, M) 
7.2.2.9 Multiple related programmes 
In some cases HRP partners were involved together in several related 
programmes or initiatives in similar topic areas creating dependencies, 
managerial and technical overlaps and potentially conflicts (A, I, L).  
7.2.2.10 Loose consortium 
Whilst most HRPs had a relatively stable membership (A, B, C, D, E), others 
were more open and continued to add members over time (F, K, M) making 
management of a coherent whole more challenging. 
7.2.2.11 Expectations of transition 
Several HRPs had established expectations that the relationship would 
transition and grow, either through the involvement of additional partners or 
the attraction of other sources of funding.  One had achieved this (K).  Most 
did not have credible processes and suitable business models in place to 
make the transition happen (A, F, O).  In a couple of instances, the 
preparations seemed more promising but these were at an early stage and 
the effectiveness had yet to be demonstrated (M, P). 
7.2.3 Contracts, Controls and IPR 
7.2.3.1 Partners in name only 
Most HRPs were run in the spirit of partnership, but with a formal contract in 
place which established a customer/supplier relationship (D, E, F, G, M, P).  
One HRP was established under the umbrella of another organisation which 
had since disappeared.  It was felt that it could continue without a formal 
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agreement although this did affect the visibility at senior levels in the partner 
organisations (C).  Another HRP was established as a „true democracy‟ with 
partners voting on how shared funds would be spent (K). 
7.2.3.2 Complicated agreements 
Most HRPs had extensive and complicated contracts or agreements (A, B, E, 
F, H, M, N, P).  Agreements involving more than one government entity 
seemed to be particularly challenging (B, N, P). Several agreements had 
large numbers of signatories which made both change and exit difficult (B, F, 
M). Considerable effort went into the development of commercial and legal 
frameworks although there were questions as to whether the results of such 
careful negotiations would ever be needed (A, E). 
In contrast, one HRP ran on the basis of a lightweight, three-way contractual 
and financial structure but this caused difficulties as it gave the main 
stakeholder no control over spending (D).   Another was bilateral and „simple‟ 
(O).  A third HRP was formed and received funding months before any 
commercial negotiations took place (L).  The earliest HRP in the study had 
no formal agreement whatsoever (J).  Whilst this did not appear to be a 
problem for the HRP, it was a source of concern for commercial managers in 
the partner organisations. 
Strained relationships between commercial managers within the different 
partner organisations were not uncommon (E, F). 
7.2.3.3 Scale 
Several HRPs had scores if not hundreds of contracts in place to cover 
ongoing research (E, F, P).  Even with standard contracts this was a 
significant commercial burden.  Negotiation of standard contracts was also a 
significant effort in itself.  Management of the bidding process for research 
work was also a challenge.  The commercial, financial and project 
management effort required in these HRPs was significant and one HRP 
found the associated resources inadequate (F). 
Chapter Seven  Synthesis of Case Study Results 
[266] 
 
7.2.3.4 Reuse 
Several HRPs emphasised the reuse of management assets such as 
contracts, IPR agreements, reporting structures and financial planning 
models (E, F).  In one case these not only saved time in preparation, but also 
in negotiation between partners for whom agreement terms were already 
familiar (E).  In another, the lack of an adequate agreement led to significant 
rework which could have been avoided (F). 
7.2.3.5 Intellectual property rights 
One HRP implemented an IPR agreement which was seen as unfair and 
caused resentment (A).  Several HRPs noted the importance of fair 
agreements: one implemented separate IPR agreements for each project 
and ensured that there was a spread of participation (B).  Management of 
IPR for integration activities was a concern for one HRP (E); another one 
proactively tackled the issue of IPR leakage through academic publications 
by instigation an effective industrial review process (I). 
The balance between the IPR which was protected for HRP participants only, 
and that which was made openly available, was an issue for all HRPs.  It was 
unclear how such decisions were made in a structured and controlled and 
controlled way (L).   
7.2.3.6 Room for uncertainty 
Several HRPs felt that there was a need for flexibility in the programme to 
accommodate uncertainties in the research area and the need for 
understanding to develop through time.  One achieved this by establishing a 
very broad scope (P): others found themselves overly constrained (D, F). 
7.2.3.7 Risk Management 
In competitive HRP space, defining the risks was very important (B).  The 
lack of responsibility for risk management was noted as a weakness in one 
HRP (D). 
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7.2.3.8 Common processes 
Most HRPs operated some form of joint or common commercial and project 
management processes (A, E, F, M, P). 
7.2.3.9 Metrics 
Several HRPs used metrics to assess performance (A, D, F). There was a 
tendency to select simple, familiar metrics which were easy to collect rather 
than those which necessarily reflected the HRP‟s objectives (A, F).  There 
was a risk that metrics were a distraction and became the target in 
themselves rather than reflecting the success of the HRP (A). 
Others felt that after several years of operation the HRP had reached the 
point where key performance indicators may be useful, but these had not 
been implemented (C). 
7.2.3.10 Independent leadership 
Several HRPs had independent leaders in a variety of roles (A, E, F, K). One 
HRP had given its independent technical director the final authority over 
programme selection and the ability to terminate underperforming work (E).  
Similar authority existed within the management team of another HRP (P). 
7.2.4 Culture 
7.2.4.1 HRP Culture 
Even within individual HRPs there were a range of views about culture.  
Some felt that all HRP participants had similar cultures by virtue of their 
engineering, systems engineering or similar backgrounds and experience (A, 
C, E, J).  Others felt that the cultural differences between industry, academia 
and government were significant (A, F, G, P). Some HRPs suffered from the 
range of cultures within the participant organisations, including that in other 
functions such as commercial management, and particularly where the 
Chapter Seven  Synthesis of Case Study Results 
[268] 
 
dominant stakeholders changed over time, introducing different cultures (C, 
D, E, F, I, L).  Cultures in the HRPs evolved (B, G, M) and some HRPs 
developed their own culture (J, M).   
Several HRPs identified the need to change culture within their own 
organisations and those of their partners (D, G, F, I, P).  The academic 
culture of competition rather than collaboration was specifically highlighted as 
needing to be changed.   
7.2.4.2 Closed communities 
Several HRPs benefitted from building on existing relationships, but there 
was a risk that this alienated newcomers (D).  A mix of „old and new‟ was felt 
to be needed (E). 
7.2.5 Resources: People  
7.2.5.1 Individual leaders are key 
All HRPs, but especially those where competitors were involved, relied 
heavily on the quality of their leaders.  These individuals demonstrated 
leadership skills at several levels in the organisation.  Those who did a 
particularly effective job stood out for praise by their peers (B, C, E, G, P).  In 
others, the leadership team was commended for working well together (F, P).  
Other leaders were noted as less effective and this was seen as damaging to 
the HRP (A, D). 
7.2.5.2 Credibility is critical 
Whether in industry, academia or government, the credibility of key figures 
was critical.  For research leadership this implied technical credibility in all the 
partner organisations, with individuals needing sufficient technical 
competence to collaborate effectively with experts in the field and establish 
common ground (A, D, F, I, N, P).  Inexperienced or less competent staff 
were felt to reduce the potential for research exploitation (N).  In 
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management and strategic roles, individuals needed influence to bring 
resources to bear and the skills to facilitate collaboration (A, C, D, F, M).  
These skills were thought to be naturally developed through the typical 
career path of such individuals (E). 
7.2.5.3 Partnerships are between people, not organisations 
Several HRPs noted that although partnership agreements may exist at the 
organisational level, the true partnership operates – or not – between 
individuals (A, D, E, J, N, P).  Turnover of senior stakeholders had to be 
managed and relationships re-established (P). Turnover of individuals within 
the HRP and the introduction of inexperienced staff were disruptive in several 
HRPs (A, D, F), but managed in another as a route for staff development (M).  
Relationships often survived beyond the formal end of an HRP (D, N). 
7.2.5.4 Resources are scarce 
A number of HRPs struggled to adequately resource the partnership with the 
necessary skills and experience (A, B, D, E, F, H), particularly with UK 
nationals (E).  Many individuals had several part-time roles in different HRPs 
or similar programmes (C, E, F); some were simply „overloaded‟ (F). 
Several HRPs were specifically targeted at developing relevant skills in 
industry (A, M), academia (E, I, P) and government (F, M, P).   
7.2.5.5 Integrated programmes need different resources 
HRPs which sought to establish integrated research programmes needed 
both research skills and integration skills (E, I). 
7.2.5.6 Individuals may be disruptive 
Several HRPs singled out specific (different) individuals who had been 
disruptive and required a disproportionate amount of management attention 
(E, G.  In such cases it was felt that one such individual could be 
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accommodated, but more than one would be seriously detrimental to the 
programme. 
7.2.6 Resources: Funding 
7.2.6.1 Running on a shoestring 
Several HRPs were run on very low levels of overhead for management and 
integration (A, E, D, F, I, M).  Central funding (A), „Contribution in Kind‟ (E, F, 
M), investments by universities (D, I) and the goodwill of individuals meant 
that costs were kept artificially low and not sustainable in the long term.  This 
had a direct impact on the ability of the HRPs to become self-sustaining (A, 
F). 
7.2.6.2 Strategic vision must be funded 
Several HRPs were funded from research funds with little or no funding for 
other activities.  Objectives which went beyond research could not be funded 
(A, F, P). 
One HRP had to win research funding on a tactical basis which did not align 
with its strategic vision.  Delivery of the vision inevitably required some direct 
research funding (A). 
Funding was an enabler for the community (P), enabling research 
organisations to work with universities (E), but the relatively small scale of the 
investment limited the effectiveness of one HRP in respect of its broader 
ambitions (F). 
7.2.6.3 Innovative research needs long term funding  
Short term funding pressures affected the ability to conduct more innovative 
research in several HRPs (D, G, I).  Annual funding cycles prevented the 
instigation of certain types of research, e.g. PhDs (G). 
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7.2.6.4 Exploitation must be funded 
A number of HRPs were unable to exploit the research outputs due to lack of 
funding (C, E, F). A funding pathway for the research is necessary from initial 
idea right through to exploitation. 
7.2.6.5 Good leverage means shared influence 
Several HRPs traded off control of the HRP‟s programme for funding 
leverage from other partners (B, K).  This added complexity and delays to the 
programme. 
7.2.6.6 Sustainable HRPs need to grow 
Several HRPs had the objective to become partially or fully self-sustaining (A, 
F, K, M, O, P).  Some of these established a significant business 
development activity to support this (K, M, P). 
7.2.6.7 ‘Smorgasbord’ management 
Both companies and universities took income from a number of sources, 
including one or more HRPs, in order to construct an internal programme of 
related work (E, G). 
7.2.6.8 Programmes may be terminated or have funding breaks 
A number of HRPs had potential break-points in the programme at which 
funding could be terminated.  Whilst this happened in only one of the HRPs 
studied (D), the risk of losing funding drove behaviours in several others (E, 
F, I). One HRP suffered an interruption in funding between programme 
phases whilst the results of the previous phase were evaluated (B).  Most 
partners sustained a level of effort from internal funding during this hiatus to 
prevent the programme from collapsing. 
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7.2.7 Lifecycle 
7.2.7.1 Inspiration 
A number of HRPs were formed as a result of inspiration and conceptual 
agreement between senior figures in the partner organisations (A, D, F, L, O, 
P).  In a number of cases, the detailed planning and what was implemented 
were somewhat short of the original vision (A, D, F). 
7.2.7.2 Formation of team 
HRPs formed teams in different ways.  Some based the HRP on existing and 
proven relationships (A, G, I, L, N), even where these were with „known‟ 
competitors (B).  In one case, its success in winning funding was attributed to 
the fact that the HRP was already operational before the proposal was 
written (N). 
Others ran an open competition for the leadership (K, P): some selected 
most or all of the academic participants before defining the research 
programme (D, P).  Team selection had both technical and political drivers 
(B, E, P). 
7.2.7.3 No instant formula 
Several of the HRPs had a long gestation period, typically years, between 
concept and implementation (A, D, P).  Most HRPs then took 1-2 years to 
become established, build relationships, properly understand the problem 
space, implement processes and start to manage research at the expected 
scale (A, B, C, E, H, P).  For researchers, the initial focus was to establish 
fundamental research progress in their area of expertise (I). 
In a number of cases, detailed planning of the research programme was not 
done until after contract award, at which point there were significant time 
pressures and the programme creation seemed rushed (D, E). 
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7.2.7.4 Different time constants 
HRP partners had different time constants.  For academia this was several 
years, largely driven by the duration of a doctorate. For industry, yearly 
changes to budget and direction were not uncommon (A).  The timing of 
annual budgeting cycles was also different, with industry, academia and 
government each working to a different financial year.  Launching an HRP at 
the „wrong‟ time of year caused difficulties in academic recruitment (E). 
7.2.7.5 Continued evolution 
HRPs are complex evolving systems.  Membership, ways of working, 
technical emphasis, delivery focus, funding models and even mission 
statements can change through time (A, E, M, O).  However one HRP was 
unable to get support for a planned evolution from an initial capability to full 
capability (F). 
7.2.7.6 Fixed duration 
With only two exceptions (J, P), all the HRPs studied had a fixed duration 
after which they would terminate.  Most also had intermediate review points 
after 2-3 years (5 years for P) at which they could be terminated early if 
necessary.  Although some reviews focused on the need and whether or not 
the HRP was fulfilling that need (A, G, P), the remainder appeared to focus 
more on research content and progress. 
Despite the cost, effort and time delay of establishing an HRP and regardless 
of ambitions in a number of cases to establish a „centre of excellence‟ (A, E, 
F), there were no provisions for contract extension.  Funding cycles were felt 
to drive an artificial lifecycle for HRPs (E), and this was supported by the one 
unfunded HRP which had survived for over 30 years (J).  Rolling contracts 
were felt to be better suited to research in this environment (E, F). 
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7.2.7.7 Reviews are disruptive 
Although it was almost unknown for an HRP to be terminated early, a number 
of HRPs described the disruption to their planned programme caused by 
uncertainty and the need to „demonstrate success‟ in the run-up to a formal 
review (B, D, E, I, M).  Some HRPs redirected effort from fundamental 
research to demonstrations (D, I).  Another HRP found its interim review less 
distracting, but had confidence that the programme would continue (G). 
7.2.7.8 Risk management 
A number of HRPs implemented risk management processes during the bid 
cycle and during the establishment of the HRP (A).  However, emphasis on 
risk management reduced with time, with the exception that HRPs subject to 
interim reviews conducted risk mitigation in the run up to the reviews (M) 
7.2.8 Complexity 
7.2.8.1 Nature of work 
For several HRPs the research itself was complex: the technology was 
complex (N) or the variables and relationships were not well understood (A, 
C, E, F, P).  One HRP noted that the lack of understanding of the problem 
meant the complexity was underestimated (F). 
Several HRPs suffered from the fact that the research area was too esoteric 
and not close enough to product, making it difficult to achieve clarity of scope 
and priorities, and making research difficult to exploit (A, D, P).  Some 
tackled this directly by focusing on a particular application (E) or „Grand 
Challenges‟ (I). Exploitation was considered to be complex by some (F). 
7.2.8.2 Many stakeholders 
Most HRPs had many stakeholders: not only those with direct roles relating 
to the HRP such as funding stakeholders (B, E), but also those simply in 
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positions of influence in one of the partner organisations (A, C, E, F).  One 
HRP felt it was less complex, having only one customer stakeholder (I).  
Stakeholders were „stovepiped‟ (C) and changed over time. 
7.2.8.3 Technical and management structures 
Several HRPs devised complex structures to partition work in order to 
manage the scope, protect intellectual property, remove competition, 
distribute work or meet other requirements of the funding body or customer 
(B, D, E, F, P).  Some had several layers of contracts and managing the 
multiplicity of contractual relationships was complex (E, F, P). 
7.2.8.4 Complex, integrated processes 
Incompatibilities between the extant processes of partners meant that joint 
HRP processes were complex (A).  Aligning the funding from different bodies 
added financial complexity (B). 
7.2.8.5 Multiple related HRPs 
A number of partners participated in multiple related HRPs at the same time.  
Whilst this provided greater leverage for funding, the relationships between 
them were complex (A). 
7.2.9 The role of Systems Engineering 
7.2.9.1 Systems engineering used 
Although only one HRP was actually „systems engineered‟ in itself (A), 
several applied systems engineering to the research programme (B, E) or to 
the delivery of tasks (J).  One had applied systems engineering to the 
„existing, adaptive system‟ and considered structure, dynamics, relationships 
and the overall „systemic balance‟ (P).  Another HRP prided themselves on 
having taken a „whole system approach‟ to the problem domain being tackled 
(B).   
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Several HRPs used systems engineering processes and techniques (A, B, D, 
E).  These included developing an operational concept (B), requirements 
definition (B, D, G, N), requirements analysis (function & non-functional; 
viewpoint analysis), Quality Function Deployment, synthetic environments (A, 
E), modelling and operational analysis (E).  One HRP used trade-off studies 
on emerging concepts and would have like the resource to do more in order 
to guide the research programme (E).  Another identified the potential value 
of using systems techniques to monitor the HRP success over time (P). 
Roadmapping was specifically identified as a critical technique to express 
requirements, conduct gap analysis and plan exploitation across different 
HRP participants (C, P).  Conducting roadmapping as a community activity 
was felt to be very powerful (P). 
The quality and appropriateness of requirements varied.  One HRP found 
them particularly bad (D).  Another noted that access to the customer and 
user was inadequate to get a sound understanding of the requirements (E).  
A third noted the balance between needing requirements and over-specifying 
the solution, and the importance of alignment to business need (G).  This 
was consistent with the struggle to get researchers to understand the real 
problem (P). 
7.2.9.2 Systems thinking 
Several HRPs which did not use systems engineering processes felt that 
systems thinking was naturally applied to the HRP by those involved (C, J). 
HRPs used systems metaphors to describe the nature of the HRP (A, E, F) 
and to support logical thinking (E). 
7.2.9.3 System boundary  
One HRP felt that there was inadequate understanding of the overall problem 
domain: in effect the systems boundary had not encompassed important 
factors (A).  It was felt that the systems engineering had „failed‟ and the 
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solution had been devised before the problem was understood (A).  In 
several cases, critical dependencies were identified but not managed as part 
of the system (A, F); in others the organisation flaws were boundary issues 
(E).  Some HRPs failed to establish an agreed system boundary altogether 
(A, D). 
7.2.9.4 Early systems engineering 
One HRP felt that the early systems engineering was effective (A) but that 
there was a discontinuity between concept and implementation. 
7.2.9.5 Architecting 
One HRP identified requirements but failed to implement a robust 
architecture of people, processes, technology and control structures to meet 
them (A).  In another, the customer had already specified the architecture at 
the tender stage without reference to the necessary functionality, and this 
was found to be lacking in a number of areas (F).  Two HRPs deliberately 
architected the work programme to separate competing academic partners (I, 
N).  Another noted the importance of developing a robust architecture to 
provide long-term flexibility (P). 
7.2.9.6 Integration  
Although some HRPs felt that academic researchers would not typically be 
interested in integration and links within the programme (E), others 
deliberately placed that expectation upon them (G, P).  Some HRPs 
incorporated an „integration layer‟ to bring together all the programme 
elements as a coherent whole (B, N).  Integrated demonstrations played an 
important role in a number of HRPs (B, E, G).  One HRP used a top-down 
and bottom-up approach of vignettes, capability challenges and generic 
system concepts in order to achieve an integrated programme (E).  Another 
HRP found the unplanned integration of its diverse programme difficult (F). 
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7.2.9.7 Demonstration 
Several HRPs developed demonstrations to show off the maturity of their 
research (B, D, E, G, I).  These were planned in advance but some seemed 
to require additional unplanned effort which was diverted from other work (D).  
Proper planning and management of demonstrations by competent staff was 
seen as a key enabler: several HRPs chose to use experienced industry staff 
for this role (B, E), whilst others provided support for an academic lead (G, I). 
7.2.9.8 Methodological rigour 
Two HRPs expressed concern at the lack of methodological rigour with which 
systems engineering research data was collected and analysed (D, P).   
7.2.9.9 Review processes 
Most of the HRPs were subject to standard, systems engineering-based 
lifecycle review processes in one or more of the partner companies.   One 
HRP expressed concern that the scale of these reviews was out of proportion 
to the value of the HRP contract (F). 
7.2.10 Perceptions of Success 
7.2.10.1 Measures of success 
One HRP was considered „best in class‟ for collaboration and working 
together and attributed its success to its focused goal (B).  Another intended 
to judge success by the „quality of relationships‟ after five years (P).  
However, for most HRPs, the measures of success tended to focus on the 
delivery of the HRP‟s research programme (A, B, D, E, F, G, I, N, O). 
Metrics were used to manage a number of HRPs (A, B, E, F), although it was 
often not clear that target figures, even if they were achieved, equated to the 
achievement of the HRP objectives.  One HRP was considered successful 
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having delivered more benefit than promised in „all the different forms 
required‟ (B).  
7.2.10.2 Networking and relationships 
A number of HRPs considered the relationships and networks that were 
formed to be important in themselves (A, B, C, E, J, M, P), although one 
struggled to demonstrate more tangible results (C). 
7.2.10.3 Bigger political objective 
Most of the HRPs attracted a level of senior management attention which 
was out of proportion to the financial values involved (A, B, C, D, E, F, O).  
This seemed to reflect the fact that the HRPs had broader value in terms of 
intangibles such as relationships, IPR risk and future work.  Such „hidden‟ 
objectives were likely to have been influencing factors in the creation of 
HRPs but were typically not formal measures of their success.  Evidence 
suggests that such strategic drivers were unlikely to justify HRP survival 
unless the primary declared objective was also met.   
Several HRPs had aspirations to become a centre of excellence and a 
national asset (A, E, F, J, K, M, P).  At the time of writing only two felt this 
had been achieved (J, P), although others retained this aspiration. 
7.2.10.4 Academic publications 
HRPs generally delivered good numbers of academic publications and the 
quality was good (D, F, G).  Two HRPs deliberately facilitated the academic 
publication process (G, I).  One HRP won a number of awards (G). 
However, the unsuitability of the outputs from academic research for a wider 
audience was a common theme, and two HRPs specifically noted the 
inaccessibility of academic reports for government audiences (F, P).  This 
was a measure of dissatisfaction rather than of success. 
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7.2.10.5 Following fashion 
One HRP had been based around a problem context which was a „hot topic‟ 
when the HRP was conceived but ceased to attract as much attention by the 
time progress was reviewed a few years later (D).  This was cited as one of 
the reasons for early termination of the HRP.  
7.2.10.6 Fragile success 
Several HRPs had been unable or were unlikely to meet their full aspirations 
(A, E, F).  Having got most of the „basics‟ right, one HRP was trusted and had 
been given „the benefit of the doubt‟, but remained finely balanced between 
acceptable performance and „going badly wrong‟ (A). 
7.2.10.7 Articulating the benefits 
Several HRPs struggled to capture and measure (M) or articulate (A, D) the 
benefits of their existence.  This is, in systems engineering language, the 
validation of the HRP: not only delivering the elements of their research 
programme but making a difference. 
7.2.10.8 Exploitation 
For most HRPs the ultimate measure of success was the exploitation (B, C, 
D, E, F, G, I) or commercialisation (K) of the research.  Routes to exploitation 
were identified by several HRPs (B, G): others expressed frustration that the 
lack of planning (D) or funding (C, E) for such routes meant that research 
was „wasted‟. 
Ironically, successful HRPs were likely to lead to further funding of the 
research area, although this would often require the re-formation of the HRP, 
or the creation of a new one (B, G). 
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7.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, eighty more detailed „messages‟ were drawn from the 
research data across the case studies.  Whilst the ten themes were retained 
for traceability, they no longer added value, as practical issues crossed 
multiple themes.   
All sixteen case studies contributed to these messages.  The non-UK case 
study, P, was included in this analysis and did not stand out as facing 
particularly different issues.  This very limited sample suggests that these are 
not UK-specific issues, but rather a characteristic of the domain and the 
relationships therein. 
The research now moves forward to consider the implications:  
 first, the Implications for Theory are discussed in Chapter Eight, in 
terms of the body of literature reviewed in Chapters One to Four, and 
the models presented in Chapter Five;  
 second, the Implications for Practice are addressed in Chapter Nine. 
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8 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
8.1 Introduction 
Having drawn together common and contrasting messages from the research 
findings, Chapter Eight now reflects on the implications: in terms of the 
themes from the literature reviewed, the systems approach and models used, 
and the research methodology. 
8.2 Implications for themes from the literature 
Reflecting upon the experiences of the sixteen case studies in the context of 
the literature review in Chapter Four, the following observations were made: 
8.2.1 Traditional Systems Engineering 
8.2.1.1 Requirements 
Expressing objectives in terms of fashionable „buzzwords‟ gave the HRP a 
limited „shelf-life‟.  It is essential to get beneath popular expressions to 
understand what they really mean, and agree objectives at that level (Case 
Study D). 
Fundamental changes in requirements, i.e. those which were not technical 
but were political or organisational (perhaps resulting from the change of a 
key stakeholder), were not tracked through to implementation, but needed to 
be (Case Study F). 
8.2.1.2 Architecture 
In some cases the architecture of the research programme needed to protect 
a „no man‟s land‟ between research tasks to prevent friction between 
potential or actual „competitor-partners‟ (organisations working together 
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within the HRP but commonly competitors in other contexts) working on 
similar or related topics (Case Studies B & D).   
For an integrated research programme, work should be partitioned as far as 
possible with integration in mind.  This implies partitioning along logical lines 
which allow interfaces to be clearly articulated and specified, and where 
issues such as IPR can be explicitly addressed (Case Studies B & E). 
Where appropriate, the HRP was intended to grow.  It was necessary for the 
architecture to enable the function of growth alongside other functions.  This 
has structural and resource implications as well as affecting mindset and 
strategy (Case Study P). 
Harmony (per Boardman): the complete HRP architecture including structure, 
controls, contract etc should be in harmony with the objectives (Boardman 
2010) (Case Studies A, D, F). 
“Think about the end before the beginning” (the motto of Omega Alpha, the 
Systems Engineering honour society).  Identifying the scope of 
demonstrations can be used to define the problem space to be addressed by 
research (Case Study G). 
Integration, verification and validation are important for the research 
programme as a whole (Case Studies D and F). 
8.2.2 Systems Science 
The ability of the partners to perform in the culture of the HRP is impacted by 
their „home environment‟ culture: for example an organisation which is 
metrics-driven will struggle to judge and reward success without the 
achievement of metrics (Case Study A). 
Interviewee views on good or bad HRP characteristics varied widely, and as 
such the „success‟ of an HRP was difficult to judge.  Different partners may 
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have different „true measures‟ of success, even where the formal measures 
are agreed in advance (Case Study D). 
8.2.3 Technology Management 
Individuals within the HRP needed the skill and competence to derive 
research questions from business requirements.  This was non-trivial and 
required an understanding of both research and business. Decomposing the 
requirements too far constrained the potential solutions (Case Study D).  
It was important to know the skill base of people involved in the HRP, without 
going too far and allowing considerations of the „team‟ to dominate research 
direction.  An iterative process evolving both team and research topics 
seemed an ideal way to develop the research programme (Case Studies B, 
D, P). 
„Research exploitation‟ was an essential phase of the HRP lifecycle which 
needed to be planned as part of the programme.  Within a defence 
environment, careful selection of demonstrations enabled them to be 
acceptable to academics whilst enabling them to be read-across to other 
applications of industry or government interest (Case Study G).  
8.2.4 Project Management 
Some HRPs had an underlying function to win more funding, thus 
perpetuating the research programme whether or not the HRP continued 
over time (Case Studies A, F and P).  This business development function 
not only needed resourcing, but if successful would introduce further work to 
be managed within the programme. 
Different funding routes for HRPs meant that aligning funding and project 
control mechanisms was not trivial.  There was a need for the contract 
architecture to be robust (Case Study D) and to manage commitments and 
concessions made during project initiation (Case Study L).  
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The HRPs were subject to a balance between stability and change: what to 
one participant was „designed to change‟ was seen by another as „ongoing 
messing‟ (Case Study A).  There was a need for the project management 
function to accommodate and facilitate necessary change. 
HRPs were subject to different lifecycles: those of the HRPs themselves, and 
the lifecycles of each research area through from idea to exploitation. Project 
managers needed the ability to coordinate lifecycles without confusing them. 
The boundary between the „implementation‟ phase of the HRP lifecycle and 
its operational sustainment phase was typically fuzzy (Case Study E). 
Each partner had their own „environment‟, changes in which (such as a 
change in strategy or tactics which led to the redistribution of resources) 
could affect the HRP. The resultant transition or change in one of the HRP 
„partners‟ could have a huge impact on the other partners, especially if it was 
the customer / owner or leading partner who was affected (Case Study F). 
The principle of successful programmes resulting from „systems engineers 
and programme managers who are joined at the hip‟ applies equally to HRPs 
(Case Study E).  HRPs benefited from a combination of effective project 
management with strong, integrated technical leadership. 
8.2.5 Knowledge Management 
The concept of HRPs as a knowledge management mechanism did not come 
through strongly in the case studies, and management of knowledge within 
the HRPs varied.  In some HRPs, the same people were involved at both 
strategic and tactical levels.  Although good for communications this would 
risk distorting relationships, particularly at the tactical level (Case Study B). 
Those responsible for operating an HRP were often different to those who 
established it.  Tools and mechanisms such as Rich Pictures would be 
valuable to effectively communicate objectives and context (Case Studies A, 
E and F). 
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8.2.6 Management Science 
The issue of clear, shared objectives was important for a number of HRPs 
and it appeared that the strength of the common goal may have affected how 
much diversity the partnership could tolerate.  Drawing from Adair (Adair 
1983) it would appear that at least one of Task/Individual/Team drivers may 
be needed to motivate effective participation (Case Studies B & J). 
It was clear that different partners had different levels of involvement and 
commitment to the HRP, and that their degrees of motivation would therefore 
be different (Case Study F). 
One key characteristic of the HRP was the closeness of the partnership, 
which could be likened to the tensions & forces between the elements in a 
mechanical mass-spring system.  These provided forces for change to, and 
within, the HRP (Case Study C). 
HRPs needed leaders: both high level sponsors (for whom the HRP was only 
a tiny fraction of their responsibilities), and lower level programme managers 
who needed leadership qualities to succeed (Case Study D). 
Individuals in HRPs needed the credibility which came from power.  
Resource, position, expert and personal power were all legitimate and 
valuable power sources within HRPs (Case Studies A, B, C, D, E, G & P). 
Conflict was observed when the implementation of the HRP violated the 
norms in the partner organisations, particularly with regard to the „imposition‟ 
of tight project controls in academic environments (Case Studies D, E & I) 
HRPs were hard to establish and compromises had to be made – as if to 
overcome „static friction‟ in the partner organisations. However, once it was 
„moving‟, insufficient effort went into redirecting the HRP to its original intent 
(Case Study A). 
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8.3 Implications for Systems Models 
The models presented in Chapter Five have been reviewed and updated 
where necessary to reflect the learning from the case studies. 
8.3.1 HRP Lifecycle Model 
The generic HRP Lifecycle Model was found to be applicable across the case 
studies, and provided a common language for understanding the evolution of 
HRPs.  However, a common message was that the lifecycle was essentially 
artificial and driven largely by funding.  HRPs which existed independent of 
funding or which managed to secure additional funding from other sources 
were less susceptible to this lifecycle.  Figure 8.1 proposes a revised model 
in which the role of funding in the lifecycle is explicitly recognised.   
Transition
Termination
SustainmentImplementation
Creation
FUNDED 
LIFECYCLE
FUNDING
 
Figure 8.1   Revised HRP Lifecycle Model 
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The revision reflects the additional „input‟ of funding at the point of 
implementation, and the fact that when the „Funded Lifecycle‟ is complete the 
HRP must undergo transition or termination.  Although transition to a new 
operating model during the funded lifecycle is theoretically feasible, in 
practice this is likely to be constrained by the funding contract and any other 
agreements that are in place. 
8.3.2 Generic Conceptual Model 
It is clear from Chapter Seven that many themes run across HRPs, but also 
that there are many different perspectives on what constitutes success.  It is 
suggested that HRPs generically have multiple purposes applicable to them.  
Each one will have a greater or lesser emphasis depending upon the 
stakeholder, the particular „make-up‟ of the HRP, its technical domain and the 
point in the lifecycle.  Some will be stated explicitly, whilst others will only 
exist in the minds of the stakeholders. For example: 
 To undertake research 
 To develop academic capability 
 To develop industrial capability 
 To establish or maintain a network 
 To demonstrate „good citizenship‟ 
The revised generic conceptual HRP model is at Figure 8.2.   
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Figure 8.2   Revised Generic Conceptual Model 
 
The principle changes from Figure 5.2 are: 
 The addition of ten supporting functions during start-up, predominantly 
at start-up but continuing at a lower level through the programme, and 
throughout the programme. 
 The removal of promotion of the discipline, knowledge dissemination, 
education and training, and consultancy which do not form part of the 
objectives of most HRPs. 
 Changing the „Community of Practice‟ to the „research community‟. 
 The addition of research integration, demonstration, exploitation and 
publication to reflect the focus of most HRPs. 
 The addition of „demonstrating team-working‟ as a function for all 
organisations involved in the HRP. 
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The four coloured ellipses were used in the Pilot Study to indicate the 
interests of different stakeholder types.  In the revised model this has been 
refined to not only reflect interest but also potential involvement, with the 
foreground ellipse indicating the primary driver.  So, for example, integration 
and demonstration would typically be led at a corporate level by „high-tech‟ 
prime contractors familiar with systems integration, whereas publication will 
be dominated by universities.  The interest of government agencies in 
sustaining the partnerships has been de-emphasised and the focus has 
shifted towards exploitation.  This is particularly true of agencies and 
departments responsible for industry and defence and those responsible for 
supporting regional development. 
The generic model reflects the major purposes commonly exhibited by the 
HRPs studied.  It is therefore intended as a start point to consider the 
purposes of any given HRP, recognising that the specific purposes in any 
given instance may be more or less extensive than the model. 
8.3.3 Academic Motivation Model 
Evidence from the case studies reinforced the findings of the pilot study, in 
that the collaboration in those HRPs where the academic „survival‟ cycle was 
explicitly supported was perceived as more successful by all parties.  There 
were no changes to the model in Figure 5.3. 
8.3.4 Systems engineering approaches in defence  
Although the original model in Figure 5.4 suggested that „softer‟ systems 
methodologies are likely to be more applicable for complex enterprise-type 
problems, it was apparent from the case studies that where objectives and 
requirements can be agreed, the basic principles of traditional SE could be 
effective for certain elements of developing and maintaining HRPs.  Figure 
8.3 shows the revised model with the addition of shading between the two 
parabolas, indicating that even within the complex problem space on the 
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right-hand-side of the diagram there are some aspects which are fairly 
deterministic, and consequently susceptible to traditional hard systems 
approaches. 
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Figure 8.3   Revised Systems Engineering Approaches in Defence   
 
8.3.5 System of Systems Methodologies (SOSM) 
Evidence from the range of case studies suggests that HRPs are typically 
pluralist.  However, evidence from the pilot study indicated that SSM was 
unlikely to be acceptable as a working methodology for those involved in the 
development and operation of HRPs.  These two positions are in conflict if 
the SOSM model in Figure 5.5 is correct.  Resolution of the conflict may be 
achieved, not by changing the model, but by dividing the problem space 
between the creative establishment of the partnership, and the engineering of 
the HRP.   
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In establishing an effective partnership there is necessarily an activity by 
which a common understanding is achieved and shared objectives agreed.  
Often this is not done explicitly, if at all, and it may be done only at some later 
date when problems have emerged.  However, this is essentially a pluralistic 
activity for bringing together the views and needs of two or more partners, 
which is susceptible to SSM if done early enough, enabling participation in 
the process of debate around what is systematically desirable and politically 
or culturally feasible.   What is clear is that the potential for such debate is 
much greater in the formative stages of an HRP, reducing drastically once 
legal agreements are in place, and that subsequent intervention is likely to be 
resisted.   
Having established shared objectives and perhaps articulated a shared 
culture for the HRP, the use of hard systems thinking is appropriate for more 
deterministic problems.  Managing requirements, architecting both the 
organisation and research programme, and planning the integration, 
verification and validation of the work becomes a tractable problem which is 
essentially unitary.  It is believed that if the two activities are divided in this 
way, then the model remains valid. 
8.3.6 Conceptagon 
None of the case studies had applied systems engineering to the 
development and operation of HRPs to the point where it was possible to use 
the Conceptagon to assess completeness.  However, the need for a 
balanced approach to meet conflicting demands was apparent across the 
case studies. Consideration of the model in Figure 5.6 is likely to be useful in 
the planning, development and ongoing operation of HRPs.  There were no 
proposed changes to the model. 
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8.3.7 Action Centred Leadership 
Evidence from the case studies suggests that the Action Centred Leadership 
model is valid for HRPs, and that a balanced approach which considers the 
needs of task, team and individual is likely to be most effective for HRPs.  
There were no suggested changes to the model in Figure 5.7. 
8.4 Implications for Methodology  
8.4.1 Holistic Approach 
Although the three core „sub-systems‟ of the research (research context, 
systems theory and research methodology) have been treated separately, it 
is clear that the three are in fact highly interrelated as illustrated in Figure 8.4 
(Valerdi, Brown et al. 2010).   
Systems 
approach / 
theory
Research 
methodology
Problem
domain
drives 
selection 
of
produces 
results 
relevant 
to
determines choice of
 
Figure 8.4   Holistic research approach 
 
In adopting a holistic philosophy for any systems engineering research: 
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 the systems approach or theory should be consistent with the problem 
domain and context 
 the methodology should be philosophically consistent with the systems 
theory or approach, and 
 the research output should be relevant and useful in the problem 
domain. 
8.4.2 Issues of Transition and Incommensurability 
Although Jackson‟s SOSM goes some way to characterise problem contexts 
in terms of complexity and the heterogeneity of participants (Jackson 2003) 
and thus enables the selection of an appropriate systems approach, 
experience from the case studies suggests that this provides an incomplete 
solution.  Effective HRPs are those which succeed in transitioning from the 
pluralist to the unitary context, enabling the diverse participants to work 
together towards a common goal.  If research into HRPs is to remain 
consistent with the context, this implies a transition from an interpretive to a 
realist paradigm as the HRP becomes increasingly homogeneous.  Since the 
paradigms are incommensurable, such a transition would normally be 
considered impossible.  
If the transition between paradigms is to be resisted, then either an 
interpretive or realist philosophy must be maintained throughout.  Authors are 
clear that SSM cannot be used as intended within a realist paradigm 
(Checkland 1981; Jackson 2003).  A question remains over how and indeed 
whether hard systems engineering techniques can be used within an 
interpretive methodology.  This is a significant philosophical and practical 
issue which will not be resolved here, but should be the subject of further 
consideration and study as the systems engineering research discipline 
evolves.  
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9 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
9.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter Five, intervention in the normal sense was not possible 
in these case studies.  Instead, the decision was made to make provision for 
intervention in the HRP community through the development of guidelines for 
those developing, implementing and operating HRPs.  The intent is that 
these guidelines be used at a time which is convenient in HRP development, 
rather than at a time which was convenient to the author but would be 
disruptive to the HRP. 
Chapter Nine therefore provides 
 Ten principles related to the context, to assist in the understanding of the 
nature of HRPs. 
 Ten practices, for using systems theory in the establishment and operation 
of HRPs.   
For each principle and practice, the Chapter Seven „messages‟ from which 
they are derived are noted in parentheses. 
9.2 Ten Principles of HRPs 
9.2.1 Principle 1: Exploitation 
(See 7.2.1.11; 7.2.10.4; 7.2.10.8)  
Even when working at relatively low TRL levels, HRPs are fundamentally 
created for exploitation.  Exploitation may be into products and processes (for 
industry & government) or additions to the academic body of knowledge 
which then act as foundations for future work.  Most HRPs are likely to need 
both forms of exploitation.  Exploitation must be supported, planned and 
resourced. 
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9.2.2 Principle 2: Multiple Purposes 
(See 7.2.1.1; 7.2.1.3; 7.2.1.8; 7.2.10.1; 7.2.10.3) 
HRPs often have multiple purposes.  Clarity of goals, whatever they may be, 
is important.  The relative emphasis between different purposes may vary 
between different stakeholders and change with time.  Even where the 
stakeholders share a common objective, the benefits to each may be 
different.  
HRPs need to be capable of delivering all their purposes.  Even for a team 
responsible for delivering a research programme, teaming can be important 
in its own right: either to be seen as a „good citizen‟, to learn from peers and 
others in the supply chain, or to „take competitors off the street‟. 
HRPs sometimes have bigger political objectives which may not be 
articulated.  The presence of such „hidden‟ objectives may be indicated by a 
level of senior management effort and involvement which is out of proportion 
to the monetary value of the HRP. Reputation, future business and wider 
relationships may all be at stake.  However, although politics may launch an 
HRP, genuine understanding, agreement and tangible outputs are necessary 
to keep it afloat. 
9.2.3 Principle 3: Traceability ‘top-down’ 
(See 7.2.1.4; 7.2.3.9; 7.2.6.2; 7.2.7.1; 7.2.10.3; 7.2.10.6) 
For an HRP to be integrated, traceability from the vision to research 
programmes must be top-down not bottom-up, in order to ensure that what is 
implemented is consistent with the original vision.  Whilst an understanding of 
the possibilities is necessary to create the top-down picture, it is inadequate 
on its own.  It is relatively easy to suggest that research makes a 
„contribution‟ to solving a problem, but much harder to demonstrate that all 
the elements are in place for the problem to be solved.  Top-down traceability 
will help to identify objectives which are idealistic and unachievable, and 
ensure that all elements necessary to achieve the strategic intent are funded.  
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Performance measures must be developed in the same way to ensure that 
they truly indicate progress towards the HRP‟s objectives. 
9.2.4 Principle 4: Harmony 
(See 7.2.1.6; 7.2.3.1; 7.2.3.9) 
The business model must reflect the aim of the HRP and, since most HRPs 
are implemented through a contractual framework, commercial and legal 
arrangements must match its function and objectives.  Successful completion 
of the contract should equate to achieving the HRP‟s strategic objectives.  
Performance metrics should measure progress towards those objectives. 
Arrangements for both foreground and background IPR must be well-
informed and made in the context of exploitation strategy.  Relevant experts 
should be involved early before commitments are made and expectations 
set. 
9.2.5 Principle 5: Robust architecture 
(See 7.2.1.7; 7.2.2.6; 7.2.9.5) 
The HRP must be architected, and the HRP architecture must reflect its 
function.  It is not adequate to simply define requirements.  The architecture, 
which should address people, processes, technology and control structures, 
should be robust to changes in individuals within the HRP, in external 
stakeholders and in the environment. 
9.2.6 Principle 6: Balance 
(See 7.2.2.4; 7.2.2.5; 7.2.3.5; 7.2.4.2) 
HRPs must be balanced, but each one faces a large number of „balance‟ 
choices.  These choices should be made consciously rather than by default.   
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For example: 
Broad publication vs IP protection 
Publishing academic papers vs Exploitation on product 
Cheaper „temporary‟ academic 
resource 
vs Building long term academic 
capability 
New knowledge & innovation vs Application & delivery 
Funding research vs Funding other functions e.g. 
business development 
Advancing the knowledge vs Sharing the knowledge through 
teaching and consultancy 
Programme management vs Technical leadership 
Architecting for research depth 
and academic focus 
vs Architecting for application and 
industrial exploitation 
Top-down management control vs Leadership freedom to determine 
programme 
Partitioning (for sensitive issues, 
reduced overhead) 
vs Integration (for an integrated 
programme, better exploitation) 
Breadth & depth of coverage 
from lots of partners / 
universities 
vs Number of interfaces, interactions, 
communications 
Effort for contract development 
and refinement 
vs Risk if something goes wrong 
Financial leverage from 
additional industrial partners 
vs Programme control 
Known partners who get up-to-
speed quickly 
vs New partners who bring new 
thinking 
Short term delivery vs Major advances in knowledge 
Costs of developing integrated 
processes 
vs Costs of operating disparate 
processes and managing process 
interfaces 
Working with friends  vs Working with competitors to tackle 
major national issues. 
Task-driven, contractual 
„certainty‟ 
vs Flexibility to tackle uncertain 
problems 
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9.2.7 Principle 7: Not simply money 
(See 7.2.2.3; 7.2.2.9; 7.2.6.1; 7.2.6.3; 7.2.6.5; 7.2.6.7; 7.2.7.4; 7.2.8.5) 
HRPs seldom stand alone in the research environment.  HRP partners will 
often have involvement in several related programmes, creating 
dependencies, overlaps and potential conflicts which must be managed.  
Good leverage on a programme means involving partners who will add 
complexity, dilute control and potentially introduce delays. 
Customers differ in their desired levels of engagement and need to be 
treated appropriately. Budget rules and financial cycles have to be 
accommodated.  Launching at the wrong time of year will affect recruitment.  
Spending may be constrained within financial years and short term funding 
models may restrict the ability to undertake more innovative research. „What 
money can be spent on‟ may depend on exactly where it came from. 
HRPs typically run on artificially low overhead levels which are unsustainable 
in the long term. 
9.2.8 Principle 8: People and Culture  
(See 7.2.2.1; 7.2.2.2; 7.2.2.7; 7.2.4.1; 7.2.5.2; 7.2.5.3; 7.2.5.6; 7.2.7.2) 
Since HRPs rely so heavily on the active and willing involvement of 
participants, the leading organisations must be committed to everyone 
getting benefit, both in terms of meeting „survival‟ needs and gaining „reward‟.  
Organisations with a „prime contract‟ position within the HRP are responsible 
for ensuring its culture and leading by example.  Early changes in influential 
people are very disruptive to cultural stability and should be avoided 
wherever possible: repeated changes may mean that the culture is never 
established.  Investment in nurturing the team is unlikely to be wasted. 
Partnerships are defined by behaviours, not contracts.   
Individuals can be highly influential, and they must be credible in their 
respective field to be effective.  Disruptive individuals demand 
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disproportionate management attention and can damage the effectiveness of 
the HRP.   Each individual will have different views: effort is needed to 
challenge & test assumptions and to see that task, team and individual needs 
are met.   
Relationships are between people, not organisations.  They may be 
influential in the establishment of the HRP and will often out-live it.  However, 
the constraints on some individuals such as government employees must be 
respected.   The longevity of relationships is one possible measure of HRP 
success, 
9.2.9 Principle 9: HRP partners are heterogeneous 
(See 7.2.2.8) 
Organisations participating in Heterogeneous Research Partnerships are, 
themselves, often heterogeneous.  Stakeholders within the partner 
organisations can be diverse, dispersed, have different priorities and drivers.  
It is important to understand the robustness or fragility of each the partners‟ 
representation, and the extent to which one individual represents a „corporate 
voice‟.  It may be valuable to understand stakeholder „maturity‟, in terms of 
commitment to the HRP and ability to coordinate internally.  Dysfunctional 
relationships within a partner organisation can make it difficult for 
relationships between the partners to be effective. 
9.2.10 Principle 10: Evolution 
(See 7.2.2.10; 7.2.2.11; 7.2.6.6; 7.2.6.8; 7.2.7.3; 7.2.7.5; 7.2.7.6; 7.2.10.8) 
HRPs do not stay the same.  They have a lifecycle and the world changes 
around them.  Those that are too sensitive to their environment will perish.  
The strongest HRPs evolve and thrive. Evolution may involve new partners, 
new funding routes, new technical emphasis or new ways of working, and the 
transition may be largely unfunded. 
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The establishment of an HRP comes at a high price in terms of money, 
resources and time.  Many take years from conception to birth and may exist 
for only a few years.  This is hugely wasteful of both time and effort, when 
provision could be made for successful HRPs to survive, evolve and grow.  
However, establishing a long term HRP requires a different mindset.  
Expectations of transition and growth must be planned and resourced, and 
treated like any other objective of the HRP. 
9.3 Ten Practices for HRPs 
Whilst there is no assumption that HRPs are systemic, evidence from the 
case studies suggests that they would benefit from the application of holistic 
thinking and systematic processes. 
9.3.1 Practice 1: Establish HRP system boundary 
(See 7.2.1.2; 7.2.1.13; 7.2.9.2; 7.2.9.3) 
The HRP system boundary is unlikely to coincide with existing organisation 
boundaries but must be established early, and both technical and 
organisational scope defined.  Any lack of clarity or difference in opinion or 
interpretation needs to be addressed, and any deliberate ambiguity 
understood and managed.  External dependencies must be identified and 
monitored.  Heavy dependencies on external factors can be a recipe for 
failure. Internal dependencies must be managed as part of the HRP.  
Boundary issues are a common cause of problems within HRPs.  Even 
where systems engineering processes are not considered appropriate, 
systems thinking is a valuable aid in the development of HRPs - and nowhere 
more so than in establishing HRP scope. 
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9.3.2 Practice 2: Determine HRP functionality 
(See 7.2.1.3; 7.2.1.5; 7.2.9.1) 
By definition, HRPs involve research.  However, HRP requirements may be 
much broader and/or deeper.  The HRP may intend to conduct research, or 
just manage or coordinate it.  Other functions may include programme 
management; capability development in industry, government or academia; 
teaching or training; and business development in order to grow.  All the 
expected functions of the HRP, including the support functions necessary 
simply to sustain itself, need to be identified.  Where stakeholders have 
different objectives or needs, these should all be reflected in the overall 
functionality 
9.3.3 Practice 3: Architect the HRP and research programme 
(See 7.2.1.9; 7.2.2.4; 7.2.3.3; 7.2.3.8; 7.2.7.4; 7.2.8.3; 7.2.8.4; 7.2.9.4) 
Determine the architecture to deliver the functionality.   Architect the intent - 
to meet ALL the requirements, not just those of the „customer‟ or lead 
organisation, and not just those relating to research.  Determine the „best‟ 
research partitioning and integration given the particular set of political, 
organisational and technical factors.  Make external dependencies explicit 
and plan for them.  Define the interfaces to the outside world.  If the intent is 
for integration and joint work, enable them.  Partition work where necessary 
to avoid competitive issues between partners.   Include and fund integration, 
demonstrations and joint publications in the agreement and the work 
breakdown structure.  
Establish common processes where necessary and identify and resolve 
incompatibilities between partners‟ extant processes where these are 
adequate.  Recognise difference in annual and multi-year cycles between 
partners from different sectors.  Acknowledge and plan for the scale of the 
HRP.  An HRP with hundreds of contracts faces different architectural 
challenges than one with only few. 
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9.3.4 Practice 4: Standardise and Reuse 
(See 7.2.3.4) 
Start with a standard contract and only modify where essential. Re-use IPR 
agreements, reporting structures and financial planning models.  Use „use 
cases‟ to explain the vision and how the HRP is intended to work to those 
establishing its legal and financial framework.  HRPs are expensive to 
establish, operate on low management overheads and are relatively short-
lived.  Where necessary, invest wisely in their commercial infrastructure. 
9.3.5 Practice 5: Plan Integration, Verification & Validation  
(See 7.2.1.10; 7.2.5.5; 7.2.9.6; 7.2.9.8; 7.2.10.7) 
Plan integration, verification and validation from the start: integrating and 
„proving‟ a research programme retrospectively can be very difficult.  This 
applies to validation of all the HRP‟s outputs including, for example, best 
practice guides and demonstrations.  Determine what is necessary to 
convince stakeholders of success and who the „approval authority‟ will be.  
Be prepared to meet both academic needs for rigour and industrial needs for 
applicability. A programme which is hard to define in simple, unambiguous 
terms will always be hard to „sell‟.  Resource appropriately: integrated 
programmes need individuals with integration skills.   
9.3.6 Practice 6: Demonstration and exploitation 
(See 7.2.1.11; 7.2.1.12; 7.2.6.4; 7.2.9.1; 7.2.9.7; 7.2.10.4) 
Roadmapping is a key tool, both at an individual project level and across the 
HRP.  Plan for quick wins on the road to long term capability, since both are 
important.  Plan to demonstrate research outcomes from the start.  Fund and 
resource the planning as well as the demonstration.   Plan exploitation of the 
demonstration through academic publications.  Plan and secure funding for 
longer term exploitation.  Responsibility for exploitation must sit at the highest 
level in the HRP and inevitably be managed across the HRP boundary. 
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Plan to exploit the HRP itself.  It represents a significant investment of time, 
effort and money in building relationships and intellectual capital.  Challenge 
the assumption that the HRP will terminate.  Without losing focus by creating 
an open-ended programme, consider what could be achieved by extending it 
and avoiding the re-start costs and delayed start of a new programme. 
9.3.7 Practice 7: Manage risk, manage stakeholders, through life 
(7.2.2.2; 7.2.3.2; 7.2.3.7; 7.2.7.7; 7.2.7.8; 7.2.8.2; 7.2.9.9; 7.2.10.5) 
Assign responsibilities within the HRP‟s leadership team and manage risk at 
a strategic level through life, to address topics such as HRP resourcing, 
funding, stakeholder change, review and termination.  Where HRPs involve 
competitors, risk management is all-the-more important.  In other cases 
commercial agreements and review processes should be proportionate to 
risk and should not add an unjustified financial burden to the partners or the 
programme. Both contractual negotiations and programme reviews are 
sources of stress and disruption to the HRP: such disruption should be as 
much as necessary, but no more. 
Key stakeholders are a primary source of complexity and risk: not only those 
with roles relating to the HRP, but also those in other positions of influence.  
Managing them requires more than just maintaining a list.  Understanding 
them, how they are changing and what matters to them is critical to HRP risk 
management.  Avoid following the latest fashion, even when there is high 
level sponsorship, unless the work is expected to complete is a relatively 
short timeframe.  There is a particular need to understand Government 
stakeholders: their role in the HRP, in influencing more widely, their access to 
data and ability to share it.   
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9.3.8 Practice 8: Leave space to manage uncertainty 
(7.2.3.6; 7.2.8.1) 
In the systems domain, the System Readiness Level (SRL) matters.  High 
TRL technologies integrated in a new problem space are no longer „close to 
market‟.  It is important to leave flexibility in the programme to manage the 
uncertainty in „systems space‟.  The problems are complex, relationships are 
complex: solutions are also likely to be complex and not fully understood at 
the outset. In complex, poorly-defined research areas significant effort may 
be needed to converge on research goals in order to be able to justify the 
value of the programme and demonstrate benefit to the stakeholders. 
9.3.9 Practice 9: Use leaders, grow leaders 
(7.2.3.10; 7.2.5.1; 7.2.5.2) 
HRPs are difficult and complex to lead and manage.  To be successful they 
need good leaders at a number of levels.  Leaders must be able to cope with 
technical, organisational and political complexity and take unpopular actions 
such as terminating poor work.  Good people lower in the HRP hierarchy will 
grow to be future programme directors or members of a strategy board and 
should be nurtured accordingly. 
The maturity of the HRP‟s research topic helps to determine the skill 
requirement.  Mature technology research needs to be led by a technical 
expert capable of engaging at a deep technical level and understanding the 
technical progress being made.  Poorly defined, innovative research needs a 
creative but credible team player capable of motivating and coordinating a 
diverse community and getting them to converge on effective solutions. 
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9.3.10 Practice 10: Grow the community 
(7.2.5.4; 7.2.6.2) 
HRPs are typically established in discipline and domain areas where skills 
are not ubiquitous.  Many HRPs struggle to resource their programmes from 
both academia and industry.  Individuals may be overloaded with part-time 
roles in several HRPs. Growing the community should be a deliberate, 
planned and integrated part of the HRP.  Technology, integration and 
partnership skills can be developed in academia, industry and government.  
To be effective this should be architected as part of the programme and 
funded accordingly. 
9.4 Opportunities for Intervention 
The original intention described in Chapter Three was to undertake this 
research following an Action Research methodology which would, by 
definition, have involved intervention in the problem domain.  Although such 
a methodology was not feasible, the principles and practices described 
herein do offer the community of HRPs (both existing and planned) an 
opportunity to review and improve their approach based on lessons learned 
from others. 
Within industry, where the approach to establishing HRPs is typically most 
structured, the Principles and Practices should be embedded within guidance 
for those establishing and operating HRPs and within formal programme 
review checklists, thus providing a ready reference for those with, and 
without, previous experience in this area.  Since the heterogeneity of 
organisations in both government and academia is likely to make such a 
formal approach more difficult, the guidance should be shared freely with 
those sectors.  This will aid the development of a broad, mutual 
understanding between the sectors which can only be of benefit to both 
current and future HRPs. 
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10 ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE WORK 
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two, the set of functions for this research were derived from the 
research requirements that had been identified.  Table 10.1 below shows 
how and where the research has addressed these functions. 
Table 10.1 Requirements Validation 
Research Function Validation Method See:  
Understand HRP context and operation Literature Review Ch. 1 
Link HRP context and operation to 
systems techniques 
Case Studies Ch. 5,6,7 
Understand HRP lifecycle and link to 
systems techniques 
Case Studies Ch. 5,6,7 
Create / interpret new knowledge Case Studies Ch. 7,8,9 
Systematically acquire / understand 
knowledge 
Literature Review +       
Case Studies + 
Modules 
Ch. 1,3,4 
Understand boundaries of SE discipline Literature Review Ch. 4 
Extend the SE discipline Case Studies Ch. 8,9 
Identify potential systems techniques Literature Review                 Ch. 3, 4 
Develop SE techniques for SoS Case Studies Ch. 8,9 
Develop SE techniques for humans in 
the system 
Case Studies Ch. 8,9 
Apply SE to research design and content Pilot Study +                  
Case Studies 
Ch. 3, 5 
Design research  Pilot Study +                  
Case Studies 
Ch. 3, 5 
Design research to give initial insight 
beyond UK 
Case Study Selection  Ch. 5 
Understand research techniques Literature Review + 
Course Module 
Ch. 4 
Match research output to business need  Principle & Practices Ch. 9 
Publish research Published Papers App. 2 
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In Chapter Three, it was identified that there were three distinct but 
interrelated research subsystems, reflecting the three perspectives of the 
problem context, systems approach and research methodology.  Chapter 
Ten first addresses the limitations of the methodology employed and then 
returns to this framework as it draws together the conclusions of the research 
in terms of both achievements and future work, and then considers the wider 
implications for SoS. 
10.2 Review of Research Methodology Employed 
10.2.1 Sample constraints and limitations 
The decision was made to limit the sample of UK case studies to those in the 
defence domain, and involving the sponsoring company.  Although this 
limited the breadth of HRPs that could be studied and thus the scope of 
direct applicability of the research findings, it provided the significant benefit 
of increasing the consistency of the data, both in terms of the typical 
terminology used, and in avoiding any potential data sensitivity or competition 
issues between interviewees. 
10.2.2 Data collection and analysis 
Whilst the intent was to maintain an interpretive philosophy throughout, the 
research methodology became a compromise between the need to collect 
interpretive data and the need to deliver an output of value to the research 
sponsor: in this case, the Principles and Practices.   
Extraction and translation of the data from interviews and other sources was 
carried out manually in order to identify similarities and differences in words 
and meaning which would not have been identified by a computer.  In fact, 
the identification of themes was in large part attributable to the author‟s 
significant experience both in the sponsoring company and working in this 
domain.  Whilst this was not as rigorous or repeatable as „automatic‟ 
computer-based methods, it enabled a much more coherent picture to be 
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formed.  Ultimately, the conclusions are largely insensitive to the intermediate 
analysis steps and will be tested - not by academic measures of validity - but 
by usage in the HRP community. 
10.3 Heterogeneous Research Partnerships 
10.3.1 Achievements 
HRPs are a fairly common instantiation of a predominantly social SoS, but 
one which is poorly represented in the literature.  Each year, significant sums 
of money and levels of effort are invested in collaborative research delivered 
through HRPs: however, for them to be acclaimed as an unmitigated success 
is rare.  This research has not only provided a better understanding of the 
domain by exploring and characterising HRPs, but has presented principles 
and practices to enable those involved in their development and operation to 
be more effective in their collaborative endeavours.  There is an indication, 
on the basis of one case study, that these principles and practices may also 
be of value outside the UK. 
10.3.2 Further research 
This research has taken a holistic, high-level view of the specific context of 
HRPs.  There is scope for research at a more detailed level which might 
consider: 
 Different structures for the HRP organisation and research programme, in 
terms of both their effectiveness and the process by which they are 
derived as part of the HRP implementation. 
 The impact of different management and leadership styles within HRPs, 
which may also consider how appropriate leaders are developed. 
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 The extent to which investment in integration (including management, 
coordination, joint publications, demonstration and reporting) of the 
research programme across an HRP delivers tangible benefits. 
 Whether intensive preparation for interim reviews, which is not uncommon 
but is viewed as highly disruptive to the research programme, actually 
makes a difference to the review outcome. 
 The possibility of reducing the annual cost to the community of 
establishing HRPs by adopting longer-term programmes without 
relinquishing control of purpose or quality. 
 Whether a generic standard HRP contract (or suite of possible contracts) 
could be developed collaboratively by the community in order to 
significantly reduce the commercial burden of establishing new HRPs. 
Additionally, the context of the research could be expanded to explore: 
 Whether the principles and practices identified are equally applicable to 
other settings such as non-defence industry; commercial organisations; 
non-governmental organisations; and multi-national partnerships in both 
culturally similar (e.g. „western‟) and culturally-diverse (e.g. global) 
situations. 
 How „shared purpose‟ might be established within heterogeneous 
partnerships and how this could be developed as a fundamental systems 
engineering concept for human-centric systems.   
 The relevance and value of concepts such as „open systems‟ and 
„systems of systems‟ as mechanisms to identify inherently uncertain 
system problems, and to enable the development and application of 
systems approaches which are well suited to this class of problem.  
 What learning processes operate within HRPs, and in particular how 
individuals and organisations develop the competence to enable them to 
contribute effectively as HRP participants. 
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10.4 Systems Engineering 
10.4.1 Achievements 
The focus of this research was on the application of systems engineering and 
not on systems engineering per se.  It has enabled the development and 
refinement of a number of generic models to assist in the establishment and 
operation of HRPs. Furthermore, it has explored the issues associated with 
addressing both unitary and pluralist aspects of the problem domain and the 
challenges that this presents in the adoption of an appropriate systems 
approach which crosses the boundary between „hard‟ and „soft‟ systems. 
The principles and practices developed bear a striking similarity to the 
systems engineering principles identified in “Creating Systems That Work” 
(Elliott, Deasley 2007).  In particular, both emphasise the importance of 
designing and managing balanced commercial, contractual and personal 
relationships alongside technological issues, and note that failures often 
occur at artificially-imposed boundaries where conflicts may exist between 
the different perspectives.  However, Creating Systems That Work does not 
explicitly tackle the issues of inherent uncertainty and complexity which 
characterise both HRPs themselves, and a number of the research findings: 
 Although Creating Systems That Work recognises the existence of 
multiple stakeholders, it assumes that a single, articulated and well-
understood purpose can be „debated, defined, revised and pursued‟ for 
the system and that individual perspectives must be „managed and 
consistent‟.  This research notes that for HRPs, there may be multiple 
intended and equally valid purposes even within each partner 
organisation.   This research challenges current systems engineering 
practices to improve the ability to establish and maintain agreed shared 
purposes in such pluralistic environments.   
 Creating Systems That Work focuses on technical systems with defined 
and bounded scope.  However, HRPs have been found to exhibit 
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characteristics (e.g. senior management involvement) which belie their 
monetary worth: in effect they may be likened to an iceberg in which only 
a small proportion of both the requirements and costs are visible.  
Success of HRPs is often measured by factors completely outside their 
control, such as their ability to deliver research which is subsequently 
exploited.   However, good HRP design demands that expectations which 
may never be articulated be accommodated, and that invisible costs are 
nonetheless prevented from spiralling out of control.  The ability to do this 
requires domain experience in organisational systems, much as Creating 
Systems That Work notes that other systems engineers need domain 
experience in the design of technical systems.  The principles and 
practices identified herein aim to recognise this domain of organisational 
systems and capture some principle elements of domain expertise. 
 Creating Systems That Work notes that investing in people is part of 
system development, suggesting that „people requirements‟ are part of 
the system requirements.  However, the transient and evolving nature of 
HRPs demands that an „open system‟ approach be taken, focusing on the 
admittedly undefined and uncertain need for overall capability in the 
community rather than limiting the consideration to current contracts. 
10.4.2 Further work 
This research has highlighted a particular issue facing the systems 
engineering of SoS with significant social aspects, namely the need to 
transition between those systems methodologies better suited to social 
issues and those better suited to hard systems problems.  It is far from clear 
that soft systems approaches can properly embrace hard systems 
engineering techniques for „sub-problems‟ which are deterministic by virtue of 
their limited scope or duration, for example.  There is significant scope for 
work at this boundary to develop both methodologies and specific techniques 
which would support practitioners working with this class of problem. 
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10.5 Research Methodology 
10.5.1 Achievements 
In order to be effective, systems engineering research must integrate 
systems engineering with a range of research traditions and paradigms to 
create outcomes which meet a purpose. This research identified the 
importance of consistency between problem domain, systems approach and 
research methodology in order for the research to be philosophically valid 
and the purpose to be met.  It contributes to the limited body of 
methodologically-explicit systems engineering research by adopting an 
interpretive methodology using qualitative methods. 
10.5.2 Further Work 
One of the significant challenges facing systems engineering research is the 
lack of a methodological body of knowledge for the discipline, from which 
students and researchers can draw in order to inform their work.  It is unclear 
whether this shortfall reflects a lack of rigour in the research itself, or simply a 
cultural norm that the reporting of research methodology is unimportant for a 
practitioner discipline. In either case, the paucity of methodological literature 
for systems engineering research is felt to be harmful for the academic 
discipline, as illustrated in Figure 10.1 (Brown 2009).   In a research 
discipline dominated by industry funding and practitioner researchers, 
deliberate effort is required to address issues of methodology and ensure 
that this body of knowledge is developed.  
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Figure 10.1   Methodological Rigour in Systems Engineering Research 
 
Whilst methodological rigour will generally benefit the discipline of systems 
engineering research, this research has also identified a specific problem 
which is related to the need to transition between interpretive and realist 
methodologies to address the different aspects of system of systems 
problems.  This is a fundamental philosophical issue for the academic 
community of systems engineering researchers to address. 
10.6 Wider implications for systems of systems 
The aim of this research was to explore potential systems engineering 
approaches to the human and social aspects of those SoS where these are 
significant factors, by focusing on the specific context of HRPs.  The work 
cannot be considered transferable to all such „social‟ SoS, since 
homogeneous SoS (where values, beliefs, culture and doctrine are common) 
will face fewer challenges in agreeing objectives and working towards a 
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shared goal.  For other heterogeneous SoS, however, there are lessons 
which can be learned from this work which may be of value.  In particular, the 
ability to implement the systems approaches necessary to expose critical 
issues for „pluralist‟ or heterogeneous problems may be constrained by 
contractual agreements, operating norms and political sensitivities.  Such 
constraints make it incumbent on the customer or lead organisation to initiate 
this exploration of issues and purposes at the earliest possible opportunity in 
SoS development, and to ensure that the outcomes are embedded in the 
formal contractual and organisational structures as these are defined.  By so 
doing, they will enable a significant advance in an area of SoS engineering 
which, thus far, has been largely overlooked. 
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systems 
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G UK 
Government 
Leading SyEs 
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international 
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government-
sponsored 
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leads to 
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systems 
engineers 
Establish and 
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Practice 
By 
Providing a 
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will provide 
enhanced 
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I University 
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from around 
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potentially 
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consultancy  
By 
Establishing and 
marketing a 
consultancy 
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problems and 
growing the 
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reputation. 
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There is a 
market for 
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will underpin 
other 
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business 
model; the 
HRP can 
attract 
suitable 
consultants. 
J Partners Partners staff Engage partners 
in joint research 
By 
Facilitating an 
understanding of 
shared interests 
and a cooperative 
approach to 
research 
Partners Joint 
research will 
be of 
greater 
benefit to 
the partners 
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 Owned by 
(O) 
Operated by 
(A) 
To (T) For (C) W 
(worldview) 
K The 
partners 
Industrial 
partners‟ staff 
and academic 
staff 
Attract and direct 
external funding 
By 
Developing 
research to match 
funding 
opportunities. 
Company 
and 
University 
partners 
Targeted 
research 
bidding can 
be used to 
control 
funding 
streams 
L The 
partners 
Leading SyEs 
from Industrial 
partners and 
University 
partner.  
Advance the 
State of the Art in 
areas of SyE 
By 
Understanding 
the state of the 
art in selected 
areas, targeting 
research at high-
value problems 
and delivering 
results. 
The partners The 
partners will 
accept 
some 
latitude in 
research 
programme
s in order to 
make 
significant 
breakthroug
hs. 
M The 
partners 
Partners‟ staff Grow the 
reputation of HRP 
partners  
By 
Being highly 
visible and 
delivering world 
class research 
(&/or education, 
knowledge 
transfer) in high 
profile areas 
The partners Visibility of 
world-class 
research, 
education, 
etc will have 
a positive 
effect on the 
reputations 
of the 
partners. 
N 
 
The 
partners 
Industrial 
partners‟ staff 
and academic 
staff 
Develop 
partners‟staff  
By 
Exposure to 
research and 
teaching in an 
academic 
environment 
Individual 
development 
of the 
partners staff 
Exposure to 
the HRP 
environment 
is beneficial 
for 
developmen
t. 
O The 
industrial 
partners 
Industrial 
partners‟ staff 
and academic 
staff 
Leverage other 
research 
By 
Conducting 
technology watch 
in agreed 
leverage areas 
The partners Greatest 
and most 
cost-
effective 
advances in 
SyE 
research will 
be made by 
building on 
existing 
work. 
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 Owned by 
(O) 
Operated by 
(A) 
To (T) For (C) W 
(worldview) 
P University 
Partner 
Industrial 
partners‟ staff 
and academic 
staff 
Provide a test 
bed for SyE tools 
and processes 
By 
Establishing a 
funded test bed 
programme with 
agreed scope and 
objectives, 
delivering piloted 
tools and 
processes. 
Partners A 
permanent 
test bed 
facility is a 
critical 
resource for 
systems 
engineering 
research 
and will 
enable a 
wide range 
of problems 
to be 
tackled 
quickly, 
efficiently 
and cost-
effectively. 
Q Partners Industrial 
partners‟ staff 
and academic 
staff 
Promote systems 
engineering 
By 
Agreeing 
promotion 
objectives and 
actions, securing 
funding and 
resources, 
delivering results. 
Society 
(employers, 
potential 
systems 
engineers, 
users of 
engineered 
goods & 
services) 
Systems 
Engineering 
is 
fundamental
ly “good” but 
is under-
represented 
in 
education, 
research 
and the 
workforce at 
large. 
R Partners Industrial 
partners‟ staff 
and academic 
staff 
Disseminate SyE 
knowledge  
By 
Agreeing 
dissemination 
objectives and 
actions, securing 
funding and 
resources, 
delivering results. 
Systems 
engineering 
society at 
large 
Sharing of 
systems 
engineering 
best 
practice 
among both 
partners 
and 
competitors 
strengthens 
the 
discipline 
overall. 
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 Owned by 
(O) 
Operated by 
(A) 
To (T) For (C) W 
(worldview) 
S Partners‟ 
senior 
managemen
t 
Industrial 
partners‟ and 
academic 
senior staff 
Sustain the HRP 
By 
Agreeing 
sustainment 
objectives and 
actions, securing 
funding and 
resources, 
delivering results. 
Partners Independent 
of its 
outputs, the 
existence of 
the HRP as 
a 
partnership 
is, in itself, a 
good thing 
for the 
partners 
and the 
HRP should 
therefore be 
sustained. 
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The following conference papers were published by the author during the 
period of doctoral research: 
BROWN, S.F., 2007. The application of systems engineering to the 
management of nationally-important research in a multi-enterprise context. 
STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, In: Conference on Systems 
Engineering Research 2007, CSER 2007. 
BROWN, S.F., 2008. Enhancing the Partnership through SSM, 6th 
Conference on Systems Engineering Research, 4th-5th April 2008, CSER 
2008. 
BROWN, S.F., 2009. Naivety in Systems Engineering Research: are we 
putting the methodological cart before the philosophical horse? 7th 
Conference on Systems Engineering Research, 20-23 April 2009, 
Loughborough University. 
BROWN, S.F. and RAGSDELL, G., 2009. Systems Engineering meets 
Knowledge Management: Introducing a 'System of Knowledge Management 
Approaches', INCOSE 2009: 19th International Symposium, 20-23 July 2009, 
International Council on Systems Engineering. 
DIXON, K., BROWN, S.F. and KEIRL, J., 2007. Integrating the Intelligent 
Enterprise, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
(INCOSE), In: INCOSE 2007, 24 - 28 June 2007, International Council on 
Systems Engineering. 
VALERDI, R., BROWN, S.F. and MULLER, G., 2010. Towards a framework 
of research methodology choices in Systems Engineering, STEVENS 
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, In: Conference on Systems Engineering 
Research, 17-19 March 2010, CSER 2010. 
The following figure illustrates their role in the evolution of the research. 
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